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
PROFESSOR MILTON A. BUCHANAN

OF THE

DEPARTMENT OF ITALIAN AND SPANISH

1906-1946









**LETTERS**  
**ON THE**  
**INTERNAL POLITICAL**  
**STATE OF SPAIN,**

**DURING THE YEARS 1821, 22, & 23.**

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**LETTERS**

ON THE

**INTERNAL POLITICAL**

**STATE OF SPAIN,**

DURING THE YEARS 1821, 22, & 23;

EXTRACTED FROM THE

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE OF THE AUTHOR,

AND FOUNDED UPON AUTHENTIC DOCUMENTS;

NOW PUBLISHED FOR THE FIRST TIME.

By G. G. D. V.

AUTHOR OF SEVERAL HISTORICAL, POLITICAL, AND MILITARY WORKS.

Translated from the original *French Manuscript.*

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SECOND EDITION.

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# THE HISTORY OF

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## INTRODUCTION.



IN the publication of this small work, the author has been induced to adopt the epistolary form, as best calculated to shew the gradual progress of the events which took place in Spain during the last three years, and the successive causes by which they were produced. Had he consulted his own inclination, he, no doubt, would have chosen a different form, as he has done, in the works hitherto published by him. The epistolary style is, perhaps, not the garb best suited to his thoughts; but he has of necessity yielded to considerations of higher importance.

After the catastrophe of Italy, the Spanish revolution, already tottering under the unsteady guidance of the cortes, and of the ministry chiefly composed of the legislators of 1812, experienced repeated attacks, which were succeeded by as many retrogressive movements. The unanimity, and the rapidity of the revolution of 1820, had stifled every effort of the adverse faction, and reduced its abettors to silent

obedience. But they kept on the mask, which they had thought proper to assume on the 9th of March, and the liberals, either from an overweening confidence, or a singular want of penetration, were not aware of the number of their opponents. By the multitude, they were singled out with instinctive discrimination; but the theorists who ruled the cortes, suffered their fears to be lulled: relying on the public opinion, they fatally persevered in their wild speculations, and the constitution became every day an easier prey to its enemies. The fall of Naples, and of Piedmont, raised the drooping spirits of the *serviles*; several of these boldly threw the mask aside—but the evil did not stop there; many, instead of rashly shewing their true colours, turned to profit the egregious want of practical knowledge, the boundless ambition, and puerile vanity of the sages of 1812, as well as the jealousy they harboured against the authors of the revolution of 1820; and, made use of all these, to undermine more directly the constitutional edifice. This state of things gave to the proceedings of the government, and consequently to the internal political movements, an unsteadiness, or perhaps, more properly speaking, a fickleness, an inconsistency which naturally influenced public opinion.

The chain of inferences drawn by the keenest and most impartial observers, from the principles of the day, was suddenly cut short by the new principles put forth by the ministry, a fortnight afterwards. The author himself, an unprejudiced witness of these scenes, generally but little susceptible of illusion, and who always kept aloof from the internal dissensions of the liberals, was not able to withstand the effects of the mutability which he has described. More than once, after having transmitted to his friends the result of his observations, he has been obliged to alter his opinion of men and things. It is, therefore, in order to present with the method and fidelity of an historian, the fluctuating opinions, which resulted from an attentive study of the administration, and internal state of Spain, at each successive period, that he has adopted, or rather preserved the epistolary form; for these letters are but a selection from his correspondence with his friends, and several Spaniards of distinction.

They were to follow a sketch of the Piedmontese revolution, which, in fact, was the first part of the correspondence; but the author having read the work published in Paris, by Corr  ard, entitled, *Revolution Piemontaise*; and attributed, perhaps, not without

foundation to count de Santa Rosa, has determined on withholding this part of his labours. The impartial fidelity, with which the work just mentioned is written, leaves nothing new to be said on the same subject. Another of its merits, is the extreme moderation by which it is characterised; a moderation which the author of these letters, could hardly have flattered himself of preserving, even to promote the cause of liberty; but when so many victims of the rage of faction are still bleeding, we cannot too highly praise the hand which pours a healing balm into their wounds.



# LETTERS,

&c. &c.

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## LETTER I.

*Tarragona, May 4, 1821.*

I SNATCH the first moment of leisure, to relieve, by a letter, the uneasiness which you no doubt experience on our account. The storm was tremendous; I was inevitably hurried along by it. Having arrived in the midst of the hurricane, and quite unprepared for it, I could not oppose to its fury those resources, which at another time, coolness and courage would have put at my command. We embarked at Genoa, on the 14th ult. and experienced for a week, the dangers and difficulties usually attendant on the equinoctial season. In consequence of a squall from the east, we missed the port of Barcelona, and made for that of Tarragona, which we entered with some difficulty. We were subjected to a week's quarantine, a hardship which I know to be unusual, and for which I am at a loss to account. The lazaret, or rather the hovel, in which we spent our quarantine, was most uncomfortable; and, at first sight, foreboded

but an unpleasant lodging to its unwilling tenants. Seventy officers were to be stowed in a building, which could not conveniently hold more than twenty-five, and which, moreover, was without doors or windows; but this was soon remedied, by the hospitality of the town's-people, and the attention of the civil authorities. Thanks to the Alcalde Don Francisco Casas de Galli, doors and windows were put up in the course of a few hours, and the inhabitants spontaneously hastened to supply us with beds, and such furniture as we required. These attentions were uninterruptedly continued during the whole time of our quarantine, and we were continually favored with visits and presents. The military especially, when they relieved each other at the entrance of the lazaret, never failed to give us proofs of the interest which they took in our welfare.

At length, on the 28th, we were admitted into the town, and our entry seemed to be hailed as a sort of triumph. We were requested to appear in our uniforms; and early in the morning, the national guard and the two regiments of Barcelona and Barbastro, composing the garrison, came to meet us in state, headed by Don Pedro Perena, governor of the place. We proceeded towards the town with a splendid band of music, playing national and patriotic airs, in which the Spanish officers and the national guard united their voices. When we had reached the *Plaza de la Constitucion*, we were requested to range ourselves round the pillar which stood in its centre,

and on which was inscribed, in letters of gold, the date of the day when Tarragona, under the auspices of colonel Perena, proclaimed a second time the constitution of 1812. The governor and magistrates once more addressed us in complimentary terms, which I considered as a call upon my oratorical powers. Although I delivered myself in Italian, which is better understood than French by the Spaniards, my speech was short; I endeavoured to compress my sentiments in a few energetic phrases. At last, I was conducted to my lodgings where I took a few hours rest; after which, the officers of the garrison came to invite me to a banquet, which had been prepared for us. I had been honored in the interim with the visits of the magisterial, and even the ecclesiastical dignitaries.

The banquet was splendid and admirably conducted; there was hilarity without confusion, although patriotism was carried even to enthusiasm. The band played every tune to which the revolution of 1812 had given rise; the intervals between each, were filled up by appropriate toasts, extemporaneous speeches, and effusions of Spanish or Italian poetry, some of which evinced considerable talent. At length, to crown these patriotic proceedings, the most distinguished guests, Spanish as well as refugees, were carried in triumph round the table, by the officers of the national guard, amidst the reiterated shouts of "The Constitution for ever!" "The liberty of Europe for ever!"

These festive scenes were prolonged till the evening—but the day that witnessed them passed too soon away; it is, I fear, the last happy day we were doomed to enjoy in Spain.

The idea of the storm, which is gathering behind us perpetually, haunts my imagination; soon or late it will burst upon Spain from the Pyrenean heights. The holy alliance has pronounced the doom of the Spanish constitution, and will seize the first favorable opportunity to attack it. The genial influence of social feeling, dispelled these gloomy forebodings during the banquet; but the next day they took a stronger hold of my mind. The cordial reception which we had met with, had evidently been dictated by the most hospitable feelings; but so much pageantry was ill suited to our circumstances, and would have been highly unseasonable, had it not been rendered necessary by paramount reasons. This could hardly escape the observations and good sense of the Spanish patriots. I guessed their motives; but to put my surmise to the test, I addressed myself without reserve to colonel Perena, and to Don Ginez Alcaraz, of the regiment of Barcelona, who had been one of the chief promoters of the civic honors with which we had been greeted. My conjectures were but too well founded. The speedy and unhappy termination of the two revolutions in Italy, has had a fatal influence on public opinion in Spain. The Spanish patriots, far from expecting such a result, depended much on the promised success of the

Italian revolution, as a new source of strength to the constitutional edifice in Spain. Deprived of this hope at a moment, when they suspect the ministers of intentions hostile to the revolution, they daily witnessed the ill disguised satisfaction of the *serviles*. Their first care must, therefore, be to raise the drooping spirit of the nation, 'ere it be too late, and to awe the adverse faction by a bold and decisive attitude. They are lost, if they betray either before the ignorant multitude, or the *serviles*, their enemies, the least sign of uneasiness and dismay. This state of things cannot, however, continue very long; struggle and convulsions must be the result, and the brand of discord once ignited, the holy alliance will hardly fail to fan the pleasing flame.

The hospitable treatment of the refugees, by the officers and inhabitants continues uninterrupted; from the former, I, in some degree expected it; but scarcely from the latter. No one can duly appreciate it, who has not been at Tarragona. When I entered the ill-fated city, my eyes met on every side the painful spectacles of ruins, which I could fancy still reeking around me. Nearly one half the houses had more or less suffered, many had been totally destroyed when the town was taken by the French, and so completely were the inhabitants ruined by the dreadful plunder which ensued, that they have not been able to rebuild or repair their dwellings. Half of the house in which I first lodged, and which was considered as one of the best, was a heap of ashes and ruins. My

heart bled when I reflected, that all this was the work of my own countrymen; and that no small number of the Italian refugees, who had been received with so many marks of kindness and distinction, once belonged to the corps of Suchet, and had taken a personal share in the scenes of devastation, which now meet their eyes at every turn.

Perhaps you will say, such is the fate of war: but place yourself for a moment in the situation of the Tarragonese—spite of their poverty, their hospitality never failed; they administered to the wants of the refugees all that it was in their power to bestow. But not satisfied with this, they admitted us, or rather invited us to all their assemblies; and not later than the second day after our entrance, they endeavoured to obliterate, by social kindness, the impression of our misfortunes. Of my residence at Tarragona, I shall always preserve a grateful remembrance.

## LETTER II.

*Tarragona, May 31, 1820.*

IF I have been so long without writing, it is because my time was taken up by occupations of a rather unpleasant nature. Since my last letter, I have been at Barcelona on business, of which I shall speak in due time ; but I proceed to give you an account of what I consider as the most interesting part of my transactions. Perpetually haunted by the idea of the dangers which threatened Spain, I thought that in return for the hospitality which I have experienced, I could not do less than warn the government of its peril, and point to its leaders the relative situation in which this country stands. During my residence at Petersburg, as a prisoner of war, I formed an acquaintance with the Chevalier Bardaxi d'Azara, one of the present ministers ; and from private reasons, as I think I have mentioned to you before, I considered him, at that time, as a man of truly patriotic and enlightened principles, to whom I might impart my ideas with advantage. The part he acted at Turin, must no doubt have escaped my memory at the time. However that may be, on the 6th instant, I addressed a note, of which the substance was as follows.

“ The unfortunate issue of the Neapolitan and Piedmontese revolutions threatens to alter completely the face of Europe, and not only to operate a change favorable to despotism, but to shift the political balance. It is easy to perceive that by this double catastrophe every part of Italy has passed into the hands of Austria, who indubitably will be sanctioned in her usurpation by an agreement with Russia. The pretence will be the necessity of stemming the political principles, which, in the language of despotism, portend the subversion of the social edifice in Europe. The very nature of the pretence shews the extent of the perils which threatens the last strong hold of liberty—the Spanish Peninsula. As long as Spain preserves her constitution, she will be considered by the league of despots as a fastness from which liberty may, once more, sally triumphant, and break asunder the fetters of Europe. This requires no illustration; or, if any were needed, the very acts of the congress at Tropau and at Laybach are the most ample comment. I grant that the government of Spain was acknowledged in its present form by these assemblies; moreover, they positively declared that nothing was intended against Spain by the mandates which the arbiters of Europe hurled at the kingdom of Naples; but fatally blind, indeed, were the Spanish patriots, who should put implicit faith in these declarations. By the acts of the congress of Laybach, the northern sovereigns have most unquestionably issued their attainder against liberal



institutions whenever they are to be met with. A practical demonstration of this truth stares me in the face. What proclamation was sent forth from the congress against the Piedmontese revolution? When Austria pronounced the doom of Naples, what threat did she hold out to the constitutional government of Turin? And yet, strange to say, the Austrian commander in Lombardy found himself authorized to put, at the disposal of general Latour, the troops which he required, and the Piedmontese territory was violated in full peace. But this flagrant outrage was directed against the institutions which the congress of Laybach had sworn to exterminate—for that reason it was justified. Who henceforth will contend that it is not the intention of the holy alliance to sap the constitutional system wherever they can lay the axe to its root?—But Spain, will it be said, is a fortress which none of the potentates will venture to attack, as long as they bear in memory its heroic resistance to the late ruler of continental Europe;—moreover France intervenes, whose territory will not be infringed with impunity.

These two objections are worth sifting;—a few words will do it. As to the first, the designs of the sovereigns of the holy alliance against the institutions of Spain, are so manifest, that their daring and their power are the only part of the question that can admit of a doubt. Now the recollections of the late Peninsular war, does not seem to be such as will deter them from the invasion, when once they have

decreed it. Spain presents no more the same political aspect as from 1809 to 1814. At that period, the whole of Europe, avowedly or tacitly united against the French empire, witnessed, with a secret pleasure, this ill-advised aggression ;—harrassed the aggressors by powerful diversions in the east and the north ;—and that Spain might persevere in the struggle, acknowledged the Spanish constitution without once enquiring into its nature. Great Britain found in the Peninsula an arena to fight Napoleon by land, a mart for her trade, and ports from which she might sally on the remnants of the French navy ; Spain herself derived from the protection of the British flag the incalculable advantage of a ready conveyance of men and stores to every point where they were required. Your excellency must surely feel the truth of these remarks.

The two invasions of France, that of Naples and of Piedmont, are, for the chiefs of the holy alliance, treasures of experience. They will once more pursue the same successful method, sow dissension, lavish gold, and fan the flame of civil war. Not satisfied with arming in their favor the anti-liberal faction, they will secure the services of such as are to be bought, and lull the apprehensions of the unwary by holding out the delusive image of institutions, calculated to conciliate the jarring interests of every party. I need not say that the promised boon is never to be granted. Thus was France deceived in 1814 and 1815, when it was solemnly declared that she should

be allowed to choose her own institutions. Thus have Naples and Piedmont been recently mocked by specious offers, and insidious protestations. There does not, therefore, appear to be any reason why the holy alliance should not make upon Spain the attempt which has so well succeeded elsewhere. If any obstacle can delay them, it is the necessity, as a preliminary step, of pacifying Italy by dooming to the scaffold all those who are suspected of liberalism.

The violation of the French territory will not be opposed by the ministers. This assertion requires no proof since the appearance of M. de Blacas at the Austrian head-quarters; and, above all, since his ratification of the acts of Laybach, which remains to this day uncontradicted. Nay, if respectable witnesses are to be believed, negotiations were then on foot relative to the passage of the troops destined to act against Spain; and the result was an agreement, of which the execution has been suspended by the Piedmontese revolution. But will the French nation tamely suffer this infringement of her territory? It is thought not—and the fear of a commotion might induce the ministry to pause. But will the French patriots put to flight the evil intentions of the government by a passive resistance? Is it to be hoped that passive resistance will avail in a drama, of which violence alone can effect the denouement? The French ministers can and will withhold from the nation every political transaction of importance; an army devoted to their interests will spring up like the sol-

diers of Cadmus, cross the southern provinces, and appear at the foot of the Pyrenees, before the mass of the nation has time to offer any resistance.

Those nations who aspire to liberty must be bound by mutual engagements, and be ever ready to unite their efforts ; this principle is never departed from with impunity, as history will testify. The French government must be taught to gratify the wishes of the immense majority of the nation, by restoring to her those liberal institutions of which she has been despoiled : till then Spain will never be safe. But must Spain idly wait till the French patriots, without external assistance, have brought about this consummation ? Forbid it, prudence ! not a moment is to be lost ;—the danger is obvious, and the future, uncertain. The opinion of the great majority of the French cannot be mistaken ; the general irritation cannot but increase under the oppression of the ministers, and of the anti-constitutional faction. The embers are mouldering, a single spark may relume the blaze ; but once more a field of operations must be found to organise the first movements ; and a rallying point be chosen, round which the patriots of the neighbouring provinces may gather with confidence. This may be done by several methods ;—the relative situation of Spain must determine the choice.

I shall add but one reflection. The present state of Europe presents a double aspect ; the encroachment of the north on the south, and the rude pressure of barbarism upon civilization. Both inroads

are made by masses ; masses alone, therefore, can oppose them with success. The example of Italy proves that where the population is thin, partial struggles should be avoided. Now, the only great mass ready for action is France ; the impulse must be given without delay ;—upon that depends the safety of Spain, and of Europe.

I know not whether you will share all my apprehensions for the fate of Spain, but the more I consider what took place in 1814, the more I am convinced of their justness. I sadly fear that their correctness must be proved by the very disasters which they portend. I dread the introduction of metaphysical speculations into political administrations ; experience daily teaches their practical absurdity. When I form an opinion of mankind, and more particularly of governments in the aggregate ; their physical or moral interest, and their manifest acts are my guides ; and I flatter myself that I am generally more correct in my estimates than those crazy system-mongers, the man of whose utopias is not the being that nature presents to the eye of observation, but the production of their own fancy, and who fondly imagine, that revolutions are produced and carried on by speeches.

On the 8th and 28th I wrote again nearly in the same terms: time will shew whether I am to receive an answer. I begin to doubt it; for the present ministry, to which Mr. Bardaxi belongs, and whose predecessors were in office at the time of our arrival,

has already awakened the fears of the Spanish patriots.

Since my last letter, the number of addresses to the king and cortes increases daily ; they are all drawn up by the magistrates, or the civil and military bodies of the different provinces of Spain—and have all the same object, the reformation of the ministry, and of the system of administration. The storm appears ready to burst: the moment no doubt approaches when the internal tranquillity which Spain enjoys since the 9th of March, 1821, will be disturbed. I watch with attentive eyes the progress of events, which all teem with interest for the cause of liberty.

Till within these few days the position of the Italian emigrants in this town was truly critical; not, however, from any discontinuance of the hospitality and kind offices of the inhabitants, and particularly of the garrison. Subscriptions have been opened in the neighbouring towns and villages. The subsistence of the students has been provided for at an inn, and they have been supplied with clothing. In short, every thing has been done to alleviate their distress. But the garrison does not exceed two battalions; the number of officers is, consequently, small. The inhabitants are not in a condition to afford much :—the civil authorities have no funds at their disposal ; and the number of emigrants is little short of three hundred. The 6th instant I went to Barcelona, in order

to obtain for them some temporary relief, till the decision of government was known. I found the captain general Don Pedro Villacampa favorably inclined ; but a recent decree of the cortes had transferred the major part of his functions to the political chief. This latter was a brigadier of artillery, of the name of Don Juan Munariz, whose unfriendly disposition I soon discovered. On the subject of the revolution of Italy, he delivered in substance the opinions contained in my last letter ; but mixed up with them so much asperity, that it was evidently a stalking horse, of which the Piedmontese refugees were to be the victims. In fact, he told me, dryly, that the commotion produced by that event, put him under the necessity of finding daily employ for the lower orders, and of paying them in ready money ; consequently that he had no fund applicable to purposes of charity. Now this was totally devoid of truth. On my return to Tarragona, I disposed of all my ready cash. I borrowed even in order to supply the wants of several officers, and about forty subalterns and soldiers. I could not render the same service to every one, and created myself enemies, even among those who might have assisted me in relieving their countrymen. I do not, however, wonder at it ; the torrent has unavoidably swept along with us many individuals who are far from entertaining the same ideas.

At length the favorable determination of the cortes was promulgated, after having been violently

opposed by several deputies even of the liberal; and amongst others, by Victorica. So many denunciations of every kind had been made, that they wished a preliminary enquiry to be instituted, respecting the character of the intended objects of their liberality. But the ministers who had founded their motion on the report which I had addressed to them from the lazaret of Tarragona, overruled the objection, and the decree was passed by the cortes. Although it is dated the 6th, in consequence of the dilatoriness of the executive department, it was not transmitted to us till the 25th; and to-day, for the first time, the emigrants have touched their contingent of the sum granted for their relief. It is but small, amounting to a quarter's pay for the subalterns, and a sixth for the superior officers. The Spanish refugees, when they flocked to France, were more munificently treated, but the Spanish treasury cannot afford much.—The students, non-commissioned officers and soldiers, have no share in the bounty. Their case is hard;—surely, if they are proscribed, they are entitled to the same assistance as others. I have petitioned in their favor; but, hitherto, without success.



## LETTER III.

*Tarragona, June 25, 1821.*

NOT having received any answer from Mr. Bardaxi, and after more mature consideration of his conduct in Piedmont, being convinced that I never shall, I determined to change my plan of attack; my intention has been confirmed by the assurance that the catastrophe begins to produce its effects; the faction of the *serviles* has now thrown off the mask, relying on the hope of being seconded by the legions of the northern despots. Ministers themselves seem to retrace their steps; and the wild theories of the system-mongers increase the fatal influence of the *serviles* over public opinion. Before the expiration of the last month, I had forwarded to Mr. Romero Alpuente, one of the most distinguished members of the cortes, copies of the different memorials, which I had transmitted to Mr. Bardaxi. The 9th instant, I sent to Mr. Moreno Guerra a fresh memorial, embracing more particulars than the former, requesting that it might be communicated to his colleagues, and more especially to Messrs. Diaz de Morales and Romero Alpuente. Being convinced from the observations of some of the most enlightened members of the cortes, that the nature of the French revolution is not well under-

stood in Spain, I had sketched its progress with as much precision as possible. I called their attention to the persevering system of attack with which it was assailed by despotism from 1792 to 1815, and the tendency from which it never diverged in spite of a series of victories on one side, and of disasters on the other. I reminded them that the result of the catastrophe of 1815, had been the institution of the holy alliance, which, in fact, is neither more nor less than a tribunal of blood ; the object of which is to annihilate liberal ideas, and liberal institutions, and every work of civilization which the scythe of war may have spared.

The first act by which the sanguinary array of the tribunal has been displayed, is the counter revolution of Italy : they have to perform another act of no less interest in the political drama of Europe, viz. the reduction of Spain to a similar state of degradation. To the holy alliance are to be annexed the secret government of France, the wretches by whom Italy was betrayed, and the serviles of Spain.

To enforce the truth, that nations wishing to preserve, or to conquer liberty, must be bound by mutual engagements, and always ready to unite their forces, I reminded them that ten thousand Spaniards in Italy would probably have rescued Naples from slavery. There is only one way of assisting the French liberals, that is, to erect a standard on the frontiers, round which they may unite : partial enterprizes must be avoided, or defeat will inevitably follow. Three

thousand men should, at least, be ready to rally round the standard, under the old tri-coloured flag; if my opinion be correct, a plan would soon be organized, and three thousand men would be a sufficient number to commence the enterprize. The three hundred thousand veterans of our national army, and a swarm of youthful votaries of liberty would, no doubt, flock round the old banner, endeared by so many triumphs.

I received on the 15th instant an answer from Don Francisco Diaz Morales, in the name of his colleagues. I send you a copy. Its tenor, as you will perceive, is such as to hold out some hope. It proves at least that the views of the liberal deputies coincide with mine; and that their attention is directed to the same point.

Since I have been without employment, I have made several excursions in the neighbourhood of the town; its aspect is dreary, but, at least, my eye is relieved from the view of ruin and distress.

In this unfortunate city there is but one street which affords an uninterrupted walk of two hundred yards, and where the houses are in a tolerable state of repair. The cathedral is the only church remarkable for beauty of architecture. The road to Barcelona extends to the north-east, on a rocky declivity, bordering on the sea, which prevents the possibility of a ramble either on the right or left. The first part of this road, however, which is wide, and kept in good

repair, though exposed in every direction to the rays of the sun, is the principal promenade of the town ; to the north are seen the remains of the forts by which the place was protected on this side ; but the ground is so interspersed with angular rocks, that it is almost impossible to scramble over it: the only side which presents a less dreary and desolate aspect is the west, along which extends a small plain, intersected by the bed of a river, which, during the greater part of the year is without water ; since the neglect of the government has suffered the trees of the neighbouring heights to be destroyed.

Tarragona, or rather the fortress, does not immediately overhang the sea. The *Puerta del Mar*, and the Mole, which affords but an inconvenient harbour, are separated by the lower town, which is well built, and is daily increasing. It is the intention of government to extend the fortification as far as the sea on each side, so as to bring both towns within the same line of defence ; the surface of the ground has been reduced to a uniform declivity, by the blowing up of the intervening rocks, which are to afford materials for the completion of the Mole; but the characteristic dilatoriness of the Spaniards, and the penury of the public coffers, do not promise a speedy termination.

I have asked permission to go to Madrid ; but my request has been followed by rather an inauspicious omen. Monsieur de la Garde, who was ambassador at the court of Munich, and who so incessantly and

so gratuitously persecuted us by his notes, has just been appointed to the Spanish embassy, and made his appearance at Madrid. More ultra in his opinions, more active, and more plausible than his predecessor, he will soon acquire powerful influence over a court which shares his opinion, and a ministry willing to become his converts. It is, therefore, more than probable, that he will prevent my journey to Madrid ;—in one respect, it will be matter of little regret ; the ministry is so constituted, that no reliance can be placed upon it. I should, therefore, gratuitously expose myself to the annoyance and petty vexations of Monsieur de la Garde.—Spies I do not mention ; I must expect to find them every where : but I can have little to fear from the wretches ; they generally belong to a class of beings against which my doors are always shut. Abroad they will shun me, and my natural reserve is always a safeguard ;—my own bosom, and a few tried friends, are my only confidants.—As, however, the leave which I have requested is to emanate from Madrid, I have asked permission till it comes to go as far as Valencia. If I succeed, I shall be so far on the road ; if not, I shall have at least escaped the tumult, and the dissensions which are still uninterrupted. Were I the only emigrant at Tarragona, I should not wish to leave it, notwithstanding the dreary aspect of the surrounding country. The character of the inhabitants, and the circle to which I have been introduced, would make it a pleasant residence : but the disagreeable scenes

which I continually witness, oblige me to quit it. You know that the French government has forbidden the Italian refugees the entrance of its territory, and caused this resolution to be published in Spain. This measure is iniquitous, and completely at variance with the customs and the hospitable character of the French nation. But, denying an asylum, is not betraying, or expelling, by the force of arms, the unfortunate, who come to seek a refuge. Notwithstanding this, the Barcelona *Constitutional* of the 15th, contains a long tirade of abuse, against the French nation, which is there charged with want of hospitality, and accused of moral degradation. The writers must have forgotten that France has ever been the asylum of misfortune, even when the refugees were her enemies. Has it escaped their memory, that there are still in France a great number of Italian officers who claimed our protection in 1815, and who obtained the privileges of French citizens, and even rank in the French army? Contrast with this the fate of the French refugees in Italy: colonel Cavalier, (better known as *colonel des dromadaires*,\*) and Didier, were betrayed into the hands of their executioners: but did we, on that account, stigmatize the Italian nation with cowardice and cruelty?

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\* From having commanded in Egypt a regiment, in the service of which dromedaries were employed.

## LETTER IV.

*Valencia, July 30, 1821.*

As I intimated in my last letter, I left Tarragona on the 30th ult. and arrived here on the 6th instant. It was my first intention to travel by land, in order to see more of Spain, of which I only know the road from Tarragona to Barcelona. But the disturbed state of the country, its poverty, and above all, the venality, and secret sanction of the tribunals, have tended so much to increase the number of robbers, that an unprotected traveller is in great danger of assassination; a sea voyage was, therefore, my only resource. This being the season when calms generally prevail, we were six days on our passage, which appeared to us sufficiently tedious.

The *grao*, or port of Valencia, is half a league from the town; the road to the latter is extremely fine, and shaded on either side by a double row of trees. The town of Valencia presents on all sides an imposing aspect. The advantage it owes to its great extent, the number of its spires, its convents, and its churches, most of them remarkable for regularity of architecture. But the detail does not correspond to the effect produced, by a view of the aggregate mass. The houses are in general ill constructed—their architecture is

devoid of taste and method, and of any thing like regularity. The streets, with the exception of three or four, are narrow and crooked—none of them are paved; and when it rains, which it seems is frequently the case in winter, the mud is knee-deep. The cathedral is a pile which cannot fail to arrest the attention of the traveller; as for the other churches, they are to be admired more for their splendid interior, than for the elegance of their external appearance. The only public edifice deserving of notice, is the *intendencia*, built opposite the municipal dungeon, called the citadel, and which general Elio had converted into a state prison.

Beyond the walls, opposite to the *puerta real*, (royal entrance) there was formerly a palace of the Moorish kings; on its site is a garden, the use of which is one of the privileges of the *captain general*. Valencia has several very agreeable pleasure walks: the road to the *grao* is one of the most frequented, especially at this time of the year, when the inhabitants go to reside at the *grao*, and the cottages of the little village Cavagnal, for the convenience of sea bathing. Between the bridge called Del Mar, and the royal bridge, extends the *Alameda Vieja*, the most ancient promenade of Valencia. The height and flourishing state of the trees with which this walk is adorned, and its width, intersected by two carriage roads, and three footpaths, give to it a magnificent appearance; it is watered every day. The next public place of resort without the walls, is the quay of the Guadalaviar, to



the north of the town; it is unsheltered from the rays of the sun, but it is pleasant towards sun-set. The fourth promenade is within the walls; it was established at a great expense by general Elio, on the space which separates the citadel and the *intendencia*: its form is quadrangular, and its longest side does not exceed two hundred yards; it is thickly studded with trees, interspersed with beds of the gayest and most odoriferous flowers, the perfume and brilliant colours of which diversify agreeably the orange and citron trees, the pomegranates and myrtles, which form the intervening borders. *La Glorietta* is a delightful garden; and when the trees are grown up, will be one of the most lovely retreats in Europe. On the east of the town meanders the Guadalaviar, to which the Valencians have restored its ancient name of Turia. This river would be considerable, were it not almost exhausted by supplying eight canals, which carry verdure and fertility into the plain of Valencia. I have, however, been told, that after the periodical melting of the snow, and sometimes after violent storms, it swells rapidly, and covers the space, by no means inconsiderable, which separates the two quays; the Turia is crossed by five bridges, not inelegant of architecture.

The country round Valencia is extremely fertile, and abounds in pleasant scenery; though from a deficiency of lofty trees it is entirely destitute of shade. The roads which cross it in every direction, and which lead to the villas and hamlets, with which it is

interspersed, would afford a pleasing variety to pedestrians, were it possible to frequent them without risk: but the Valencian peasants, whose habits and lineaments still present the characteristic features of the Bedouin Arabs, are natural prone to robbery and murder. There is no venturing into the country without being well armed and well accompanied; the natives even, dare not constantly reside in their country houses, still less furnish them with any degree of splendor; they now and then spend two or three days in the country; but more generally return to town before night.

To the south-west of Valencia, at about two leagues distant, is an extensive lake, parallel to the sea, from which it is separated by a bank covered with under-wood, to which the inhabitants resort for the diversion of rabbit shooting. This lake, which is called *Albufera*, empties itself into the sea at its western extremities; it was the domain of marshal Suchet, who still preserves the title of duke of Albufera. The produce of this lake is amongst the revenues of the infants of Spain. The quantity of fish which it contains, and the almost incredible number of water fowls which frequent it, render this branch of income by no means inconsiderable. It is held under lease by a corporate body; but by an ancient custom which is still preserved, the public are allowed the privilege of shooting every year, on Martinmas day (11th of November). On any other day, individuals may obtain the same privilege by a trifling retribution, or even

gratuitously. The sport on Martinmas day, is said to be an interesting sight, from the number of boats with which the surface of the lake is covered, and of vehicles of all description, with which the neighbouring hamlets are crowded. All the genteel company of Valencia come to witness, or to share this diversion; and on the night, between the 10th and 11th, take their abode in wretched taverns, or crowd in fishermen's huts, and sleep on straw, if they have neglected to bring their own bed furniture. The day, however, never passes without accidents, either from the mismanagement of the boats, or the heedless firing of the sportsmen, who display a carelessness, which seems inherent in the Spanish character.

The town of Valencia is far from being quiet; the adverse parties are in hostile array, and seem to be on the eve of beginning hostilities. Report, which always magnifies, had spread, and exaggerated these dissensions at Tarragona before our departure. It was even said, that the two factions had come to blows, and that blood had flowed in the streets of Valencia: if I mistake not, this had been printed in the newspapers for the benefit of the quidnunes. On my arrival, I found these rumours to be without foundation; but the warmth, and the mutual threats, to which the petulant and restless character of the Valencians, gives an appearance of furious exasperation, are sufficient to alarm a stranger.

The famous general Don Francisco Javier Elio, who was captain general in this city, from 1814 to

1820, is a prisoner in one of the towers of the citadel. Having been arrested at the instance of an indignant public, a short time after the proclamation of 1820, and accused of treason for having induced the king in 1814, to resume absolute power, and for having supported him with his army, he was brought to trial. In the first instance, the advocate Don Martín Serrano, one of the most distinguished citizens of Valencia, who conducted the prosecution, insisted that general Elio should be transferred to a place of greater security, on the ground that the culprit was to be tried on ten capital charges; he detailed them in his speech, supported them by proofs, and moved for sentence of death. The security of Elio's new place of confinement, has prevented his escape; he has appealed against the sentence to judges, who are in no haste to give a decision, which, in fact, cannot be wondered at. In the first place, there is not one of the judges to whom he has appealed, but who is hostile to the present state of affairs; in the next, the *servile* faction uses every exertion to save a man whom it considers as its chief, and its firmest support; and to crown all, the court party, who would not scruple to sacrifice him, if they thought it beneficial to their interest, do not wish to see things carried to extremities, for fear Elio should exhibit the secret orders which he received, and the documents which he always carries about his person. In addition to all this, it appears to me, that the affair has been very badly managed. In the

first place, the grounds of accusation were not sufficiently strong. Those who were most deeply implicated in the overthrow of the revolution of 1815, the sixty-nine deputies, called *Persians*,\* have been much less severely dealt with. During the reign of despotism, offences against the constitution could be tried, since the rights and power of despotism were every where admitted; for it is but too well known, that a distinction between the government *de facto*, and the government *de jure*, is but a weapon, which the executioners may hold *in terrorem* over those whom they mark out for their victims. When the constitution of 1820 was proclaimed, Elio submitted, without hesitation, to the orders of the court party.

The following interesting anecdote on the subject has been circulated: when he received the despatches announcing that the king had ratified the constitution by his oath, and ordering him to proclaim it, he remained for some time in indignant silence -- then dashing the despatch at his feet, he exclaimed, "the coward! he dares not even be a tyrant!" There were other facts, which might have been brought against general Elio, without trespassing beyond the boundaries of reason and of justice, and which would have constituted capital offences, even according to the laws, which

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\* So called from having presented to the king a memorial, beginning, "it was a custom amongst the *Persians*."

were in force during the reign of despotism ; for, not only had he deprived citizens of their property, without having subjected them to trial, and sent others to the galleys, on his own responsibility ; but he had consigned many to the scaffold, without any accusation, enquiry, or even the shew of trial : and some of the victims had been acquitted by the *audiencia*, which had never been accused of too much mildness. This I will exemplify by a fact : thirteen individuals had been indicted as conspirators—twelve of them were condemned to death by the *audiencia* ; the thirteenth, a tradesman, whose family occupies the house adjoining my lodgings, was acquitted, as no proof was brought against him. According to Spanish customs, the sentence could not be carried into execution, without the approval of the captain general ; it was, therefore, presented to general Elio ; not only did he give his approval, but opposite to the name of the man, who had been absolved, he wrote, as a marginal note, the three following words, *y este tambien*, (and this one also)—the poor fellow was hanged. You may judge, that there was enough to condemn him without having recourse to political opinions ; and, if politics had been thrown aside, his protectors would have been sadly puzzled.

I am in the habit of frequently seeing the captain general, who has succeeded Elio, count Almodovar, brigadier general, and lieutenant colonel of artillery ; who, on the proclamation of the constitution, was taken from the dungeons of the inquisition, and

made captain general. He is well informed—his manners are pleasing; but he has a little of the Spanish stiffness, which may be assimilated to the pride of a young sprig of nobility, who owes his advancement to his own exertions. Don Ildefonso Diaz de Ribera, officer of artillery, had joined, during the last war, the staff of the duke of Wellington; and, according to the Spanish custom of giving brevet rank, had obtained in 1812, that of brigadier general. On his return to Valencia, where his regiment was stationed, he paid his addresses to a young lady of considerable personal attractions, whom he was on the eve of leading to the altar, when he met in society with the young countess of Almodovar, equally agreeable, and the only daughter of a nobleman of large fortune. Having discovered, that he had made some impression on the young heiress, he determined to try his fortune, and transferred his vows to another shrine. His suit was carried on with so much success, that he soon authorized mutual friends to make proposals; and the young lady declared, that she would accept no other for her husband. The old count had no objection to urge, but the narrow fortune of the suitor; and, clinging to the only hope of perpetuating his name, he yielded his consent, on condition that his son-in-law should change his name of Ribera, into that of Almodovar. He died soon after, and transmitted his titles to his son-in-law. In justice to the present count of Almodovar, it must be said, that he is

a good husband and a good father; and that his wife, by bestowing riches upon him, has not done it to the detriment of her own happiness.

I have not yet received the letter, which had been announced to me by Mr. Morales; from the enquiries which I have made, and caused to be made, I am assured, that it was intercepted by some person, who made use of my name at the gates of Tarra-gona. I determined on writing again the 21st instant.

I added to this fresh memorial, a plan for the formation of a legion, which might consist of as many as three thousand men, to be made up, not only of French, and other refugees, who may be found in Spain; but of such Spanish volunteers, as I wish to have the power of enlisting; and I am confident, that I should find no difficulty in completing the number. The tri-coloured flag, and a French leader, will be sufficient to rally them. I have chosen the eastern Pyrenees as my point of attack, because it affords me many advantages; one of which is the facility of capturing the fortresses, a thing which, for many reasons, is not so difficult as might be thought: in the next place, I shall be able to enlist *Miquelets*,\* to whom my name is rather favorably known: in addition to this, I rely upon other resources, which I cannot as yet describe, and which in a few days would put a considerable force at my disposal.

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\* A kind of Guerillas.



I have just received, three days after having despatched my memorial, a letter from *Cugnet de Montarlot*, who is at Saragossa, and who advises me of the plans which he has formed with deputies, general officers, military men, and citizens of every class, and which he is constantly employed in bringing to maturity. The French liberals, who have so much extolled him, and who have spread all over the country lithographics of his portrait, have, perhaps, engaged his services. This would appear to me inconsistent with expedience and wisdom, since he is not a military man; and that a man may be a good writer of songs, and still know nothing of politics. This I fear will upset all my plans. We shall see what this unexpected incident will produce.

## LETTER V.

*Valencia, September 2, 1821.*

I Wrote to general Riego, who is captain general of Arragon, on the 2d ult. to caution him against the precipitation, which the letter of Montarlot led me to apprehend, and to beg of him to prevent, if it is in his power, any partial movement; the result of which, is only a useless effusion of blood. I have, in the mean time; taken the opportunity of sounding him, to ascertain in what manner, and to what degree, he may be depended upon in case of need. I had not long to wait for an answer—his letter is dated 12th ult.\* Riego finds himself embarrassed by the nature of his present connexion with the government, and dreads to a certain degree, the idea of being the first to declare his sentiments. His answer is much the same as that which I received from the Neapolitan government, when I proposed calling together the officers of the late kingdom of Italy. But what most surprises me is, that he does not allude at all to what I wrote to him concerning Montarlot; but even supposing that it was not his

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\* Appendix, No. 2.

intention to act without the sanction of the Spanish government, the opinion which I transmitted to him, respecting the danger of partial movements, and the necessity of preventing them, surely deserved his attention. The count Almodovar, to whom I shewed the letter, assures me, that Riego, with whom he is in correspondence, would not be the first to throw down the gauntlet; but if a movement on the frontiers were to succeed, and present to him a favorable opportunity, he would not hesitate to join it. How far this may be depended upon, time and circumstances will shew. In the mean time, I pursue with secret and unremitting perseverance the ripening of my plan.

It is already sufficiently advanced, to induce me to hope, that its completion will not be delayed more than six weeks or two months at the farthest. I am still bent on choosing Catalonia as my point of attack; perhaps it will be objected, that the frontier of Roussillon is narrow, and thickly studded with fortresses; this is the very ground of my decision. In the first place, it generally happens, that the position which is considered to be best protected, falls the easiest prey. In the second place, in every expedition, and particularly in one of the nature of that which I am about to undertake, it is necessary to secure a field, whereon to establish a first line of operations. Nothing inspires more confidence, than the occupation of one or more fortresses. I do not overlook the difficulties, which necessarily attend the bold

stroke, which I have in view. I have weighed against them the chances of success, and the balance is much in favor of the latter. This does not come under the rules of ordinary warfare; amongst the elements, upon which I have a right to depend, some would assist in the execution of my plans, some would be gained over by the first success, and the remainder would be neutralized by the want of hostile energy, or overwhelmed by a majority. I am, therefore, quite determined, and I shall follow my favorite maxim, that if slowness and precaution are necessary in combining our plans, and in obviating every impediment, rapidity and boldness are equally necessary to execute them.

Danger is magnified, by being viewed at a distance; but when we fearlessly grapple with it, it disappears.

The first opposing forces I should meet with, would be six battalions at Perpignan, Bellegarde, and Prats de Mollo; two at Mont Louis, and one at Collioure.

Our next opposition would be a cavalry regiment, at Carcassone; at Toulouse, four battalions, including two Swiss battalions, and two regiments of artillery. We should next meet a regiment of cavalry, at Beziers, and two battalions at Montpellier. I should only have to encounter at first nine battalions, composed in a great degree of men, who are by no means hostile to my plans. But what force will be at my disposal? about three thousand men, Miquelets and

Spanish, French and Italian volunteers, who have almost all served under the tri-coloured flag. Moreover, I should conduct the expedition in such a manner, that six of these battalions would join my standard, or be reduced to inactivity; and in less than twelve hours, the three others would be deprived of all means of resistance, were they disposed to attempt it; but I am convinced that they would not. In fact, when our measures are well concerted, we muster our troops on the eve of the expedition before sun-set, at Lá Jonquiere; and 'ere midnight, Bellegarde is in our hands. There are those within its walls, who would supply us with scaling ladders, were it necessary to use them.

The length of the nights in October or November, favors my reaching Perpignan by break of day; every thing is there in readiness for a surprise, like that which rendered the Spaniards masters of Arras; and agents residing in the town, upon whom I can rely, would open to me the gates of the citadel, which is only two hundred yards distant from the entrance, at which I should make my appearance. The garrison of Perpignan is favorably disposed. I have friends at Mont Louis and at Collioure; you may suppose, that they would not be inactive, when they knew that the tri-coloured flag was waving over Perpignan, and defended by six thousand men. This is not all—I have emissaries ready to start with money, and safe passports for the southern provinces, in order to prepare the patriots for this expedition,

and to induce them to support it by their co-operation. I can rely on the military chiefs of Catalonia, Valencia, and Arragon; but I cannot expect that they will commence the attack—I know they will not. But I am certain, that when I have preceded them, in giving occupation to the adverse party, in the eastern Pyrenees, they will lead their troops to the frontiers, under the pretence of restoring order: but, in fact, to support me in case of need. My intention is to march directly on Toulouse, and thence on Lyons. Thus you see, that my plans are such as to hold out ample grounds of confidence, and obviate the necessity of any premature disclosure of party principles.

This consideration should never be lost sight of. Once more, we must avoid those partial movements, of which the success is more than doubtful, as the blood of so many victims can testify. We must beware of shedding more blood, particularly that of the patriots. Time will shew whether any incident, and what incident will mar my designs.

The 7th instant, I had written to the deputy Morales. Being convinced that all hope of assistance from the Spanish government was nugatory, I had determined to place my only reliance on the co-operation of the patriots. I told him, that since my arrival in this town, I had been in communication with the free-masons, who being the promoters of the revolution of 1820, ought to coincide with my views in furtherance of the work which they had com-

menced: but assured him, that my plans could be carried into execution, with the assistance of the patriots alone. I subjoined the three following observations; first, that it was necessary to avoid a rash or partial attack—secondly, to keep our plans as secret as possible, and to employ very few confidential agents, (as it is the only way of avoiding the spies of the French police, who are so well seconded by the Spanish serviles)—thirdly, not to suffer himself to be deluded by the idea, that such a plan could be carried into effect with five or six hundred men. This would be incurring the risk of an almost unavoidable defeat, and deferring our hopes to a distant period. I apprized him, at the same time, of the arrival of Montarlot at Saragossa, and likewise of his intentions, transmitting the substance of my letter to him, in which I deprecated any partial attack. I received, on the 23d instant, the answer of Morales, of which I enclose a copy.\* You will, no doubt, be struck with the following expressions—“the society with which you are in correspondence, and of which I am one of the eldest members, does not take in your views the interest which you imagine.” These expressions require some explanation; and the accurate information, which it has been in my power to obtain on the subject, enables me to solve the mystery.

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\* Appendix, No. 3.

Some time ago, the free-masons, in order to extend their influence over the public, without setting forth the name of their sect, which the jesuitism of the inquisition has unremittingly pursued with its denunciations, thought of organizing something like a seminary of neophytes. Those neophytes, before their initiation, which was to be the end and reward of their labors, were to organize in every province an association, which was to have regular meetings for the purpose of disseminating, explaining, and defending, if necessary, the principles of the constitution. I need not say that the chiefs were to be free-masons. The plan was drawn up at the principal lodge at Madrid. Its execution was confided to the most enlightened members, and especially to Messrs. Diaz de Morales, Romero Alpuente, Moreno Guerra, and to the Don Jose Maria del Regato, who is mentioned by Mr. Morales in his letter to me. This preliminary part of the scheme was almost completed, when its authors were apprized that the other members of the free-masons, whose incapacity had kept them in the back ground, intended taking the management into their own hands as soon as the plan was matured. This treachery, this jesuitical mistrust, excited their indignation. Aware of the advantage of their situation, and of the popularity, which a society like the one they intended to organize, would not fail to acquire, they determined to break off all connexion with the free-masons. They availed themselves of those



historical recollections, cherished by every Spaniard, who still treasures up the remembrance of the ancient liberty of Spain, a liberty acknowledged by a recent decree of the cortes. They appealed to the shades of Padilla, of Bravo, and Maldonado, those heroic defenders of the rights and privileges of the *communes* of Castile, who fell victims to liberty, whose cause they sealed with their blood, which flowed on the scaffold, erected by Charles the fifth, on the field Vilallar.\* Borne along by these chivalrous and enthusiastic ideas, they are now the *invisible* chiefs of the association, which has taken the name of *comuneros*. This society spreads rapidly, and acquires strength at every step. This cannot be wondered at; the recollection of the anathemas, which the jesuits, who are themselves nothing less than a free-masonry of monks, has pronounced against a society which it apes, and the dreadful colours under which the popish priests and monks have represented it, have identified in the minds of the lower orders the name of free-mason with that of jew and heretic. Even in the middling classes, there are many whose conscientious scruples, and dread of ecclesiastical censures, would not have permitted them to become members of a society, which, however far from deserving the odious epithets bestowed

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\* They were defeated on the 23d of April, 1521, and executed the following day.

upon it by priestcraft, holds principles which these scruples will not allow. Aware of all this, the *comuneros* bear upon their standard the sacred words of constitutional king and religion, which they represent as inseparable, and profess to defend to their latest breath. Thus they hold out every inducement to generous and patriotic minds, without awaking the fears of the most bigotted catholic. I send you an extract of their resolutions.\* You will perceive that they are much the same as those of our *federés* of 1790, or rather of 1815, but on a larger scale. You will be convinced that whoever wishes to become practically a political economist, instead of being bewildered in utopian mazes, must become a convert to the system of this society, and do all in his power to consolidate and extend its influence. In my opinion, it is the only society which can propagate in Spain the cause of liberty. You will ask, perhaps, whether I am one of its members? I am not—nor am I a free-mason: for it is my wish to remain neutral, in order to give an unbiassed opinion of the two liberal parties.

The internal state of Valencia continues to be as much agitated as I found it on my arrival: indeed the ferment seems to be on the increase. As the same causes still exist, the same effects must naturally be expected. The additional cause is the in-

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\* Appendix, No. 4.

creased agitation of the servile faction which every day raises its head, since the arrival of Monsieur de la Garde at Madrid, who carries on his intrigues openly, and scatters gold with a lavish hand. Speaking of Monsieur de la Garde, I think I have forgotten to mention, that, as I foresaw, I have been refused permission to go to Madrid. I wrote a rather sharp letter to Mr. Bardaxi, and there the business ends. For the execution of my plans, I am more favorably situated at Valencia.

A word more of the Valencians. Their exaltation may, I think, be attributed to their fickle and restless disposition; they promise much, but perform little. Almost every day, messengers came to announce to me, that at midnight the insurgents would be under arms. I was requested to give notice to the Piedmontese emigrants to keep within doors, or to assemble at my quarters, and not shew themselves after nine o'clock. The portentous secret of these plots was known at every corner of Valencia twenty-four hours before its execution, and at length ended in smoke. At first these messages made some impression upon me; but now they do not at all disturb my rest. There is in Spain a kind of proverb respecting the character of the Valencians, which I do not think absolutely void of truth: it is this—"A Valencia la carne es yerba, e la yerba aqua. Los hombres, son mugeres y las mugeres nada." At Valencia, flesh is grass, and grass is water. Men are women, and women are nothing.

I do not mean to say, however, that the uneasiness and irritation of the Valencians, is wholly without cause. As long as Elio lives, and the Spanish government pursues the same system, the Valencians cannot for a moment feel secure of life and liberty; they have every moment to dread some resolution, which by restoring Elio to liberty, would put them at the mercy of a tiger thirsting for vengeance. The serviles, who a short time ago were afraid to shew themselves, are now daily seen to visit his prison. It is well known, that money is spread in every direction, in order that he may be liberated by force of arms. Men still more guilty than Elio, the venal magistrates of Murviedro, whose cruelty and whose sanguinary deeds have stamped them with infamy, shew themselves in every public place, without fear of molestation, or the just vengeance, which the public voice denounces against them for deeds, which it would be impossible for them to disprove.

I have received another letter from Montarlot, dated 28th August; he still speaks of his plan like a man who means to carry it immediately into execution. He says, that he is employed by the secret associations of France, with which he is in communication. This may be true; but in the mean time, as he mentions in his last letter, that his friends at Madrid are in possession of his plans, I have thought it necessary to be on the alert. On the 27th ult. I wrote to Romero Alpuente, to apprise him of this

circumstance, (Morales being at Cordova.) I again explained to him my plan, requesting him to use every precaution to prevent its failure, and to guard against any wild and premature attempt. I have just received a fresh letter from Montarlot, who apprizes me of his departure for the frontiers. He says likewise, that he shall take from Saragossa four hundred infantry, and one hundred horse; and that general Riego will march towards the frontiers to support him. This may be; but it little accords with the tenor of the letter which I have received from general Riego.

Time will shew, but I much fear this is a quixotic enterprize, which will end in the loss of many valuable lives.

## LETTER VI.

*September 30, 1821.*

THE bubble has burst just as I apprehended ; many persons are implicated—and, moreover, my plans have been entirely defeated ; as from the number of intermediate agents, which I should be under the necessity of employing, prudence forbids my persevering.

On the 31st of August, Moreda, the political chief of Saragossa, issued an order for the arrest of Montarlot. But the latter having been put upon his guard by a patriot, who supplied him with a passport, disappeared before the arrival of the magistrate at his house. This escape was, however, only temporary ; after a circuitous detour, he came back to the high road of Oleron, and was stopped between Jaca and Campfranc, and with him four or five companions. He had about him a batch of proclamations, in which he assumes the titles of generalissimo, and of president of the great empire. He was taken back to Saragossa, where he is in prison. It appears, that the five hundred men, who were to join him at Saragossa, have vanished in the air ; or rather, that this promised assistance was but a trap laid for him, by the agents of the serviles. To be convinced that Montarlot was played upon by these

agents, and the French spies in the pay of M. de la Garde, it is only necessary to read the following article of the Universal of the 6th instant—"An individual, distinguished for his patriotism, and for the persecution of which he was the victim during the six years of oppression, was solicited by the *rebels* to assist them in their treasons. Determined to become acquainted with the plans of the enemies of order, he apparently entered into their plots so deeply, as to waken the suspicions of the political chief, who, although apprized of his motives, had no official proof of the purity of his intentions. This patriot was the first to furnish the magistrates with the documents necessary to authorize them to act without infringing the laws; and laid all his proceedings before the captain-general of another province, who was to be the first victim of this desperate enterprize."

This article, no doubt transmitted by the principal actor in this transaction, is a rare specimen of modesty. This chief, so distinguished for his patriotism, who professedly has been employed in the noble character of a spy, and an instigator, is no other than the political chief of Saragossa; who, if public report is to be credited, has already received a large sum of money from M. de la Garde, as the reward of his talent, and of his liberalism. Do not, however, believe that all this fuss has been made merely about Montarlot; his name has been but a stalking horse.

With what punishment can they visit an individual whose attempt was only that of a madman, sup-

ported by five or six individuals as mad as himself, whose papers are nothing more than a proclamation of which the Spanish government cannot legally take cognizance, and which they have taken good care not to publish for fear of exposing the folly of this enterprise.

The expression of rebels, which the Spanish government could apply to none but Spaniards, was made use of to give a different coloring to this foolish business, *and the other province* was that of Valencia, to which extended, as they would feign have the public believe, the ramifications of a most alarming conspiracy; but less ingenious than Rabelais in the management of his Gargantuca, Messrs. de la Garde, Feliù, Sanchez, Salvador, and Moreda, are at a loss to bring into play this gigantic child of their own imagination.

Moreda, who was colonel of the Queen's regiment, quartered at Valencia, in 1820, pretended to be more liberal in his opinion than the other agents of Elio. When, however, Riego marched upon Malaga, he was chosen by Elio to stop him; and when the patriots begged him to join Riego, and thus restore, without delay, the constitution to the kingdom of Valencia, he resisted their earnest entreaties, and was Riego's most violent opponent: when the government compulsorily yielding to the public voice, was obliged to nominate general Riego, captain-general of Arragon, Moreda was immediately after created political chief of the same province. Not only was he



to be a spy upon the captain-general, but great hopes were entertained that his genius for intrigue, and the secret hatred which he bore to Riego, would spur him on to effect the ruin of this enemy of the serviles. It may be supposed, that M. de la Garde, who could not be very anxious to see Riego at the head of a province, bordering upon France, used every effort to rid the *pavillon Marsan* of so great an object of terror. Sure enough Moreda insinuated himself into the confidence of Riego, whose noble and chivalrous character never harboured a suspicion of treachery, and ill knew how to guard against the wiles of perfidy. Entirely devoted to his country, having no other object in view but its welfare, ready to make every sacrifice in its cause, he was easily deceived by the protestations of hypocrisy. Moreda who had no difficulty in rendering himself master of the designs of Montarlot, communicated them to general Riego;—that was not all—the hero of Las Cabezas was adored by the patriots of Arragon, and it was contrived to turn this sentiment of enthusiasm into an engine of destruction. The murmuring against government increased every day;—advantage was taken of the rash expressions of some of the patriots, urged on, no doubt, by hired instigators, who spoke continually of the necessity of a radical reform, to erect the fabric of a conspiracy, the absurdity of which was scarcely paralleled by the atrocity of the invention. At length when Moreda thought that every spring was ready to be set in motion, he requested and

obtained at Madrid an order dated 29th August, superseding Riego, banishing him to Lerida, and transferring the military command to the denunciator himself. On the 31st, he published this decree in a proclamation, got up to terrify the public by the pretended discovery of a vast conspiracy, having for its object the overthrow of the constitution, to establish a republic; and which would necessarily be productive of the greatest calamities.

Though the name of general Riego did not appear in this proclamation, he was but too clearly alluded to. In the mean time Moreda caused to be arrested, in a very conspicuous manner, a citizen of Saragossa, named Don Francisca Villamor, and some of his friends, who never had any connection with general Riego.

Finding, however, that the public began to unravel this tissue of falsehood, he was obliged, on the 4th instant, to retract his calumnies in a mean and evasive manner. It was declared in a fresh proclamation, *that general Riego was not implicated in the conspiracy; that his removal was an act authorized by the constitution, and which could by no means tarnish his name.* Must not every body be struck with the absurdity and contradictions which these few words involve?

As soon as Moreda had received the order which he had solicited from government, he hastened to send it to general Riego, who was on his return from inspecting the province under his command.

The precautionary measures which Moreda took, sufficiently proved the perfidy of his intentions. He sent to meet general Riego a company of the regiment of Gerona, under the orders of one Don Manuel Calderon, his worthy confidant, and reinforced it with forty militia men.

Calderon having learnt on his arrival at Puebla de Alfinden that Riego was approaching, placed the militia in ambuscade ; and, as soon as he saw the general, who was on horseback, with a few orderlies about his person, caused him to be surrounded by his men, and notified to him the order of which he was the bearer. It was calculated that Riego, irritated by so great an indignity, would refuse to submit, or at least that he would insist on returning to Saragossa, that he might settle his affairs, and make arrangements to travel in a suitable and convenient manner. The resistance thus provoked was to be the signal for his assassination.

The mildness, the moderation, and meekness of this hero of Spain, for once defeated the intentions of his murderers. He turned his horse quietly round, and rode on towards the place of his exile. While this was going on at Saragossa, M. Moreda was strenuously labouring in his new vocation, and was ably seconded by his worthy emissaries in the next province, that is, the province of Valencia. As soon as he had received the order of the court, and had issued the proclamation of the 31st, he wrote to the political chief, and to the captain-

general to apprise them of the dreadful discovery which he had made, and that the plot had extensive ramifications in every part of the province under their command. On the very day on which this despatch was received, the serviles of Valencia hastened to inform against those whom they considered as implicated in the *rebellion*. These accomplices were myself, whom Moreda had pointed out; three Piedmontese refugees, who knew nothing of my private intentions; and four veterans, who knew nothing at all about me.

The news of the disgrace of Riego, was a death-blow to the liberals of Valencia; and being at too great a distance from the focus of the intrigues of Moreda, to unravel at once the dirty web which had been worked up at Saragossa, they imagined that some revolutionary movement was really intended. Being well acquainted with the respective characters of Riego and Moreda, they thought that the former had intended to bring about a change of ministry in favor of the patriots, and that the latter had been armed by the government to prevent it. The political chief of Valencia was absent, and the intendente Don Juan Modenes, who filled his place, was a worthy man, incapable of harbouring any sinister designs. But being apprized of the danger which threatened me, he requested a Valencian patriot, one of his friends, to put me on my guard. On the other hand, the count d'Almodovar, to whom Moreda, who was no friend of his, had sent a short letter, and who, conse-

quently, being but imperfectly acquainted with the nature of the accusation, was fearful of being implicated himself, from his knowledge of my intention to enter Roussillon, sent me similar intelligence. I was therefore fully apprized of the plans that were carried against me, and I was offered passports and money sufficient to retire wherever I should think proper. I deliberately refused, and begged of the count d'Almodovar, that he would put me upon my trial. When the patriots were apprized of my determination, they furnished me with a list of the charges which were to be brought against me. This strengthened my resolution; as I was convinced, upon inspection, of the facility with which I could repel these absurd accusations.

The principal charge, or rather the only one, (since the others were all included in it) was that of levying recruits for the republican army of general Riego. This alone shewed me the nature of the intrigue; and I congratulated myself, for the sake of the general, as well as for my own, that I had determined not to stir. Had I listened to timorous advice, and disappeared at once, this ideal republic would no more have been considered as the mere invention of our enemies, and the reputation of Riego would have been blasted. My presence has caused to vanish the airy fabric of this vision. The absence of the political chief, Don Francisco Plasencia, was favorable to count d'Almodovar. M. Modenes had received from government an order,

empowering him, in case he should think the captain-general implicated, to announce to him his exile to Alicante, and authorizing him to take the military command. Modenes did not put in force an order of which he knew the injustice ; but Plasencia, who is very ambitious, and a constant attendant at the court, about which he has almost continually been employed, would not have lost such an opportunity of promoting his own interest. In that case, the accusation would have taken a more substantial form, and some of the charges would have been levelled more particularly at the count D'Almodovar. Plasencia was so much vexed at having lost so good a chance of preferment, that, on his return, he denounced the intendente, for having diverted the current of public justice from its regular channel. Poor Modenes who had acted with real loyalty, and in the sincerity of his heart, was disgraced as having been guilty of mal-practices, which never have been, nor ever can be proved against him. He and Riego have been the only victims of this bubble.

Meanwhile the proceedings against me began on the 4th. The nature of the accusation, the enunciation of the charges, and their palpable absurdity, drew a smile even from the fiscal, by whom I was interrogated. My answers were plain, short, and energetic. I took no small pleasure in tearing the veil from the intrigue, which had been directed against Riego. The material part of the affair did not go beyond the first day, for no fresh incident

characterized the subsequent sittings. These charges had produced such a sensation, that it was necessary to adhere strictly throughout to judicial forms, lest any flaw should be detected, which might invalidate the decision of the court. The interrogatories of those who were accused with me, and the examination of the witnesses whom I produced, lasted a fortnight; at the end of which the *auditor de guerra*,\* having summed up, and called for judgment, sentence was pronounced, and confirmed by the captain-general. I was declared innocent without *spot or blemish* (*sin tacha ni nota*).

I have reason to congratulate myself upon the course which I pursued throughout this affair; it has proved, that the firmness of an honest man is proof against the machinations of villainy; and it has been sufficient to overthrow the fabric of imposture, which was directed to destroy Riego.

While the proceedings were pending, the captain-general received from the minister at war, an order to transfer me to the state prison of the castle of Alicante. This was the work of M. de la Garde, who still fancied himself among his dearly beloved cossacks. Count d'Almodovar replied, that he could not interrupt the course of the proceedings, independently of which he could claim no power over the liberty of an individual, beyond that which was authorized by the constitution.

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\* Don Jaun Genoves.

After judgment had been pronounced, he received a fresh order to put me under arrest in my own house, till the termination of the proceedings at Saragossa. This was opposed, upon the ground that the order was unconstitutional, and that I could not be deprived of my liberty, unless fresh charges were preferred against me. To crown the whole, they wanted to revise the proceedings at Madrid. M. de la Garde wished to have a finger in the pie, in order to try if he could not lay hold of something to enrich his memorandum-book. The reply to this was, that the affair having been terminated by a sentence, which is not subject to the revisal of the supreme council of war, can only be officially recorded in the archives of Valencia, where the parties aggrieved may take cognizance of it, in the manner prescribed by the law. Having been foiled in every attempt, M. de la Garde and his agent, M. Sanchez Salvador, ceased to molest me. I cannot complain of the Spanish newspapers, the *Universal* which alone speaks of this business, though supposing me to be really implicated, makes use of the most flattering expressions, lamenting, that a man distinguished by his talent and his virtues, should be involved in such a transaction.

There is only a wretch of the name of Chapuis, the editor of a paper professedly liberal, who, without knowing any thing of me, circulates to my prejudice the most absurd calumnies. I have learnt since, that there was in the back ground, a Piedmontese emi-



grant, who took this method of counteracting the answer which I gave to the slanders, which I mentioned in my letter of the 25th of June. In consequence of a rather severe letter which I wrote to Chapuis, and which I caused to be inserted in the Spanish newspapers, he made a kind of recantation as despicable as his calumnies.

General Riego on his arrival at Lerida, addressed to the minister of war a memorial, dated 7th instant. In this memorial, after having recapitulated the insults which he suffered last year, when he was banished to Oviedo, and when, as a reparation, the military command was bestowed upon him at the beginning of the present year, he urged anew the motives which had induced him to solicit his removal in June last. On these grounds he requested leave to quit Spain, that he might be out of the reach of those enemies, whose object was to destroy him, and to rid the Spanish government of the presence of a soldier, whose disinterested patriotism merited a far different treatment. The reply which he had received from the minister of war, Moreno d'Aoiz, had renewed his hopes, when he was suddenly surprised at La Puebla de Alfinden, by a band of soldiers, who surrounded him like a criminal. To remove any suspicion they might entertain, respecting him, he retraced his steps without even tendering his resignation. The proclamation of the political chief of Saragossa, which announces in the same breath the disgrace of Riego, and an extensive conspiracy, is a direct aim against

his reputation. It little avails the political chief, that in his next proclamation, he declares the innocence of general Riego, and speaks of his disgrace as of a constitutional measure ; this poor subterfuge of the ministers, but badly cloaked an act so arbitrary. General Riego concludes his memorial by demanding justice, and the declaration of his innocence by a tribunal, before which he requests to be traduced.

The same day a very strong manifesto was circulated at Saragossa, by the seven battalions of the infantry and cavalry of the national guard. One sentence in particular, of which I send you the translation, proves that the patriots were not deceived by the intrigue directed against Riego. " Doubt it not, countrymen, and fellow citizens, these republican schemes, the bug-bears with which they have attempted to frighten you, by coupling with them the names of the most patriotic and most worthy citizens, such as Ballesteros, Riego, and several of the most distinguished deputies of the cortes, are mere inventions of wretches panting for plunder and assassination, and all the disorders of which anarchy is the fruitful source. It is to anarchy that they wish to lead us by spreading mistrust and divisions ; but their plans will be defeated were hell to assist them in their infernal designs."

General Riego having obtained leave to remove from Lerida to the castle of Farfagna, on the 22d sent a petition to the king, in person, complaining that no attention had been paid to the memorial

which he had addressed on the 7th to the minister of war. Neither will avail him, as long as the ministry shall be more than half servile, and at the beck of M. de la Garde, as it is at the present moment.

Riego cannot expect to be employed. The documents in question will only serve as manifestos to the Spanish nation; as such, he does well to publish them. No one can deny him the right of exposing his calumniators.

The situation of Spain becomes every day more critical in Arragon. The manœuvres of the clergy begin to influence the public opinion. The archbishop of Saragossa visits his diocese, not to feed the poor, or to comfort the orphan and the widow, but to fan the flame of rebellion. He preaches openly resistance to the constitutional system, and deliberately lays the foundation of revolt. In Catalonia, the clergy are at the same work. At Cadiz, in Andalusia, and in Galicia, agitation begins to be felt. I have apprized you of what has taken place at Valencia.

Politics have made me forget, till now, to mention the epidemic which broke out at Barcelona on the 6th July. It is the yellow fever, which manifested itself in the factories of Barcelonetta, and at Barcelona, on the same day, through the neglect of the police, and the medical authorities, and the rapacity of the smugglers. To give you an instance of it, this is what took place at Barcelona. The crew of a ship from the Havannah having landed, part of them

went to the inn of the *Escudo de Francia*, and some of them to the *Dorca* printing-house, where they had acquaintances. Three days after the disease had broken out, the crew, all those who were at the inn, and all the inhabitants of the printing-house were sent to the lazaretto. But the disease is spread about the town, and makes most fearful strides. The situation of the Piedmontese emigrants is dreadful; they cannot quit the town, and can no longer depend on the slender pittance granted to them by the government. In this destitute and forlorn state, several have perished through want and hunger, rather than from the effects of the disease. The yellow fever has spread as far as Tortosa, to several parts of Catalonia, and to the frontiers of Arragon, where the inhabitants of Barcelona and Tortosa carried the contagion, from which they were trying to escape. Here we are free from it. Besides the cordon formed on the frontiers of the province, there is another round Valencia, the gates of which are closed. We are provided with a *carte de sante* (certificate of health) without which we cannot venture abroad, and strangers are conducted to a lazaret beyond the walls. At each of the four gates, through which entrance is permitted, is posted a monk as sentry, who is relieved every day. The instinct of these animals in detecting a stranger is surprising; it is impossible for any one to stand the test of their inquisitorial eye.

## LETTER VII.

*Valencia, November 15, 1821.*

I Have been some time without writing to you, because I was watching the preparation of events, of which I was anxious to see the commencement. Now the effects of the conduct of ministers and of the cortes begin to develope themselves. A re-action on the part of the liberals seems to be shortly intended : let us see how far we may depend upon it.

The electoral assemblies for the nomination of deputies to the cortes, took place on the 5th of October, and the result has been favorable to the good cause. I have, however, witnessed an anomaly which caused me no small degree of surprize.

The officers, subalterns, and soldiers of the regiment of artillery, were allowed to vote in every parish. The extension of such a privilege to men on active service, is in direct opposition to the principles of every sound constitution, because the duties of a soldier are incompatible with such a privilege ; and in every well disciplined regiment, the soldiers generally abide by the opinion of the colonel. To add to all this irregularity, the regiment of Zamora were not allowed to vote, while the cuirassiers were permitted to use their franchise. Thus the exclu-

sion and admission of particular voters have been equally arbitrary.

The free-masons who had the lead amongst the patriots, in order to thwart the serviles and the moderados, who seemed inclined to stifle the public voice, endeavored to increase the mass of voters, and with that view, included in the number all those whom they could depend upon. The regiment of Zamora, which is inclined to servilism, was excluded. The electoral assemblies of the districts, took place on the 2nd instant; and the parish electors being liberals, the electors of the districts are consequently the same. In Murcia, the elections have been equally favorable; those of the other provinces are not known as yet. The state of Valencia is still the same; the serviles are continually plotting to restore general Elio to liberty—the patriots are constantly under arms—and all ends in smoke.

I have just received from C——, a Genoese of your acquaintance, a prospectus of a philanthropic society, which is to supersede the masons, comuneros, carbonari, &c. The plan itself would be advantageous to Spain, as it would unite the free-masons and the comuneros: but I cannot help pointing out to you, one of those contradictions, to which human nature is liable, when the power of habit withdraws us imperceptibly from the path of reason.

In the preamble, he traces the vices and the fluctuations of every association of this kind. He observes, that the moral weakness of their members has

always caused them to deviate from its primitive object; that their forms and their mysteries have generally awakened suspicion; that every degree of their hierarchy has served as a stepping stone for ambition; lastly, that from their secrecy, and their paraphernalia, they have had to encounter numberless difficulties. These expressions would naturally lead one to suppose, that the author has in view a public society, similar to our confederations; this is not the case—a *secret society* is his object. I shall give you a short sketch of its organization.

The chief object of the philanthropical society will be to unite its members by the fraternal bond of mutual assistance and good will; to create, uphold, and maintain a system virtually representative; to organize a confederacy amongst nations, as far as their geographical situation will allow. The society is to be secret, and to be composed of directors and of laborers. The directors are to pay an admission fee, and a stipulated sum monthly. The laborers are to supply their contingent by the fruits of their industry.

The society is to be governed by a board consisting of twenty-four members, elected and re-elected, or suspended every fifth year, on a majority of one hundred votes of the directors residing within a certain distance of the central board. The central board is not to refuse the written votes of one hundred directors for the dismissal and re-election of a number of central directors, not exceeding twelve. The central

board is to reside for the present in a free country, and Spain is proposed. In every town or district, with more than five thousand inhabitants, there is to be a director elected, and discharged by the central board, on the written representation of a third of the directors of the colony. The society is to have a pass word, signs to recognize each other, and a word for muster: a cipher is to be adopted for secret correspondence. You see that this new association is built on the model of almost every other secret society.

I have said that it might be serviceable to Spain at the present crisis. This is true, in as far as it would naturally include all the comuneros; and by forcing the free-masons to lay aside their hierarchical forms, obviate the evils of the jesuitical spirit which begins to characterize this society in Spain. This is my opinion, considering the actual state of things here. As to the society itself, my opinion of it is that which I entertain of secret political societies in general.

When the yoke of despotism galls a nation, those who wish to overthrow the tyranny which oppresses it, have no resource left but secret assemblies to escape the vigilance of the agents of despotism, and to prepare the elements of a political change. The more a nation is dissatisfied, the more these assemblies gain credit in its opinion. The very mystery with which they surround themselves is a proof that their efforts are directed against despotism. Power



may stalk abroad; its adversaries must seek a hiding-place. But when once liberty has been regained, when once the government is really constitutional, the case is different. Secret assemblies being no more necessary, are viewed with a jealous eye, by the very reason that their labours not being required in the cause of liberty, they are supposed to have private interest for their object. This opinion is unfortunately but too plausible, and but too well established by a close observation of human nature.

When secret societies are no longer called upon to promote the public weal, they direct their views to a different object—for an object they must have: and self-interest, that great spring of human action, impels them to direct their efforts to the welfare of their individual members. If there be but one of these societies, its aim will be political dominion; if there be two of them, they will dispute the palm.

Consider, under this point of view, they do harm; and when the situation of affairs is such as I have just described, they are totally useless. When once the constitutional system is established, and the government is avowedly, though, perhaps, not cordially constitutional, all that remains to be done is—to propagate constitutional principles; to enlighten the nation by teaching every citizen his privilege and his duties; and to give to every class an interest in the constitution by demonstrating its general utility.

This requires no secret society. Nations, and mankind in general, do not like their dearest interests to be discussed when they are no party to the discussion: they take the alarm at the mystery which involves the affairs in which they have the greatest right to be concerned. Public assemblies, and public assemblies alone, are necessary; the turbulence of universal deliberation may be avoided. In organizing a public society, where every good citizen should claim right of admittance, the power of deliberating might be restricted to a committee; but this committee should meet on days and at hours previously known to the public. Every citizen should have free access to the sittings. Every motion or petition of a member should be received without difficulty, read aloud, discussed, and decided upon in public. The lower orders will thus become fond of institutions, and of a society in which they will find clearly traced their rights and their duties; which have for the constant object of their labours the general welfare of the public; and whose operations are always open to the animadversions of the public, whose interests are confided to their care.

I have communicated this idea to a great number of patriots; but the spirit of mistrust which has been entailed upon the Spaniards, still more by the fearful power of the inquisition, than by political tyranny, will, I am afraid, subvert this plan.

As to the plan of C——, I have transmitted it according to his request, to the committee of patriots,

through the medium of Morales, to whom I wrote on the subject on the 19th of October ; but I apprehend nothing is to be expected from it.

The free-masons and the comuneros will naturally oppose this new society, which they must consider as the bane of their own. It might have been established when the comuneros were organizing themselves—but it is now too late. I thought it right to transmit, in the same letter, the result of my observations on the affairs of Saragossa, and some opinions circulated respecting the undertaking of M——. I had concluded that the Spanish patriots did not intend to enter into a sphere of action, extending beyond the confines of their own country ; and that they did not mean to attack France, which they seemed to consider as an object of apprehension. On the latter subject, he sent me a satisfactory reply, dated 26th instant;\* but you will observe, that he does not speak at all of the plan of C——. You will also be struck with an expression, which caused me a great deal of surprise. I mean that which implies mistrust of count Torreno, who, however, is still reckoned among the liberal deputies.

Time will give me the key to this enigma ; in the mean while I have not had any communication with

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\* Appendix, No. 5.

M. Torreno ; and if he knows any thing concerning me, it must be through another channel.

Since my last letter, we have heard of the death of major-general Arcos Agüerro, the governor of Badajoz, in consequence of a fall from his horse on the 13th September. He was the companion of Quiroga and Riego ; and the patriots who considered him as their superior in point of talent, activity and firmness, bitterly lament his loss.

An extraordinary meeting of the cortes took place on the 29th of September : they seem to go on worse than ever. The first business which has occupied their attention, is the division of the Spanish territory upon a different scale, a business which the Spanish government gives specious reasons for considering as extremely urgent ; and, indeed, for the Spanish *government*, it is an affair of no little importance, since the number of new appointments, such as political chiefs, military commandants, and intendants, and their respective subordinate officers, will open a field for ministers to thrust their agents into every branch of administration.

On the 12th of October, the ministers submitted, and carried a plan for the immediate organization of twelve thousand active militia. This plan is a sinister omen for the liberals who consider it as a blow aimed at them. There are in Spain two kinds of militia ; the national guard, properly so called, and the active militia. The former is divided into volun-

teers, composed of citizens, who engage to defend permanently the constitution, choose their own officers, admit or reject those who subsequently present themselves, and occasionally do the duty of regular troops. They arm and equip themselves at their own expence, or by voluntary subscriptions, or at the expence of municipalities, composed of liberals. They are already a fine body of men, well trained and disciplined, equal to regular troops as to tactics, and very superior as to the spirit by which they are animated. Volunteers are the real pillars of the constitution.

The second part of the national guard is called (*milicia de la ley*;) it is composed of the remainder of the citizens, who are capable of bearing arms, but it is hardly any where effective.

The *active militia* is a supplementary part of the permanent army, which is recruited by a ballot similar to that which takes place for the regular troops. The officers are named by government, and are on the same footing as the officers of the line; you may, therefore, readily suppose, that the active militia is completely in the hands of the ministers. In the present instance the apprehensions of the patriots are the more grounded, that the future officers of this latter corps are but too well known;—they are in a great measure taken from the ranks of the late provincial grenadiers; and thus of course belong to the aristocratical class, and the servile party. On the

23d, government submitted to the cortes a plan for organizing the active militia. I need not say that ministers made use of all their influence, and completely succeeded in their designs.

Towards the latter end of October, agitation began to prevail in several provinces, and seems to be on the eve of producing a convulsion. In October, there was at Cadiz a triumphant patriotic procession, in which the portrait of Riego, surrounded with all the emblems of the constitution, was carried about in every street.

The prudence and moderation of the magistrates who tolerated, and even sanctioned by their presence, this harmless manifestation of public opinion, kept all within bounds, and prevented every excess which imprudent and ill-timed opposition might have occasioned.

We have received, within these few days, news from Saragossa. Public indignation has manifested itself against Moreda, the major part of the national guard have taken arms, and given him notice to quit the town, which he has been under the necessity of doing; but a rather unfavorable symptom has since shewed itself. Two or three days after this energetic manifestation, two out of the four districts into which the town is divided, circulated a manifesto against this proceeding, and have receded from the other districts.

Ministers are not well pleased with what took place at Cadiz. From the hatred which they bear to

the high priest of the constitution, they are determined to put down the restless spirit of the inhabitants. For fear, however, of shewing the cloven foot too much, they have affected to use constitutional measures, similar to those which they directed against Riego, and to rid themselves in the same manner of the commandants who may be too liberally inclined. Don Francisco Martin, called l'Empecinado, who was governor of Zamora, was the first to fall under their displeasure. A few days afterwards, they likewise dismissed Don Jacinto Romaraté, military commandant of Cadiz, who had committed the crime of joining in the procession. His successor was Don Francisco Javier Vanegas, an avowed servile, whose principles had formerly caused him to be expelled from Galicia, as an enemy of his country. On the 29th, the news of the nomination of general Vanegas having reached Cadiz, the inhabitants began to take the alarm, and anxiously tumultuous groups were to be seen in every direction. About six in the evening, the *Plaza de la Constitucion* was filled with an immense crowd of individuals of every class, and ferment was at its height. To divert the attention of the populace, and to prevent any riotous excess, a kind of *auto da fe* was thought of; the number of the *Universal*, dated the 23d of October, in which general Riego was accused of being the principal promoter of the agitation which pervaded Cadiz, and of being the cause of the mistrust of the executive power evinced by the inhabitants, was committed to

the flames. This was not sufficient ; at seven o'clock in the evening, the crowd either joined, or went to meet the patriotic society. Some one having complained of the tumult thus occasioned, and having called to order, it was replied—" That the intention of the inhabitants of Cadiz was to refuse admittance to general Vanegas, because at such a moment his principles were suspected ; that any arbitrary act of government should be resisted, unless a military chief were chosen, known for his merit, his attachment to the constitution, and possessed of the public confidence."

Some speakers having represented to the assembled multitude, that the political chief was the person to whom such a representation ought to be made, they went to his residence, preceded by a band of music. The political chief replied—" That he would willingly transmit to his majesty a respectful and energetic representation, requesting him to accede to the universal wishes of the inhabitants of Cadiz ; and that he had already assembled a junta, to which the provincial deputies, the municipal and other authorities would unite themselves to discuss this important question." Satisfied with this answer, the crowd dispersed quietly, and order was restored without the least accident.

The same night was promulgated a representation signed by all the civil and military authorities ; the beginning of it deserves to be quoted on account of the truth that it contains.



“ *Let us embrace cordially the constitutional system. I shall be the first to give the example.* Such were the expressions made use of by your majesty, when you swore to uphold the constitution of the Spanish monarchy. The whole nation did your majesty the justice to place implicit confidence in this declaration, in which confidence it would still persevere, if your ministers were not guilty of the most cruel injustice against your majesty, by severing the bonds which should unite a constitutional king to his subjects. The scandalous and repeated infractions of the laws, and of the constitution itself; the unrelenting persecution of the restorer of liberty, general Riego; the fatal consequences which the removal of general Lopez Bagnos has produced in Navarre; the appointment in the war department of individuals, either imbecile, or blasted in the public opinion; the extreme activity with which judicial proceedings are carried on against the patriots, compared to the barefaced dilatoriness with which the punishment of the enemies of the constitution is put off; the undiminished prevalence of despotic magistrates in every tribunal; the dismissal of the chief officer of every public body, whose opinions are favorable to the new institutions, in order that his place may be occupied by a successor of contrary principles; the impunity of the prelates, who preach and disseminate doctrines contrary to the constitution;—all these crying evils, strengthened by the unfavorable opinion universally enter-

tained of your majesty's present ministers, have persuaded the Spanish nation that every act of these ministers is an attempt to overthrow the constitutional system, and to rivet the fetters of those who redeemed your majesty from captivity at the price of their blood, and replaced upon your head the crown of your ancestors."

After having mentioned the dismissal of l'Empeinado, and observed that general Vanegas is notorious throughout Spain as an enemy to the constitution, and that he has been once disgraced as such ; that he cannot be employed without the violation of an express law decreed by the cortes, which forbids the appointment of any individual who has not given proofs of his attachment to the new order of things; the representation concludes by praying that the military command may be continued to Don Manuel Francisco de Jaureguy, on whom it devolved by the resignation of general Romaraté ; or that it may be given to a person uniting the same qualifications, and the same civic virtues.

This representation of the town of Cadiz has kindled the flame in other provinces. On the 9th, a great number of citizens of Madrid, and on the 13th, the town of Valencia issued representations of the same kind. In that of Madrid is to be found a sentence remarkable for its boldness.

" On your speedy and firm resolution depends the safety of the state ; and, we may add, the fate of your

majesty. We beg that your majesty will recollect the history of the revolution of a neighbouring state, and consider the extremities to which its monarch was reduced, by the advice of his courtiers and sycophants, when they combined to oppose the wishes of the nation, who had sworn to the alternative of death or liberty."

## LETTER VIII.

*Valencia, December 1, 1821.*

AGITATION still continues, not only in the provinces, but in the very bosom of Madrid. In this metropolis, the patriotic societies are never destitute of attendants; political pamphlets and advertisements succeed each other without interruption.

The town of Valencia has not been satisfied with sending one representation to the king; the municipality addressed a second, on the 15th ult.; but it is easy to see, that the municipality in so doing, was compelled to yield to public opinion. This representation is, in substance, the same as that of Cadiz, because the statements contained in both are founded on truth, and are too obvious to remain unnoticed. But the municipal authorities of Valencia have been so profuse, in their protestations of respect and obedience, and have picked out with so much care the most submissive terms, that it is evident that they care but little about the professed object of their petition. The municipality of Valencia has for some time been making such a parade of moderation, that they have lost the confidence of the patriots, who hail the approach of a new election, which takes place on the 8th instant.

We have received the representation, addressed to the king, on the 2d of November, by the authorities of the town of Seville. It is signed by the political chief, Don Ramon Louis Escobedo, and by the commandant-general Don Manuel de Velasco. The petitioners after having recapitulated the grievances pointed out by the inhabitants of Cadiz, and its vicinity, in the expression of which grievances they entirely concur, request with equal firmness, the dismissal of the ministry, and the treacherous advisers who beset his majesty's person. But it is impossible to pass unnoticed the following expressions, replete with truth and energy.

“ To rule over a nation with equity and justice, it is not sufficient, sire, to say that it is so ruled. Nations know but too well the value of such declarations; and the good, or the evil, which they actually experience, form the only criterion by which they can judge of their rulers. It is, therefore, needless to say, that there is a constitution—that we are governed according to this constitution—that the measures of your majesty's government are in conformity with it—and, that your majesty's government does not exceed its legal and constitutional powers. This is not sufficient—the satisfaction of the public, and the assurance that the nation enjoys every advantage held out by the constitutional system, are the only safeguards of your majesty's government. If these safeguards fail, neither your power, nor your purest intentions, nor the wish to suppose,

that your majesty's agents have no object in view, but the public good, can save the credit of you majesty's government, and suppress the general agitation with which the nation is afflicted."

The removal of Domenech, the political chief of Murcia, has equally agitated this province, and particularly Carthagena, where the spirit of liberalism prevails to an eminent degree. Under the impression of these feelings, the inhabitants of Carthagena have addressed to the king a representation, in which they call for a speedy remedy to the calamities which press upon the nation; *without it*, they add, *woe to the nation, and to the person of your majesty!*

Since my last letter, a fresh representation, signed by a great number of the inhabitants of Madrid, made its appearance on the 15th of November. Its object is, likewise, the dismissal of the ministry, and a change of the present system of government. I transcribe a sentence, which for boldness does not yield to any thing that was said in the representation of the 9th.

"Remember, sire, the immense sacrifices with which you have been redeemed by the Spanish nation, that great and generous nation, which, forsaken by you, and retrieved from despair by its own efforts, placed upon your brow that diadem, which from its inherent rights it might have *bestowed upon another*. Remember that it was this nation that transferred you from a dungeon to a throne—and that to its

heroic efforts alone, you are indebted for your present situation. It was not by divine right, but by our free will, that you were proclaimed our sovereign, because providence never intended that we should be your's by birth-right ; and we will never submit to be the victims of a conspiracy between the altar and the throne."

Internal dissensions have caused the town of Saragossa to shew a more yielding spirit. Moreda who had been ordered by government to return there with two battalions, was admitted. I need not add, that arrests have been the consequence.

Government has just appointed superior commandant at Seville, general Moreno d'Aoiz ; political chief at Cadiz, general Abadia ; and superior military chief, in the same town, general baron d'Andilla.

I am persuaded, that the internal agitation of Spain, and the bold language of the patriots, must produce a great impression on the other nations of Europe, and that important results are generally expected. As to myself, who am a witness to all these transactions, I cannot divest myself of certain apprehensions. Much is undertaking—but will any thing be brought to a conclusion ? The patriots exhibit a pretended spirit of moderation, which ends in apathy. At Valencia, since drawing up and transmitting to the king their spirited representation, the patriots seem to have slumbered, and the serviles endeavoured openly, and with success, to counteract

the work of their adversaries. This is difficult to understand; as on the 13th of November, the Valencian patriots had to oppose a decided majority in point of numbers, and prevailed only through dint of courage and persevering activity. The satisfaction which this caused me, induced me to write to Morales on the 2nd ult.

“Hasten (I said) the solution of the political problem which is in your hand—things cannot remain long in this unnatural situation—it behoves you to give a fresh impulse to affairs, in order to avoid a schism, or a re-action. The patriots are tardy in all their proceedings—their moderation is unseasonable; they appear to slumber, while the enemies of liberty, assisted by government, are constantly upon the alert. Depend upon it, they will do every thing in their power to prevent, or to thwart the intended meeting of the cortes. I wait, with anxiety, the result of the patriotic resolutions of Cadiz and Seville. Be upon your guard, my valued friend—firmness and activity are necessary to preserve the liberty of Spain, and that of Europe. Do not despise, do not overlook the example, and the lessons afforded by our revolution. Although great moral revolutions have all their peculiar features, (to be assigned, perhaps, rather to momentary circumstances, than to the diversity of national characters), their general results are ever the same. This must naturally be expected, since men are every where the active and passive instruments.”



Cadiz has witnessed a fresh ebullition of popular feeling. The inhabitants having learnt by the *Courier* of the 14th of November, that the representation transmitted to the king, had been only answered by coarse invectives, printed in the *Universal* and the *Impartial*, a great ferment broke out in the town, on the very same evening, and lasted the whole of the 15th. On that day the authorities met again, in order to draw up and transmit, without delay, to the permanent deputation of the cortes, fresh complaints, grounded upon the slight with which the first representation had been treated, and the consequent danger which threatened the public tranquillity. This memorial was sent off on the 15th at twelve o'clock at night, and quiet was restored ; but fresh disorders were provoked on the 16th, by the arrival of the courier of the provincial deputies, to announce that baron d'Andilla had left Madrid, to take the chief command at Cadiz. This intelligence, equally unexpected, and unpleasant at the time, when a very different answer was looked for to the representation which had been sent to Madrid, increased almost to fury the irritation of the inhabitants of Cadiz.

The authorities, in order to prevent any fatal results, met at four o'clock in the afternoon, for the purpose of deliberating on what should be done, on the entry of the baron d'Andilla, which was hourly expected. Meanwhile, the streets and squares were filled by a mob, vociferating that the new governor

must not be received. Several of the military, assisted by citizens of note, in order to appease the populace, proposed the legal remedy of a verbal representation to the political chief. The crowd went quietly to the residence of the magistrate, and several citizens requested of him, in the name of the people, that measures should be taken to prevent the entrance of the new governor. The political chief replied, that this request should be taken into consideration. The crowd then withdrew to the *Plaza de la Constitucion*, where it was decided, that the same request should be drawn up and laid before the assembled authorities. Whilst this was going on, a fresh deputation waited upon the assembled authorities, to make before them the verbal declaration, of which they were shortly to receive the transcript. This verbal communication was brief and energetic. Here it is word for word.

“ 1st. The people are determined not to allow baron d’Andilla to take the chief command of the province, because he has been appointed by the ministry, of which the dismissal has been demanded.

“ 2nd. No order emanating from the ministry shall be obeyed, until other ministers have been named.”

This declaration having in the meanwhile been drawn up in the same laconic style, was delivered to the authorities, who promised to take it into consideration; and the mob retired quietly to their homes.

On the 18th, at seven o'clock in the evening, baron D'Andilla presented himself at the Cartuja de Jerez, where there was a battalion of the regiment Espagna. The chief of battalion notified to him the resolution of the inhabitants not to suffer his entrance into Cadiz, and informed him that he should not pass on. Each of them wrote to the political chief, and to the acting commandant Jaureguy. The latter replied, by the repetition and confirmation of what the chief of battalion had notified to the baron. It was then agreed that baron D'Andilla should leave the province, and retire to Utrera, till the arrival of fresh orders. Jaureguy transmitted this agreement to the minister of the interior, Don Ramora Feliu, to whom its perusal would, no doubt, be any thing but agreeable. D'Andilla, during his residence at Cartuja de Jerez, delivered to the chief of battalion above-mentioned a circular of the minister of war, Sanchez Salvador, dated the 13th November, addressed to the principal authorities of the province of Cadiz. I enclose it for your perusal.\* You will easily detect the spirit in which it is drawn up. In fact, it is nothing but an exhortation to passive obedience, and an attempt to create civil war in the province of Cadiz.

General Riego had transmitted to the king in the month of October, a memorial, complaining of the shameful treatment which he had experienced, even

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\* Appendix, No. 6.

in the choice of the place which had been fixed upon for his exile. He had been sent at first to Lerida, where the yellow fever was raging. It was with difficulty that he obtained leave to go to the castle of Farfagna, in the neighbourhood, where he was nearly as much exposed to the same epidemic which prevailed in the surrounding villages. The ministers would willingly have got rid of him in this way, but at last, for fear of carrying to the highest pitch the irritation of the patriots, who threatened to organize an army, and to put Riego at its head, they allowed him to choose the place of his exile. He fixed upon the small town of Reus. The authorities, the garrison, and the inhabitants, came to meet him, and received him with the loudest acclamations. A few days after, Riego went to Tarragona, where he met the same enthusiastic reception. The three days which he spent in that town, exhibited a scene of uninterrupted festivity. There he received from all the patriotic societies of Spain congratulations upon his birth-day. He addressed the people several times, amidst the loudest acclamations, unmingled with any shouts of *viva el rey*.

The inhabitants of Cadiz call upon him—the Spanish patriots beg of him not to forsake the army—to lend them his powerful assistance in the cause of liberty, of which he is the restorer and support. At this moment, the name of Riego has upon the army and the patriots the same influence that the name of Napoleon had on the French, in 1815, when he re-

turned from Elba. The new penal code has just been submitted to the deliberation of the cortes. It is certainly essential to establish a new penal code, harmonizing with the present system of government, and to abrogate a confused heap of decrees and decisions, absurd and contradictory, like every thing which emanates from the hand of despotism : but the first proper step would have been to supersede nine-tenths of the present judges, who are all inimical to amelioration, and liberal ideas of every kind, and who are notorious for their venality. They should have been replaced by men, whose opinions coincide with the new system; and new judicial forms should have been adopted in the mean time, or rather previously agreed upon; for as long as the present forms are persisted in, they are so favorable to the corruption of judges, that any alteration in the penal code is nugatory. The system of juries should likewise have been established, but the intention of government is not to uphold the constitution. Cast your eye on the prospectus of the penal code : it bears on the face of it the stamp of despotism, endeavoring to fortify and organize itself.

The government has taken advantage of the events at Cadiz and Seville, to strengthen itself by taking extraordinary measures. A message from the king relating to these events, was addressed to the cortes on the 25th of November. Government requests, as might be expected, to be allowed to invest the exe-

cutive power with extraordinary privileges, so as to give it a decided preponderance over the other constitutional elements. This is what they call in their language, to consolidate the constitution. The cortes have clearly proved by their answer, that they are prepared to go even greater lengths than they will be required to do. These laws were submitted to a committee. I enclose the message of the king, and the reply of the cortes. \*

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\* Appendix, No. 7.

## LETTER IX.

*Valencia, January 4, 1822.*

ON the day when I last wrote to you, a patriotic festival took place. It was a banquet, to which the second battalion of volunteers, called the Exaltados, invited the first battalion, which is said to be rather too moderate ; but this was no drawback to the interest of the meeting.

It took place at the Grao, which the two battalions left in the evening, as if they composed one body. The fraternal union of the guests—the toasts given, “liberty to the nation”—and “the unanimity of the patriots”—the patriotic songs in which every one joined—the cordiality between the citizens and the military—and the ingenuous expression of the sentiments, which glowed in the bosoms of the actors and the spectators—all contributed to heighten the interest of the scene.

The return of the first battalion into the town, may be considered as a fresh scene of festivity. The soldier-like appearance, the martial aspect of the volunteers, who entered the town in close columns, and in as good order as veteran troops, presented an imposing sight. Imagination carries me back to the 14th of July, 1790, of which this festival

was a striking image. Once more my gloomy forebodings were banished, by the cheerful recollection of the past.

The situation of Cadiz is unaltered; preparations are making for its defence. The Isla de Leon is bristling with guns; all the old batteries are in a complete state of defence; and fresh works have been constructed to cover the bridge of Suazo. The new political chief, Abadia, presented himself at the bridge of Suazo, and demanded admittance into Cadiz, making a great parade of his patriotic sentiments. The reply was, that no one wished to doubt the sincerity of his protestations; but that they would be of no avail, as the town of Cadiz had determined not to admit any emissary of the present ministers. Mr. Abadia was, therefore, obliged to return as he came.

We have just received the news of a political commotion at Corunna. On the 18th of November, this town following the example of Cadiz, had addressed to the king an energetic representation, which had been signed by the captain-general Don Francisco Espoz y Mina, as well as by all the military and judicial authorities; but not by the ecclesiastics. The government, which eagerly lays hold of every opportunity of following up its designs, that is, of depriving the patriots of every kind of authority, has not failed to take advantage of this circumstance. Ministers knew that they could depend upon the zeal of the new political chief, Don Manuel de Latre,



who had arrived at Corunna a short time after the representation in question had been signed by the inhabitants, and who has proved by his conduct in this business, that he is, and ever will be, one of the tools of despotism.

On the afternoon of the 27th of November, a courier from the ministers arrived with despatches, of which the contents were carefully concealed by the political chief. This mystery aroused the fears and suspicions of the inhabitants; a crowd assembled on the Plaza de la Constitucion; and amidst the conjectures, which were hazarded, respecting the despatches brought by the courier, the ferment increased. The unpopularity of the ministers is such, that nothing but treachery was expected. All of a sudden it was rumoured, that the courier was the bearer of an order for the dismissal of Mina. The reading of the despatches was loudly called for; deputies, appointed by the people, demanded imperiously that the municipal and other authorities, should forthwith assemble at the town hall.

They did assemble; and shortly afterwards the political chief, in order to calm the effervescence of the people, barefacedly declared, that the despatches which he had received, being of a private nature, could not be communicated to any one; *but he gave his word of honor*, that they did not contain an order for the *dismissal of any of the authorities*.

The crowd was naturally irritated by an answer which implied treachery. They unanimously declared,

that the time for mystery was gone by ; that the people were aware of their rights, and insisted upon knowing every circumstance, in which the cause of liberty was concerned ; they further declared, that they would not separate, until they were fully apprized of the nature of the intelligence contained in the despatches. The authorities were obliged to comply, and public lecture was made of a royal order sealed, addressed to general Mina, and signed by Salvador. This order announced in laconic terms to general Mina, his dismissal and exile to Siguenza, and named De Latre for his successor.

On receiving this intelligence, the crowd unanimously declared, that they would not allow the departure of Mina. Several deputations presented themselves before the authorities, and requested that a courier should be despatched to Madrid, to announce the resolution of the people. This was promised ; but at eleven o'clock at night the people were apprized, that the despatch to Madrid was not contemplated, and that the departure of Mina was decided upon.

The major part of the population paraded the streets during the night. The garrison remained under arms at their quarters, and all seemed to threaten an explosion the next day. The authorities begged of the political chief to take into consideration the critical situation of the town. The officers of the garrison declared that the troops would not act against the people. It was then announced that Mina

should not leave Corunna, and that a proper answer should be sent to the ministers. This declaration restored tranquillity, but only for a short time.

It was known at day-break, that the political chief had written seven times in the course of the night to Mina, to ask whether he would obey the orders of government ;—that the general had replied, “ That he was prepared,” and that a sloop was getting ready at the *Palamios* for his conveyance. The crowd, infuriated by this intelligence, rushed tumultuously to the house of Mina, who, obliged to yield to the general wish, was conducted in triumph to the town hall, under the escort of part of the national guard, who had hastily put themselves under arms. Meanwhile the political chief had gone to the Alameda, where the chief part of the garrison had assembled. He called the officers around him, and represented to them the necessity of complying with the orders of government. The officers unanimously replied, that they were ready to sacrifice their lives in the cause of the nation, which was daily insulted by a perfidious ministry ; and, that the only means of preventing the effusion of blood, would be not to remove any of the present authorities. De Latre wished to return his sword, but it was not accepted ; and he was told, that it was his duty to continue his functions as political chief. He then returned to the municipality, in order to consult on the measures which it would be necessary to adopt, to calm the irritation of the people, who loudly insisted on

the restoration of Mina. A citizen read aloud the instructions, which the political chief had received from the minister of war: their tenor is as follows—

“ The king has been pleased to deprive of the supreme command of the province of Galicia, major-general Don Francisco Espoz y Mina, and to banish him to the town of Siguenza in this province, as you will find expressed in the orders herewith transmitted. His majesty further directs, that you shall, in the mean time, take the military command of the province. Should you think it necessary, for the preservation of public tranquillity, to put some militia regiments under arms, you are hereby authorized so to do, as well as to dismiss the chiefs and officers, whose loyalty you may doubt, giving me due notice of the same for the approval of his majesty.”

*Madrid, November 24, 1821.*

The reading of these instructions carried to its height the exasperation of the people. Deputies chosen from amongst them, and the national militia, proceeded to the town hall, and notified in strong terms the public wish. At length De Latre was obliged to give way, and to draw up a statement, by which he resigned the military command to general Mina:—quiet was thus restored.

A few days afterwards, this same De Latre left Corunna secretly, and appeared at Lugo, where he announced himself as general-commandant of Galicia;

but the inhabitants refused to acknowledge his authority. This has not stopped his intrigues. He has provoked, through his agents, a counter revolution among the serviles at Orense, and general Mina will be under the necessity of marching against that town. Thus ended the affair at Corunna.

The government, obliged to yield, has caused Salvador to write to general Mina, that the king approved of his conduct on the 28th of November. How pitiful is a government, which has thus recourse to falsehood and treachery!

The election of the deputies to the cortes, took place here on the 3d of December, and has been favorable to the cause of the patriots. The most striking names are those of Messrs. Serrano, a distinguished advocate, Salva Navarro Texeiro, Bertran de Lis, whose nephew was one of the victims of general Elio, father Rico, a franciscan, and Domenech and Mr. Marau, among the supplementary deputies.

The election of the new municipality, took place on the 17th of December. Most of the new members are patriots: but in every election, the hierarchy of the free-masons, and the jesuitical spirit of their chiefs, gives them a great advantage over the comuneros. The former have had almost every where a triumphant majority. In the election of the municipality, I have observed a contradiction, which is the result of party manœuvres, and which was necessary to insure the election of patriots. I have somewhere mentioned, that the artillerymen had

been permitted to vote during the first election ; since that time, this corps has changed its principles in favor of the serviles. They have, therefore, been excluded from the present election, under a pretence, that as Spanish citizens, they had a right to vote for the representatives of the whole nation : but not when the elections were confined to the authorities of the town of Valencia. This exclusion has already created disputes between the artillerymen and the inhabitants.

General Moreno d'Aoiz, appointed by government to the command of Seville, came as far as Ecija, the frontier town of the province on the road from the capital. On the same day a deputation from Seville arrived likewise at Ecija, to notify to the general, that they would acknowledge neither his authority, nor that of the ministry who had sent him. Moreno d'Aoiz wished to make some observations ; but the people, who were already in a state of exasperation, became so outrageous, that the political chief vainly endeavored to appease them, till Moreno d'Aoiz took his departure from the province.

He first retreated to Carlota, where baron d'Andilla, whose intrigues had not procured him entrance into Cadiz, came to join him. On the 1st of December, they left the place together, and arrived at an early hour at Cordova, where Moreno expected to find forces to march on Seville. The military governor of Cordova, received general Moreno with due respect, and gave orders, that the subordinate

authorities should follow the same example, and pay to the general the usual visits. Shortly afterwards the officers of the regiment, Infante Don Antonio, presented themselves, and addressed to Moreno d'Aoiz, the following compliment—

“ We come to offer our services to your excellency, in every thing which does not relate to the national service, concerning which your excellency can have nothing to communicate to us, till the cortes have found some remedy for the calamities with which Spain is afflicted.”

This address was approved by all those who are not decidedly serviles. On the same day, another curious incident took place. General Moreno presented his passport when he entered Cordova; but baron d'Andilla contrived to evade it. When, however, he was seen in the interior of the town, some one remarked that he came from a province supposed to be infected with a contagious disorder, and that he had violated the quarantine laws. The municipality met to discuss the question, and after some debate, it was decided that Messrs. d'Andilla and d'Aoiz, and their suite, should go to the lazaret, as well the inmates of the hotel where they resided. The political chief, the colonel of the carbineers, and a few other serviles, who had dined with them, were sent to keep them company.

In Andalusia, two divisions of three thousand men each, are forming under the orders of general Velasco and colonel San Miguel. General Velasco has

just ordered two battalions, two hundred and fifty horse, and some artillery, to advance towards Cordova, to support, in case of need, the patriots of that town.

Jaureguy has ordered a similar force to march from Cadiz towards Grenada: The king returned from the escurial to Madrid, on the 4th of December, in the afternoon; his reception by the people was very cool—there was hardly a cry of *viva el rey*.

Tranquillity has been again disturbed at Saragossa. On the 7th of December, in the evening, a contention arose between the citizens and the militia, in consequence of which some shots were exchanged. The political chief, *pro tempore*, (Moreda having been recalled by government) immediately sent a detachment of the regiment of Gerona, under the orders of Calderon, (the same who signified to Riego his dismissal), and another officer of the same regiment. On his reaching the Plaza de la Constitucion, Calderon saw a number of citizens assembled at the doors of the coffee-houses; he had the atrocity to order the charge to be sounded, and commanded the soldiers to fire on the defenceless crowd. Luckily only six persons were wounded; amongst them was an officer of the garrison. The national guards ran to arms, the authorities hastened to the spot, and fortunately succeeded in calming the indignation of the people, by causing the two officers to be arrested, and promising that they should be brought to punishment for this murderous deed.



On the 13th of December, the fifth regiment of marines being assembled for inspection, on the Plaza de la Constitucion of Carthagena, the colonel Don Francisco Piella formed it into a square, and asked the officers, subalterns, and soldiers, whether they were ready to join their brethren in arms at Cadiz, Seville, Corunna, and wherever they had embraced the cause of liberty? The regiment and all the spectators, military and others, testified their assent by loud acclamations. Inspired by this example, the national militia, and the other troops of the garrison, unanimously joined in a similar declaration.

At the patriotic society it was resolved, that if the next courier did not bring intelligence, that the ministry was dismissed, the municipality should be requested to issue a proclamation to the like effect. The next day, the militia and the troops of the garrison assembled on the Plaza de la Constitucion, where the chiefs harangued the soldiers. The substance of their speeches was a perfect acquiescence with their brethren in arms, who called for the dismissal of the present ministry; they declared that the present ministers were enemies to liberty, and to their country—that they would never make a compromise with despotism—and that they again would swear to defend the constitution to the last drop of their blood. These speeches were answered by universal shouts of applause.

The troops then withdrew to their quarters, with the exception of the volunteer battalion, which

remained on the Plaza de la Constitucion, where they dined, while they waited the arrival of the courier. On his arrival, they took up their arms, and went to the town hall, followed by a crowd. The municipality immediately met, to receive a deputation from the battalion. The deputies expressed the wish of the people and of the troops; begged the acquiescence of the municipality, and requested them to prevail upon the other authorities to follow their example. The municipality replied, that they participated in the feelings of the people, and would call upon the other authorities to subscribe to the same sentiments. On receiving this answer, the battalion and its followers withdrew with boisterous demonstrations of satisfaction.

The people then assembled at the Colliseum, as it is usual, when a courier is expected. Colonel Piella read the form of an address to the cortes, which was received with loud acclamations. The people immediately appointed ten deputies to submit this address to the inspection and approval of the authorities for their signature, if they sanctioned its contents. It was approved and sent off the same night. The inhabitants and the garrison of Carthagera, therein declare openly to the cortes, that they are ready to march to the defence of any province or town, which may be attacked at the instigation of despotic ministers, who by losing the confidence of the nation, have morally lost its influence; and that they are determined not to obey any order emanating from

such a ministry, if it should appear to them the least hostile to the liberties of the nation.

On the 17th, the garrison and the national militia having again assembled, the people demanded, that the troops should swear under their colours their adherence to the declaration which had been drawn up the preceding day. The commandant-general made some objections; this exasperated the people, who sent a fresh deputation to the town hall. The municipality immediately sent some of its members to the commandant to remonstrate. The officers of the provincial corps of Malaga, and of the national guard, and the other chiefs, assumed a decided tone, and the commandant-general was obliged to accede to their wishes. The troops defiled by the constitutional pillar, each corps taking successively the oath prescribed.

There has been a commotion at Barcelona; the political chief has been obliged to give in his resignation, in order to escape the public vengeance. The governor of the citadel has been put under an arrest, for having attempted to introduce into the garrison Swiss troops, who are looked upon with an eye of suspicion.

The committee, whose duty it was to prepare an address to the king, submitted the result of their labours on the 13th of December: the substance of the address is as follows—

“ Although the committee be of opinion, that the tumult, which they lament, has in a great measure

been occasioned by the conduct of the citizens, they think, nevertheless, that these disorders may also be imputed to his majesty's ministers; they, therefore, propose that the cortes should transmit to his majesty a message to the following effect :—

“ In the first place, shewing that it is expedient, in order to allay the public fears and suspicions, and to rouse the slumbering energies of the government, that his majesty should condescend to make in his ministry such alterations as circumstances imperiously require.

“ 2nd. That, if to remedy the above-mentioned evils, his majesty should think it necessary to enact new legislative measures, the cortes are ready to deliberate on any plan, which his majesty may think proper in his prudence to lay before them.”

This proposition was discussed on the 14th and 15th, and the opposition of a great number of members, who thought that the first part breathed too high tone for servants speaking to their masters, obliged the committee to modify it as follows :—

“ The cortes are of opinion, that the present ministry have not the moral energy necessary to conduct properly the affairs of the nation, and *to support and cause to be respected the dignity and prerogative of the throne*: the cortes, therefore, hope and beg, that your majesty will make use of the privileges with which you are invested, and will be pleased to adopt such prompt and decisive measures as the exigencies of the state require.”

Thus, at last, the cortes declared themselves in unequivocal terms. The majority did not suffer to escape the opportunity of laying foundations for profiting *by the laws of exception*.

The discussion, to which it gave rise, has given me a clue to the expression of distrust, of which Morales made use, when he spoke to me of count Torreno, who is evidently a tool of the ministerial party.

The address, after having obtained the approval of the cortes, was presented to the king. It contains the following remarkable expressions.

“ The cortes forbear from passing any censure on the acts of government; they do not feel authorized to do it as yet, as these acts are not sufficiently known to them. Their judgment is founded on undeniable results, on the manner in which public opinion has been affected. They are of opinion, that the errors or the misfortunes of the ministry, have deprived them of the confidence of the majority of the Spanish nation.

“ The cortes have no reason for doubting the good intention of the ministers; and they are aware, that every minister is not alike the object of suspicion; but good intentions, talents, and even virtues, are not always sufficient to insure a successful administration. They will not even always conciliate the public opinion; and ministers who have not the public opinion in their favor, cannot govern a free nation.

“ At a moment when the enemies of the constitution, and of your majesty, begin to resume a threatening attitude, it is by energy, by *practical knowledge*, by zeal, by patriotism, by strenuously supporting the rights of the people—it is by these qualities alone, that the ministry can gain the confidence of the nation, and assist your majesty in calming the prevailing spirit of discontent; in conciliating the jarring interests of the nation; in rectifying the erroneous notions which are abroad; in repressing licentiousness, and upholding the supremacy of the law: the dignity of the crown even requires it:—the crown, whose authority is too often identified with those, whose duty it is to transmit the orders emanating from it. The cortes who hold the honor of your majesty, and the splendor of the throne, as dear as the liberty of the heroic nation, of which they are the representatives, would think that they were failing in their duty, if they did not express to your majesty their full conviction, that the present ministry is devoid of the moral energy, which is necessary to superintend the affairs of the nation, to uphold and cause to be respected the dignity and the prerogative of the throne, &c. &c.”

Was it possible for them to ask in more explicit terms for the situation of ministers, of political chief, &c. in a word, to express more clearly, at what price they would vote for the laws of exception?

Valencia has followed the example of other towns. On the 21st of December, a representation was transmitted to the permanent deputation of the cortes, which after an enumeration of the misdeeds of the present ministry, ends with the following expressions.

“Valencia, faithful to the solemn oath which she has taken, declares that she is inspired with the same sentiments as Cadiz, Seville, Galicia, and the other cities, which have publicly manifested their opinion; and she will consider as an attack upon the unalienable rights of the nation, any measures hostile to these places; and, that she does not, nor ever will acknowledge, that the present deputies of the cortes have any right to alter in the least the constitutional charter. In a word, Valencia will neither acknowledge, nor obey any authority deviating in the least from the path which she has prescribed to herself, and which admits of no alternative, but the constitution or death.”

This address was signed by the political chief, Plasencia, the municipality, the three battalions, the cavalry and artillery of the volunteers, and by the *governador de la mitra*, (a title given to the person who occupies the bishop's see *pro tempore*).

No military authority, nor any corps of the garrison, gave their signatures; even Mr. Plasencia has hastened to apologise to government; he has pleaded the necessity of maintaining order, by apparently acceding to the wishes of the people.

The serviles, on their part, made on the 30th of December, a counter declaration, which they had the audacity to print with the names of those who signed it, to the number of about three hundred, including some artillerymen, and some servants.

In Navarre, the efforts of the clergy, and of the other serviles, (who have thrown off the mask, likewise in Arragon and Catalonia) begin to produce their effect.

On the 7th of December, the garrison of Pampeluna, gave a banquet in honor of Riego; after which, they came out of the citadel and paraded the town, singing patriotic songs, and shouting at intervals, *viva Riego*. The people took up arms, fired on the defenceless party, and left some killed and wounded on the spot. The troops withdrew to the citadel, from which they threatened to burn the town.

Fresh commotion in Murcia; Abadia, who had been refused admittance to Cadiz, was appointed its political chief: he was driven out of it on the 29th of December; and colonel of the regiment, Malaga Don Gregorio Piquero, is appointed to succeed him.



## LETTER X.

*Valencia, February 5, 1822.*

THE first day of this year, a newly organised society held its first meeting at Madrid. It has adopted for its title that of the constitutional society; but it is called by the public, the society *de los anilleros*, on account of the golden ring, which is the distinctive badge of its members. The real object of this society, the founders of which are the pith and marrow of the cortes, is to uphold and extend the power of government, in order to become its agents; or in other words, to increase the strength of the executive power, that they may bring into play an engine of their own creating, when they have secured all the military and civil appointments, and the lucrative offices of every description. Quiet and moderation are with them the order of the day; but for quiet and moderation, read passive obedience; their fundamental maxim, which they have fearlessly avowed before the assembled cortes, is, that to support the executive power, (that is, the ministry) is to defend the cause of liberty. If the society gains ground, it will cause a great deal of mischief.

The town of Valencia was in a truly critical situation during the last month, which may be imputed to the authorities. I have already told you, that the regiment of artillery is inclined to servilism, their progress has been rapid, and no one can wonder at it. The guard over general Elio is exclusively composed of men of this regiment; it was, therefore, the aim of those who wish him to escape, or to make use of him for a counter revolution, to bribe the artillerymen. Their efforts have not been unsuccessful; they are trying the same means with the regiment of Zamora, which would soon be on a par with the artillery.

The first symptoms of disturbance, manifested themselves in December last, and were aimed against the volunteers, and the first regiment of cuirassiers, which is entirely composed of liberals. Several of the orderlies of the cuirassiers were assassinated; and several militiamen have been attacked and wounded; of course when the artillerymen had the advantage in numbers. The latter paraded the streets at night armed, and shouting *viva el rey neto*. The superior authorities pay no attention to the complaints of the municipality, and do not think of putting a stop to these disorders.

Plasencia is sold to the anilleros, and Almodovar is little better; to which, add his pride, his ridiculous vanity, and the esprit de corps by which he is blinded. He will listen to nothing unfavorable to the regiment in which he has served, and defends it right or wrong.

The visit which, in December last, the duke de Infantado paid incog. to Valencia and Barcelona will produce fatal effects; he has corrupted the authorities, and given fresh vigor to the servile party.

It was evident, that the artillerymen, backed as they were by superior authority, would become insolent. In fact, they fancied they had a right to insult and illtreat the citizens; and had it not been for their cowardice, there would have been more bloodshed.

On the 7th of January, in the afternoon, the tumult was at its height. The artillerymen ran through the town with their swords under their cloaks, and many armed with daggers, shouting *viva el rey neto*, and insulting all those who would not join in this cry. Their fury was principally directed against the cuirassiers, but fortunately for these bravos, colonel Espino kept his men within their quarters, and fortunately the appearance of a single militiaman, with his sword, was sufficient to put to flight eight or ten of these heroic cannoneers. Thus there was more noise than bloodshed. The exasperation of the citizens, and of the militia was, however, daily increasing: they rightly judged, that the conduct of the artillery, who were rather like banditti than regular troops, would lead to some serious disaster. The political chief, Plasencia, secretly encouraged them, and refrained from any coercive measure. The chief commandant, Almodovar, openly

supported them, shut his eyes to the most flagrant acts, and thus emboldened them to go on.

The municipality alone from the day of its installation, the 1st of January, had endeavored to find a remedy for present evils, and to obviate future calamities. They repeatedly and earnestly requested the political chief to do his duty. At length on the 6th, in a secret conference between several members of the municipality and Plasencia, it had been forcibly represented to him, that it was necessary to send the regiment of artillery out of the town, in order to prevent any serious disturbance. Plasencia feigned acquiescence; he persuaded the municipality to assemble the next day, in order to hear the complaints and depositions of a great number of citizens, who wished to lay their grievances before the magistrates; he appeared convinced of the necessity of removing the artillery, and promised to be present at the meeting, and sanction the resolutions which should be proposed by the assembly. The next day, before the meeting of the municipality, one of the Syndics, who till then, had been a friend of Plasencia's, wrote to him to ask whether he intended to be present at the meeting, or whether he had altered his determination? The political chief replied, by a note *which I have read*, "That being detained by urgent business, he could not be present at the first part of the meeting; but, that he would come as early as possible; in the mean while

he requested that the resolutions should be prepared, and promised that he would sign them, reiterating the assurance *that he still sanctioned all that had been agreed upon.*

On the 7th, the municipality assembled at four o'clock in the afternoon; a great number of citizens came to make depositions, concerning the events of the preceding day. Towards the evening, the tumult having increased, a crowd of citizens of every class assembled before the town hall, calling loudly upon the magistrates to restore tranquillity, to remove from the town the regiment of artillery, and to put under arms the three battalions of militia, for the purpose of keeping order till the artillery had departed.

In this state of things, the political chief thought fit to make his appearance at the municipality; *but, before he left his house,* he wrote to Almodovar that he was at the town hall, that his personal safety was threatened; and, that he requested a detachment to protect him, and to convey him in safety from the danger with which he was surrounded.

This letter was entrusted to two officers of the names of Manjon and Haro, who were employed about his person. The political chief on his arrival at the town hall, requested that the crowd, which surrounded the gates, should be ordered to withdraw, giving his word of honor that he had taken such measures as would restore tranquillity. But the people obstinately refused to retire before they

had obtained the object of their wishes, viz. the removal of the artillery, and the assembling of the militia. The remonstrances of the magistrates were fruitless, and Plasencia expressed his intention of retiring; but the municipality having represented to him, that it was necessary at such a moment that he should remain amongst them, and continue to preside over them, he kept his seat. Meanwhile the vociferations of the crowd were as loud as ever, when suddenly, at about eleven o'clock, it was given out that armed force was marching towards the town hall. Upon this the municipality insisted that the militia should run to arms, and *Plasencia gave an order to that effect*. A few moments afterwards, Almodovar appeared at the head of a detachment of a hundred men of the regiment of Zamora, with fixed bayonets.

On his arrival before the town hall, he caused the soldiers to disperse the crowd with the bayonet, or the butt end of their muskets, without any previous warning; in consequence of which several persons were wounded, even on the stairs and in the ante-rooms. Almodovar having ordered the men to point their bayonets at the breasts of the municipal magistrates, took hold of the coat of the political chief, with the intention of leading him away. Plasencia, who was not sorry to find an opportunity of casting the public odium upon Almodovar, refused to stir, saying, that his presence was necessary for the public safety, and to second the efforts of the

magistrates in endeavoring to restore order, *and that he felt himself perfectly secure.* Almodovar withdrew, and Plasencia remained some time; he read the proceedings of the meeting, gave his verbal approbation, and promised to add his signature after having entered the following protest; *that he had not called the armed force;* and that, his secretaries, Manjon and Haro, had acted without his orders: he then withdrew. The next day, for fear of counter-acting the false account, which he intended to send to government, he refused the signature which he had promised. The municipality then caused a proclamation to be placarded; it was nothing more than a transcript of the proceedings of the sitting which I have mentioned: Plasencia ordered it to be torn down. The remainder of the day was sufficiently quiet, although the spirit of discontent was far from being hushed; and Plasencia, seconded by Almodovar, was getting up a new farce, in order to convince government of their devotion, and to obtain the meed which they expected.

The 9th was the precursor of a scene unheard of for the mixture of atrocity and ridicule by which it was characterized. In the afternoon, the artillerymen, sure of the approval of the superior authorities, began again to parade the town with their old cry of *viva el rey neto.* Towards the evening, emboldened by the impunity upon which they knew they could well depend, from the sentinels placed by Almodovar, they threatened to disarm, and drive

from their post thirty men of the national militia, who were on duty on the parade. When this was known, about forty militiamen ran to arms, and came to the support of their comrades. Plasencia, who was aware of this movement, and of the cause which had given rise to it, was in duty bound to appear on the spot to re-establish order, and to send back the volunteers who came to offer their assistance: but he would thus have lost the advantage which he sought by his intrigues. He, therefore, went to the superior commandant, and called for the assistance of the troops, who were already under arms at their quarters. The alarm was sounded, and a moment afterwards, the two battalions of Zamora, the artillery with five pieces of cannon, and with lighted matches, advanced against sixty men, who were quietly deliberating at the guard-house on the means of resisting any attack which might be made upon them. I saw these assassins go by with threats and vociferation, and in so disorderly a manner, that a handful of well mounted cavalry would have cut them to pieces and taken their guns. When they had reached the parade, a battalion of the regiment of Zamora drew up in front of the guard-house with two pieces of artillery. The remainder of the troops ranged themselves in the neighboring streets; but with so little discipline, that the three remaining guns were in narrow lanes, where they could not possibly have taken effect. Plasencia then caused martial law to be proclaimed, no doubt for the benefit



of the walls and closed doors; for the people, astonished and frightened, had fled in every direction, and the streets were quite clear. As far as military tactics were concerned, all ended there; for Almodovar and Plasencia were afraid of exposing their troops, by ordering them to attack the national guard. The latter, on the contrary, wished to begin the fray, and no doubt would have done so had not the remonstrances of their officers, and particularly of the chief of the 2d battalion, Visedo, prevented it. It is ten to one that if the militia had fired, the garrison would have run away. But bloodshed was the object of the artillery, and they accomplished it like cowards. One of their centinels met a son of the fiscal judge, Hernandez, quite a youth, who was going home with some of his friends; they were ordered to retire, and they obeyed. A moment afterwards they were desired to stop, and they did so; upon which this band of assassins, in spite of the efforts of their officers, fired upon this youthful party. The young Hernandez, pierced by several balls, fell mortally wounded. He expired the next day in the most excruciating sufferings. In another part of the town, the same doughty heroes murdered an old woman at her door. Such are the trophies which Almodovar and Plasencia reaped on the evening of the 9th. At length, at eleven o'clock at night, finding the streets clear, because the inhabitants had shut their doors, they and their satellites retired; and thus

ended the lamentable farce, in which they had been the principal actors.

On the 11th, the political chief sent an account of his exploits by an extraordinary courier. Though you may well suppose that he disguised facts, you have no idea how much he altered them. He does not mention, that the commandant in chief caused the alarm to be sounded at his request; on the contrary, he accuses the militia of having attempted to do it. Of the national guard stationed on the parade, he makes a crowd of factious, shouting *viva Riego*; he speaks not of the assassination; he mentions not the conduct of the artillery, their cries of *viva el rey neto*, the complaints which had been made to him; nor the former complaints which had been put into his hands. What is still more incredible, he passes over the scenes of the 7th. In a word, an impartial spectator must sigh with grief and indignation, to see the fate of so many citizens committed to the hands of those who are capable of such excesses. I have witnessed all; and such is the feeling I experience.

On the 9th of January, the ministry was changed at Madrid: but it is merely a partial and temporary change. The new elected ministers are destined to occupy, only for about two months, the seats reserved for the members of the cortes, who shall have most distinguished themselves by their successful efforts against the public liberty.

Bardaxi, Feliu, Salvador, and Vallejo, have resigned, and have been replaced as follows:—the new minister of state, is Don Ramon Lopez Pellegrin; the minister of interior, Don Vicente Cano Manuel; the minister of war, Don Jose Castellar; the minister of finance, Don Jose de Imaz.

On the 15th of January, there was a fresh commotion at Seville. Velasco resigned the command, when he found that his efforts to rouse the patriots were unavailing. The minister of war appointed to succeed him, the brigadier Don Salvador Sebastian, a notorious servile. A few days after his installation, he received despatches from government, upon which he immediately doubled the guard at every post, and also at the door of his residence. The patriots, who were not without their fears about him, assembled on the Plaza de la Constitucion, whence a deputation waited on the general to ask him the meaning of all these precautions, and to enquire whether the despatches intimated any danger. Sebastian went down to the street to meet the deputation, whom he ordered to retire, bestowing upon them the epithet of *canaille*, and ordering the guard to fire upon them. Some of the soldiers began loading their arms, and others to disperse the mob with the butt end of their muskets. Upon this, the citizens ran tumultuously to the Plaza de la Constitucion; the municipality met, and it was decided that Sebastian should be removed, and that the command should be given to major-general Don

Carlos de la Barcena, who happened to be at Seville. This resolution was notified to Sebastian; he replied to it by writing to the municipality two letters, in which he did not attempt to disguise his servile intentions. Not satisfied with this, he again doubled the guard round his house, ordered the garrison to assemble at their quarters, and sent to the Plaza de la Constitución a detachment of the cavalry regiment of Farneze. But this detachment, on its arrival at the Plaza de la Constitución, joined the cause of the citizens. It was then resolved that the new general, La Barcena, should be requested to go to Sebastian's, notify to him his dismissal, and to put him under arrest. La Barcena consented, and was followed by a detachment of the national guard; he entered the house, came out a few moments afterwards, and announced that Sebastian had escaped; by this means he, no doubt, saved the life of the wretch.

I mentioned to you, that in Navarra, the clergy were endeavoring to exasperate the people. Their endeavors have not been unsuccessful; and as they are by no means nice in the choice of their instruments, the first *partidas* of the defenders of the faith, and absolutism, are composed of highway robbers. The principal chiefs of these bands are Ladrón, Baldo, and Juanito.

The sketch of the new penal code has been sent by the cortes to the *audiencias* of the kingdom for their opinion. The following fact will give you an idea of the spirit of these tribunals. An article in

the penal code awards sentence of death against any one, who shall attempt to establish a new religion in Spain : the audiencia of Valencia thought the *sentence too mild*.

On the 10th of January, general Romarate having been recalled by government to the military command of Cadiz, was received in that town without opposition.

The disturbances at Corunna are likewise at an end, and general Mina has resigned his command in Galicia : in short government has prevailed every where. Velasco, Jauregui, Piquero, and others, have been traduced before the tribunals. These events will surprise you, not less than they do myself, particularly when it is considered, that this apparent calm is the sudden effect of a spontaneous submission ; not a compulsory surrender to the forces employed by government. I have tried to investigate the cause of this remarkable circumstance, and the result of my information is as follows.

The impulse was given by the free-masons, who had an understanding to that effect with the comuneros ; but when the liberal party were on the point of compelling government to act in conformity to the constitution, the chief masonic lodge suddenly ordered its agents to desist, and the comuneros remained alone exposed to the vengeance of the ministers. It is the general opinion, that an understanding has taken place between the ministry and the chief masonic lodge, in which the interests of the

free-masons have not been forgotten. I have many reasons for believing this opinion to be correct; time will no doubt give me more.

In the sitting of the 21st of January, ministers proposed two laws, one of them relating to the restriction of the liberty of the press, the other to the restriction of personal liberty. On the 25th, the committee, whose business it was to consider these laws, made their report. The venality of the committee, and their fear of losing the bribes which had been held out to them were such, that they not only extended these two laws, but added a third, investing government with the power of suspending the meeting of patriotic societies.

General Riego, elected deputy to the cortes, by the province of Asturias, of which he is a native, arrived here on the 31st of January. His reception was a real triumph: the municipality and the patriotic society sent a deputation to meet him; they congratulated him at Murviedo the day before his arrival at Valencia. On the 31st, about twelve, another deputation went to meet him half a league from the town. A splendid coach had been prepared for him: but he preferred making his entry on horseback. An immense concourse of people followed him through the streets which they paraded, singing patriotic hymns, and rending the air with shouts of *viva Riego*. The general at his arrival at the town hall was met, and congratulated by the municipality and other authorities. Almodovar and Plasencia,

who dare not absent themselves, looked a little like the devil compelled to praise the saints. From the town hall the procession went to the stone of the Constitution, near which Riego harangued the people. Finally, he was conducted to the house prepared for him, where a splendid banquet awaited him, of which the authorities, the staff of the national militia, and other dignitaries partook. In the evening there was a general illumination. The public buildings, and the houses of the patriots, were illuminated every night during the stay of Riego.

The next day he was conducted to the patriotic society, where he once more harangued the people, as he had done from the balcony of his house. From the patriotic society, he went to the theatre, where he was greeted by fresh testimonies of public respect. When he had quitted the theatre, he paid a visit to the national militia, who were assembled before the principal post of the parade, which they had gaily decorated; they presented a scarf to the general. The festivities of the day were crowned by a splendid ball, in the hall of the tribunal of commerce. On the 3d, general Riego left the town, and was accompanied as far as Alberique by a deputation of the municipality, and a great number of the patriots on horseback. Not only did I see him frequently during the four days, which he spent at Valencia, but I had with him a long private conference, concerning the persecution of which we had been the object, and about the situation of Spain. General Riego is a man

of real information, which he frankly acknowledged having acquired, while he was a prisoner of war in France. He is gifted with a sound judgment, and a quick and correct discrimination: but he shines by other far more amiable qualities; a mildness amounting almost to submissive deference to the opinion of others; modesty almost to a fault, and patriotism most ardent, sincere, and disinterested. To him his country is every thing: for the sake of his country, he would at any time sacrifice his fortune and his life. In fact, I consider him as the purest model of patriotism.



## LETTER XI.

*Valencia, March 1, 1822.*

THE month which has just passed has been barren of events. The revolutionary movements have subsided; the time approaches when the new legislators will assume their functions, and all Spain awaits with anxiety their proceedings.

The discussion of the laws of exception proposed by government, and, as I have already mentioned, extended by the committee, has produced the effect which might be expected. In vain did the deputy Calatrava try to oppose the passing of these laws: in vain did he represent, that when the cortes requested that the ministers should be removed, and replaced by men endowed with energy, and possessing the public confidence, the court had paid no attention to their remonstrances: in vain did he insist, that prudence forbade to put weapons so dangerous in the hands of imbecile and despicable ministers: these representations were fruitless, and the laws were passed. Calatrava was not acting in character; he wished to regain a little popularity at the expense of his colleagues, for he is one of the chiefs amongst the anilleros.

The next day the servile party testified its approbation to count Torreno and several of his colleagues, who had supported with zeal the laws of exception. The shouts of applause of the serviles were intermingled with cries of *viva el rey meto muera Riego!* On the 4th, the patriots had their revenge; at the end of the sitting they insulted Torreno, Garelli, Martinez de la Rosa, and other abettors of the laws of exception. The new deputies are already assembling at Madrid, where the decided liberals amongst them have met on their arrival to count their numbers and arrange their plans.

I have availed myself of the few days preceding the first sitting of this new assembly, to write to general Riego. I send you a copy of my letter, which, perhaps, will not appear to you devoid of interest. I have written nearly to the same effect to Don Martin Serrano, one of those with whom I am best acquainted. I have since transmitted to them a memorial, for the inspection of their colleagues. I proposed to them to take advantage of the present situation of France, and begin the attack 'ere it be too late, or more properly speaking, to retaliate on the French government for its secret machinations.

My plan is to organize, at the foot of the Pyrenees, a body of about three thousand men, to form a rallying point for the French patriots. This body will not be difficult to organize, if volunteers are admitted; for I know by experience that plenty are to be found. But the Spanish government must extend

to this organization the same protection which is afforded by the French government to the Spanish counter-revolutionists. This may be obtained from a liberal ministry, but not from any other.

The extraordinary cortes terminated the session the 14th of February. The day preceding, one of the deputies had proposed that the cortes should declare, that none of them should be allowed for two years to come, to accept from government employ, pensions, orders, or honorary distinctions of any kind whatever. You may readily suppose that those who are promised the situations of minister, political chief, &c. immediately voted against this odious proposition. It was consequently rejected; and the cortes declared that Spain must not lose the benefit of their superior talents.

The names of those who signed the proposition deserve to be recorded; they are as follows—Dias del Moral, Riego, Dias Morales, Odaly, Delprat, Romero (D. Jose), Perez Costa, Navarro (D. Felipe), Becerra, Munnoz, Array, Golfín, Solanot, Yusto, Lallave, (Don Vic<sup>te</sup>), Oliver, Quintana, Fernandez, Gasco, Cosio, Osorio, Puigblanch and Ochòs.

The internal situation of Spain is such, that a sketch of its operations, of the legislators who have just resigned their functions, and of the influence which these operations have had on the Spanish nation, cannot be devoid of interest.

But in order to give to this sketch its full effect, it is necessary to go back to a rather earlier period, and

to take a rapid view of the events anterior to the month of May, 1814. The Spanish nation accustomed to bow to the imperious voice of an absolute government, hailed with rapture and surprise the first dawn of liberty. Those who first proclaimed liberal ideas were listened to as oracles; the people gave them credit for the practical talent implied by their seductive theories, and looked up to them with a feeling of veneration amounting almost to superstition. The favorable effect which the league against Napoleon had upon Spain, contributed much to the high reputation which those men acquired; *they remained but a short time as chief actors in the political drama*, a circumstance favorable to their interests; finally, the persecution which they experienced at the hands of king Ferdinand made of them the idols of the nation.

If there be any honor in giving up the field of battle to the enemy, the promoters of the constitutional system from 1812 to 1814, may boast that their most glorious feat at that time was, *to suffer the nation to lose gradually its liberties*. Their conduct in the last session would make one suppose that they were to have the honor of completing the deed, if fortunately the resistance of the provinces had not prevented it, and thus deserved to be branded by these worthies as rebellious.

Amongst those who then proclaimed themselves chiefs of the liberal party, some having been imprisoned, and others having emigrated, one would

readily suppose that they aimed at liberating their country from the fetters which they suffered to be imposed upon it in 1814. I am sorry to say, however, that absolute power had never more peaceable adversaries; if, indeed, they may be at all ranked as adversaries; many of them merely acted the part, because government refused to employ them.

In several parts of Spain, attempts were made to restore liberty to this unfortunate nation; and it does not appear, that those who fain would pass for the champions of liberty took the least part in these enterprises. It is futile to say that their imprisonment prevented it; for experience proves that to him whose intentions are honest, few barriers are insurmountable. But admitting this excuse for those who were deprived of liberty, one can hardly find an apology for those who were in foreign countries, whence they sent the most humble protestations, and disowned the opinions of Don Pedro Sardino, who had the courage to publish in London, a journal, called, the *Constitutional Spaniard*. But these worthies fancied, that tyranny was thus to be disarmed; they even honored the other Spaniards, by treating as absurd and unseasonable their efforts in the cause of liberty, as one of them wrote to Mr. Moreno Guerra.

There were, however, amongst the prisoners and the emigrants, whom I have just mentioned, some persons worthy of respect, whose zeal for liberty never varied.

An army was destined to load afresh with chains and slavery, the inhabitants of Rio de la Plata ; but the good genius of Spanish liberty caused the most desirable effects to spring from this baneful source. This army was, therefore, the first promoter of revolution, undeniably so, though some persons have endeavored to deprive it of this honor. The schemes which had been devised in favor of liberty, fell to the ground after the disaster of Vidal at Valencia, and the efforts of their authors were universally paralysed. The sphere of action was, therefore, confined to the army. This movement, it is true, was seconded in almost every part of Spain ; and the noble spirit that prevailed so generally, decided the fate of the nation, and averted from the army of San Fernando the danger which threatened it as early as February : but no one can deny that that army struck the first blow. The count d'Abisbal yielding to the importunities of Sarsfield, and of others, who were interested in the ruinous war of America, brought on the fatal day of the 8th of July, 1819.

The revolution was adjourned for a time ; but truth requires it to be said that the measures adopted by this chief were so moderate, and the punishment which he inflicted was so mild, that the same system is pursued to this day ; and it was formally adopted on the 1st of January, 1820.

Riego drew the sword in the cause of liberty at Las Cabezas : a little band of heroes followed his example, and faced the dangers which as early as

February surrounded them on every side : but liberty was triumphant, and the constitution was proclaimed throughout Spain. As a preliminary step it was necessary to pay a tribute at the shrine of military pride. No general had at that period declared himself for the cause of liberty. Liberal ideas did not extend to a higher rank than the chiefs of battalion. Don Antonio Quiroga was the only colonel amongst the liberals ; the only one of his rank who had taken a share in the revolution ; he was, therefore, made a general in chief.

The prisons were opened at the command of the liberating army and its coadjutors. The men, beneath whose hands the constitutional system of 1814 expired, were restored to liberty. Would you believe that instead of testifying their gratitude to their benefactors, and apologising to the nation for their folly and inexperience, they have had the assurance to appear once more in the revolutionary arena ; as the arbitrators of public opinion, and of the destinies of Spain. The liberal party, blindly partial to these men, invested them with the highest dignities, thinking that adversity and experience had made them wise. This choice was generally applauded ; but Spain pays dearly for her blind partiality.

Instead of forming with the party which promoted the revolution of 1820, an indissoluble union, they have proved its fiercest enemies ; either considering it as composed of those by whose merit they are obscured, or of men averse to the advantages which they

mean to monopolise *under the mask of moderation*.

Since the administration has fallen into their hands, the only plan in which they seem to have persevered, is that of giving employment to persons of their own stamp. Thus when one of the greatest advantages that was to be expected from a political reform, was the suppression of a number of sinecures, in the space which intervened between the nomination of the pseudo-liberal ministers of 1820, and the instauration of the cortes, more agents have been employed, (considering the shortness of the period) than at the time of Godoy, Macaniz, Moyano, and the like. The title of liberal seems to be no more a pledge of patriotism, but a passport to lucrative employment. To many were restored the situations of which they were deprived, when they suffered Spain to be despoiled of her liberties; they were even taught to consider these situations as a kind of patrimony, by the payment of their arrears for the time they had been imprisoned or exiled. In short, they fully justified what was said of them, by their antagonists, the serviles, viz. *That they were liberals, in order to domineer, to monopolise every lucrative employ, and to trample others under their feet.*

The cortes began their career; and this body which ought to have defended the liberties of the nation against ministerial faction, was, with the exception of a small number of deputies, the firmest support of that very faction. If we consider for a moment of what



elements the cortes were composed, such a result will no longer appear surprising.

The Spanish congress of 1820 and 1821, was made up in a great measure of persons identified with the ministers of 1820, by their interests, their opinions, and their connections; of individuals who had taken no share in the revolution, and were entirely indebted for their election to the rank which they occupied in their respective towns; of some *satellites of the late despotism*, whose adroitness had caused them to be considered as necessary instruments of the revolution; and, finally, of a very small number of those who had restored Spain to liberty, the few who had escaped the disgrace of their party. The only means by which the ministers could attain their end, was to influence the cortes, or rather to have them completely in their power. In this they succeeded, every circumstance being in their favor; as in addition to what I have said, a great number of the deputies had received favors at the hands of ministers, and others were employed in the public offices: all these thought of providing for themselves, when they should cease to be members of the legislature. Those who understood nothing of the revolution, blindly seconded the votes of the men whom public opinion still characterized as liberals. From this hasty sketch you may judge of the results which might be expected from such a combination.

It suited the views of the ministry and of the ministerial faction, to frame, or rather to mislead the

opinion of the congress ; the instrument they made use of was the constitution itself. The cortes, who were the offspring of the revolution, which had nothing in common with any other that had preceded it, followed with a servile imitation every step of former revolutions, and bowed with slavish homage not only to the precedents which they afforded, but to the opinions of those who shared in them. The fatal expressions of *order and moderation* were despotically used against the deputies, who were not leagued with the ministry ; they were not even allowed to speak.

In this state of things, the ministers relied on the assistance of the cortes, where they had a decided majority. They began, therefore, to manifest their designs against every institution in which they might fear a rival. One of the chief objects was the disbanding of the army, which had announced itself in favor of liberty. A kind of skirmish was the prelude to this open attack.

Brigadier O'Donnel, colonel of the regiment imperial Alejandro, with whom count d'Abisbal had proclaimed the constitution at Ocaña (an event of which the influence reached as far as Madrid, and even the king's palace) was removed by the minister of war, marquess de las Amarillas, whose love for liberty is so notorious. The regiment imperial Alejandro had proclaimed the constitution—that no doubt was a sufficient offence. The colonel and the officers appealed to the cortes. The minister ought

to have been made responsible for such an act, instead of which there was a debate upon the prerogative of the king. The usual sophistry was resorted to on the occasion, and the ministers gained the day. From that moment Spanish liberty has been at the mercy of the executive power, and the triumph of the ministry has proved that *good written laws and practical despotism are not incompatible.*

Ministers now thought themselves strong enough to aim a blow at the army of San Fernando. Orders were consequently despatched to send the troops garrisoned in Andalusia to join different corps of the army, and to replace them by fresh troops. General Riego was ordered to Galicia, with permission to go to Madrid, as his majesty wished to see him. Espinoza was nominated to the government of Tortosa; Agüero had another mission out of Andalusia. In a word, all was prepared to destroy the body to which Spain owed its liberty and its constitution.

Some of the liberal deputies having had the opportunity of witnessing these intrigues, and having seen through the perſidious intentions by which they were dictated, were alive to the danger which would result from the disorganization of the only force capable of supporting the recent revolution; and hastened to warn their friends at Cadiz, and those in the army. The result was a decided opposition on the part of the generals, and several of the provincial corporations. Foiled in the first instance, the ministers and their faction saw that no time was to be lost in

preparing for a second attempt upon a larger scale, so as to hem in all the partisans of San Fernando then at Madrid. They were all known, for they were simple enough to confide in certain individuals, who apparently coincided with them at the patriotic society, and at the sittings of the cortes.

In order to remove suspicion, a report was spread of the dismissal of the marquess de las Amarillas, who was charged with all the blame of the measures adopted against the patriotic army. It was then asserted that Amarillas having ceased to belong to the ministry, nothing farther was to be apprehended, since the patriotism of the other ministers was sufficiently established. How much mischief has been occasioned by these usurped reputations ! Meanwhile the brother of Riego, a canon, was invited to Madrid ; his simplicity was imposed upon ; he was prevailed upon to induce his brother to join him in the capital. Other inhabitants of Cadiz and Seville used the same entreaties. Riego unfortunately listened to them ; he left his friends, his brothers in arms : from that moment he was a lost man, and became the toy of the two ministries of 1820 and 1821.

I have said that the ministers intended to implicate other persons in their attempt against the army ; but the scene of action was in this case to be the congress itself, when the army was disorganized, by being deprived of its general, who was still destined to be the victim of persecution ; for he was guilty of the crime of having *transferred from the gallies to the*

*ministry, and to other dignities, the very men who were now his bitterest enemies.*

The political chief had been assailed by insulting clamours at the theatre del principe ; Riego happened to be there, merely as a spectator : this was sufficient ground to exile him to Oviedo.

General Velasco, at that time governor of Madrid, Evaristo San Miguel, Nunez, and others, shared the same fate. This affair was brought before the cortes ; the ministers and their faction used all their resources of falsehood and hypocrisy. Many of the representatives of the people suffered themselves to be duped, and others listened, like slaves, to the calumnies of the ministers. Discord was sown amongst the liberals, by the infamous forgery of the correspondence known under the name of *Las Paginas*. The congress sanctioned, by its deference to the ministry, this scandalous insult offered to a number of illustrious citizens, chiefly military men, against whom no distinct charge had been preferred.

This was a fatal blow to new-born liberty : she has not yet recovered it, and her efforts are the effect of a very precarious and partial convalescence.

The designs of the ministry were seconded at Seville, by general Don Juan O'Donoju, a wretch, who after having betrayed Spain, and blasted the hopes of liberty by his manœuvres and calumnies, went to South America, where he entered into a negociation with the independents, not with the intention of liberating them from the yoke of the

mother country, and of promoting the cause of liberty ; but in furtherance of his ambition, his thirst of command, and his love of fame ; in a word, to deceive the Americans, as he had deceived the Spaniards. But the Spanish nation cannot but be aware that he was the author of the *Paginas*, and consequently of all the blunders of the ministers who believed, upon the faith of these letters, that Riego, the liberating army, several citizens of Cadiz, and even some of the deputies to the cortes, wished to establish a republic. By a simultaneous movement, and as it would seem, prepared before hand, colonels Miranda and Santos San Miguel, and lieutenant-colonels Cires and Osorno were banished from Seville, with the same forms and the same injustice as they had been banished from Madrid.

You will not be astonished at the number of those who panegyrised these atrocious deeds, if you consider the number of those who are in the hire of the ministers, or who solicited employ ; to which you must add those who unaware of the causes by which all this was effected, implicitly crediting the eulogiums bestowed upon the ministry, strengthened its measures by their approbation. Now things begin to alter, and the name of liberal embraces persons whose opinions by no means assimilate.

If the intention of ministers and their partisans was to concentrate the power in their own hands (as it undoubtedly must have been), their plan was absurd, and proves their political insufficiency. They

forgot that they were the offspring of the revolution; that to the revolution they owed the rank which they occupied, and that an attempt to stem it in the beginning of its career, was the greatest absurdity they could imagine. Nothing therefore appeared more ridiculous than the declamations of the partisans of the ministers, who attributed the dismissal of the ministry in March, 1821, to the exaltados, jacobins, republicans, and other imaginary beings, forgetting that the ministers had caused their own ruin, by attempting to destroy the mother who gave them birth — the revolution.

The king, or rather his advisers, were aware that these gentry had lost the confidence of the nation; and thus they paid the penalty of having attempted a part beyond their strength. Though it cannot be affirmed that the intention of the king was good, the cause of liberty would certainly have been promoted, if for the happiness of Spain the new ministers had not been scions of the old stock; but the perfidious designs of the old ministers seemed to have been inherited by their successors. Instead therefore of being benefited by the experience resulting from the faults of the first set of constitutional ministers, the condition of Spain is daily becoming worse. She is still groaning under the despotism of a faction armed with forms apparently legal; the most fatal situation in which a nation can be placed; a proof of it, if any were needed is, that the most disinterested patriots are incessantly persecuted, and that their fate is in

the hands of enemies as implacable as the inquisition could be; and the causes of this persecution are still a mystery. If these causes are, as it is pretended, *respect for general Riego, and a wish to honor his illustrious name*, a greater insult cannot be offered to a nation. If such an indignity is longer tolerated, the cause of liberty is for ever lost: the name of constitution, and the monuments which are its emblem, are nothing but a cruel mockery.

In a political revolution no feature is without importance; every act has a powerful influence, whether productive of baneful or beneficial results. It is therefore difficult to remedy the first errors, especially those which mislead the public opinion. This is particularly the case with the class of people who do not think for themselves, but whose actions are guided by certain men to whom they look up, and from whom they have some advantage to expect. This cause, and political fanaticism, have brought every bad passion into play, and led those to vilify and hate each other, who neither know their antagonists nor the subject of their dispute.

This is the state to which Spain has been reduced by the ideas which the ministers of 1820 disseminated, and which the ministers of 1821 have fostered and enlarged. When the former died away, their principles were firmly established; they were confided to certain men, to whom they were bequeathed by their expiring masters; and to do them justice, they seem faithfully to have discharged the duties of executors.



I shall terminate this sketch by a cursory view of the different branches of administration.

### FOREIGN RELATIONS.

It would be easy to show that Spain is less respected abroad, than her neighbours, the Moors. The ministers know nothing of the state of Europe, but through the medium of the newspapers; and have not been able to answer objections which have been put to them by members of the cortes, such as Romero Alpuente, and Moreno Guerra. From the ambassador of the highest rank, to the most insignificant consul, all the diplomatic agents are averse to the constitution.

### INTERIOR.

To describe this branch of administration, which has so much influence over the internal state of Spain, it is sufficient to say, that it gave birth to the plan of O'Donoju; that it filled every situation at its disposal with creatures of its own, or of the preceding ministry; that public confidence is generally on the wane; that every public establishment, over which it has any influence, is in a state of stagnation; and, finally, that it undauntedly perseveres in employing men, who are suspected of being averse to liberty, and who had avowedly opposed the constitution.

## MINISTRY OF WAR.

When this branch of administration was re-organized, there was an army of twenty thousand men, well disciplined ; the regiments composing it are now reduced to skeletons ; and thanks to the ministry, most of the subalterns are employed in the excise, or in some public office. But of staff officers Spain has a plentiful supply ; she has enough for an army of five hundred thousand men. As to the national militia, it is not known whether Spain be indebted to it for that branch of administration of which I am speaking, since the rules drawn up for its organization are so theoretical, that were it not for the patriotic zeal of the citizens, the decrees for its establishment would be nugatory. It would, however, be easy to make of it the most substantial support of the liberties of Spain.

## ADMIRALTY.

Of this branch of administration, little can be said as far as relates to ships and to sailors. As to officers, especially superior officers and admirals, there are enough to command the British navy. At this moment two South American privateers blockade the coast of Spain : this is sufficient to give you an idea of the Spanish navy, and of the absurdity of pretending to carry on a naval warfare.

## COLONIES.

This ministry, like the last, is merely nominal as to its utility: its existence is only known by its lavish expenditure, which is caused by the manœuvres of those who find it their interest to protract the American war, under the pretence of upholding the rights of a government, which, as far as relates to America, is merely ideal.

## MINISTRY OF JUSTICE.

The bishops and the clergy oppose openly and with impunity the constitutional system. The tribunals are composed of enemies of the constitution, and of every thing liberal. The only culprits who are brought before them to be condemned, are the most decided patriots. So much for the ministry.

## FINANCE.

Little can be said of this ministry; such are the abuses and the arbitrary proceedings by which it is characterized! Perhaps the most favorable thing that can be said of it is, that it has no finances at its disposal. All the blame is not, however, to be attached to the ministers; they have been powerfully seconded by the cortes. To the cortes are to be imputed, extravagant loans, ruinous to any but the contractors, the financial sinecures, and the excise regulations, which alone would be sufficient to exhaust over and over again the treasures of a Cræsus. What has, perhaps, contributed more than any thing else to the

unpopularity of this branch of administration is, the creation of numberless bodies of excisemen. Strange to say, there is almost an army of them; not only the old ones were suffered to remain, but new ones have been added, and also military excisemen. In spite of all these, smuggling thrives more than ever. They are so ill paid, that they connive with the smugglers; and the consequence is, that demoralization increases every day on the coast and borders of Spain.

What is not to be apprehended from ministers, whose folly and corruptive influence thus induce them to make a traffic of their patronage! The public offices, which had always been too crowded, have now four times the number of officers requisite. Moreover, every branch of administration, in order to increase the number of its dependants, has allowed a great number of officers to retire upon their full salary. This is not all; there is another class of retired officers, who are entitled to three-fourths of their salary; their numbers equal that of the two other classes. It remains to be added, that to my certain knowledge several of those who are on the retired list, never performed any duty whatever. It is needless to observe that nine-tenths of these individuals, are enemies to the constitution.

## LETTER XII.

*Valencia, April 4, 1822.*

THE cortes in the last of their preparatory sittings, nominate as their president, general Riego. This nomination produced great effect upon the public opinion, and the liberals entertained the most brilliant hopes.

On the 1st of March, the king in person opened the cortes. His speech was short and insignificant; and as the cortes replied to each paragraph, I shall content myself with transmitting you their answer.

“SIRE,

“The assembled deputies of the nation respectfully offer to your majesty the expression of their attachment, and of their respect, and the assurance that in concert with your majesty, they sincerely wish to consolidate, by constitutional measures, the liberty of Spain, and the happiness of the nation, which has confided to them its destinies.

“The cortes participate in the feelings of your majesty, and hail the day which dawns upon the opening of this legislative assembly, in spite of the secret, or open machinations of the enemies of your majesty and of Spain, and in spite of the late un-

happy dissensions, the causes of which are recorded in the message of the 15th of December, of the cortes, our predecessors. The cortes join your majesty in lamenting these dissensions, and will use every endeavor to prevent their recurrence. They will assiduously remove the numerous and powerful obstacles which have hitherto prevented the Spanish nation from enjoying the advantages held out by the constitution; they will do their utmost to conciliate the public opinion, without which the goodwill of the nation is forfeited, and their safety and authority are endangered.

“ The cortes have nothing to fear from the attempts which may be renewed against them, by men who are unaware of the silent, but powerful influence of time and events. Confiding in the moral strength, by which they are, at this moment, surrounded and supported, they will boldly pursue the constitutional path, towards the accomplishment of the revolution, so fortunately commenced in 1812, and revived in 1820. The cortes have heard with great satisfaction that our relations with foreign powers promise a lasting peace; and they hope that peace will be maintained by the only means which can give it a solid duration, by causing foreign nations to respect the name of a free and powerful people.

“ The cortes are aware, that the moment is not yet arrived, when the situation of Spain can be sensibly ameliorated. They are, however, of opinion,

that some amelioration would have taken place, if the humane decrees of the preceding legislative assemblies had been carried into effect ; they will, therefore, enquire into the real state of the nation, and into the evils of which it complains, in order to relieve it by speedy and efficient remedies.

“ The cortes will endeavor to realize the flattering hopes, which your majesty has condescended to anticipate from their efforts ; being convinced that your majesty will co-operate with them in promoting the public welfare, of which liberty and order are the basis, and which cannot exist without the most perfect union between the throne, the legislative power, and the nation.”

Some days before the opening of the session, the king nominated a new ministry ; that is to say, the moment of the reward is come for the ex-deputies who defended, or extended the laws of exception.

Martinez de la Rosa, who was appointed minister of state, filled the ministry with his creatures. Moscoso, his worthy colleague, is minister of the interior. Garelli is minister of justice ; and so on.

The new division of Spain, into fifty-two provinces, had been decreed under the late administration. This caused the appointment of about forty extra political chiefs, and as many intendentes, and superior military commandants. The ex-deputies were of course appointed to the new dignities.

As early as the 4th of March, I wrote to general Riego, and to the deputy Serrano, to open their eyes,

and to call their attention, and that of their colleagues, to the real situation of their country.

I subjoin an extract of my letter—"It appears that your government renouncing an open contest, is determined to try the effect of condescension. This new state of things appears at first sight to present many advantages. That it does present some I admit: but they are not so easy to lay hold of as you may imagine. Do you really believe that so sudden a change, so complete a recantation, can be the effect of sincere conviction? Let me undeceive you; the chiefs of the anti-liberal faction will never be converted, let the mask of liberalism set upon them ever so well. The moderation of the liberals is depended on: it is expected that they will again be disarmed by the least appearance of submission. In short the object of your adversaries is to paralyse the operations of the congress, *and to reach the end of the present session, without suffering it to be characterized by any striking feature.*

"But I am willing to suppose, for the moment, that the ministers will sanction every law tending to strengthen the Spanish constitution. Do you flatter yourself that when this end is obtained you will have nothing more to do? On the contrary you may rest assured, that every advantage you reap will provoke fresh dangers, if the sphere of operations is confined to Spain. You cannot expect to bring about the necessary reform; you cannot warrant for a moment the existence and the execution of the constitutional



laws, without goading to madness the serviles, and throwing into their hands the creatures of the ministry; since the latter must be deprived of offices, through which they undermine, by degrees, every liberal institution. This jarring of interests must of necessity prepare the elements of a civil war. External interference would soon kindle the embers into a blaze; and you are too well aware that the factious have powerful abettors out of Spain.

“ Depend upon it, you cannot hope to enjoy the constitution, nor internal tranquillity, as long as France shall be deprived of institutions truly liberal; and till you can have a political mass determined, and firmly united, to oppose to the holy alliance.

“ You have too much experience, I am sure, not to be aware that mass must be opposed to mass; and that it is folly to rely upon natural courage when isolated or divided. The French armies of 1814 and 1815 were certainly not deficient in courage.

“ To sum up, you can neither recede, nor stop midway, without ruining the cause of liberty both in Spain and in Europe. If you give a moment’s respite to the anti-revolutionary hydra, by failing to intercept the assistance which it receives from beyond the Pyrenees, it will daily become bolder, and soon threaten you under the protection of foreign bayonets.”

To this letter I added a memorial, in which I discussed the three following questions.—1. Is a change of system in the French government necessary

to Spain?—2. Has the constitutional government of Spain any right to attempt such a change?—3. Is it possible to effect it?

The second of these questions has been solved by the holy alliance itself, who established and turned to their profit the following principle. *When the political system of a nation threatens the tranquillity or the safety of its neighbour, the latter has a right to ask an account of those principles which it considers to be dangerous to itself, and to take such measures, as it may think conformable to prudence.* The direct consequence of this axiom, as the invasions of France and Italy have proved, is as follows: *When the internal constitution and the political system of a nation, are such as to threaten the political constitution of its neighbours, the latter has a right to interfere in the internal situation of the former, and if possible to alter its constitution, in order to avert the danger with which it is itself threatened.*

The powers combined against France and Italy made a good or bad use of this principle—Spain should now adopt it. Her right to do so is the stronger, as the French government, by assisting the factious, is the real aggressor. But the allies did not confine themselves to mere protestations, they had recourse to force of arms. Spain must follow their example.

I received from the deputy Serrano an answer, which proves that the liberal deputies coincide with my ideas; and leads me to hope that in due time

they will be able to carry them into execution.\* Mr. Serrano being a member of the superintending committee for the conduct of public offices, and the committee for regulating the national guard, I gave him, as he requested, my opinion upon the duties confided to the committees in question.

“ I consider (I have said) the effective responsibility of every officer for the past and present transactions, as the key-stone to the constitutional edifice ; the militia comes in point of importance the next in rank.

“ The natural progress of despotism, the intrigues of some, the lukewarmness of others, and the shameful collusion of most of your predecessors, have thrown almost all the patronage into the hands of the serviles. The most zealous efforts of the cortes, and the wisest laws will be ineffectual, unless, *as a preliminary step*, these wretches are deprived of the means, not only of squandering the public revenue, but of paralyzing the hands of justice, and undermining the fundamental institutions of the constitutional system.

“ To exact responsibility from every individual of such a swarm, would be a hopeless attempt : when a tree is to be cut down, the trunk is to be attacked ; nobody thinks of shaking off the leaves. The council of state fills many of the public situations ; and I

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\* Appendix, No. 9.

cannot help repeating that an alteration in the council of state, and the severe punishment of one minister at least, are the only means of consolidating your labors. Of achieving this there is an easy method, naturally presented by a late proceeding of the cortes: they have requested from the ministers a list of the officers appointed by them, with a description of their character. This, in addition to the information which each deputy will have the opportunity of acquiring in his province, cannot fail to bring to condign punishment many culprits which have hitherto escaped.

“I have said that the national militia is the part of the constitution next in importance: a few words are sufficient to prove it. It is the only armed force completely organized which liberty can oppose to the encroachments of despotism. The national guard in France was well organized, but the *volunteer militia* of Spain is a better institution. This national seminary of the defenders of liberty cannot be cultivated with too much care: it has been wisely thought of in the new plan of its regulations to extend the term for the enlistment of the volunteers; but I could have wished that some proviso had been made for its being kept to its full complement.

“It has likewise been wisely proposed, that the national militia should be independent of the political chief, and should not be called into active service without the consent of the municipality. As long as the executive power shall have any influence di-

rectly or indirectly over the appointment of the political chiefs, these must not have a national militia at their disposal. A fundamental principle which is never to be lost sight of is, that the national militia is nothing else *but a confederation of citizens for the support of the constitution, and the defence of liberty*: it must therefore receive orders from none but the magistrates of the people.

A second principle which the events of the 9th of January, at Valencia, must make you appreciate is, *that a permanent armed force cannot be employed in the interior, not even under the pretence of restoring order, without the request or the sanction of the municipal magistrates*. The author of the events of the 9th of January, ought to have forfeited his life, because the municipality should have had the right to outlaw him, and to arm the citizens.

“ I must say a word of another institution of great importance, which the late cortes have rendered inefficient, or to which they have given a perverse direction, I mean the active militia. The caution with which the 364th article of the constitution is drawn up, proves that the active militia is not to be considered directly under the controul of the executive power.

“ This body, which should be considered as a moveable column of the national guard, has been interposed between the permanent troops and the citizens; and it is rather assimilated to the former, since the appointment of the officers has been assumed by

the executive power. This is an erroneous principle, and a false interpretation of the law. The active militia should have been organized on the plan of the French volunteer battalions of 1791. Government had the appointment of the second colonel and adjutant; the other officers were chosen by the volunteers themselves."

At Madrid the serviles are as restless as in the provinces. The cortes are as much the object of their fears, as of the hopes of the liberals, and they are anxious to get rid of them. They use therefore all the means in their power to thwart their operations, or to bring about their dissolution.

On the 9th of March, there was at Madrid an attempt at insurrection, which proves that there is a spirit of insubordination in the royal guard. In the afternoon a dispute arose near the bridge of Toledo, between some soldiers of the guard, assisted by some of the regiment of Ferdinand the seventh, and militiamen, intermixed with citizens. The former party shouted *viva el rey neto!* and their adversaries *viva Riego!* The higher powers of Madrid took no measures towards repressing the tumult; the political chief, San Martin, has been bought by the servile faction, and the captain-general Morillo is the same man who desolated and deluged with blood South America. The dispute, however, ended that day without any accident, save the wounding of a corporal. The next day some deputies having called upon

the ministers to give an account of the events of the preceding day, and of the actual state of the metropolis, Mr. Moscoso had the impudence to represent the affair which had taken place as a drunken brawl, and *quite unconnected with any political opinions*. He further added, that measures had been taken to maintain public tranquillity.

Notwithstanding this, the soldiers and the citizens again assembled at the same rallying word, some armed with sticks, some with swords, and the affray was renewed. The indignation of the deputies, and the serious appeal made by the whole body of the cortes, obliged government to adopt conciliatory measures. Infantry and cavalry patrol were ordered out, and quiet was restored. The troops were sent to their quarters, and some individuals were put under arrest; you may well suppose they were among those who had cried *viva Riego!*

The servile faction in the pay of the ministry, finding that this attempt had not produced the effect upon which they calculated, suspended their measures, and on the 11th Madrid enjoyed its usual tranquillity.

The cortes have just witnessed a very inauspicious omen, which must sadly damp the hopes of the liberals. On the 12th some deputies revived a motion which had been made on the 13th of February in the preceding session, viz. "That for two years after each session the deputies should not be allowed to accept any office nor any emolument from government." This motion was lost by a majority of three,

(sixty-seven to sixty-four) on the ground that Spain must not be deprived of the experience and talents of so many distinguished individuals.

This majority proves that four deputies have thrown off the mask, since in the first sitting the liberals were sixty-eight to sixty-three. Trust ministers for losing the opportunity of bribing wretches who hold themselves up to the highest bidder.

On the 17th instant tranquillity was again interrupted at Valencia by the artillery, in consequence of a most atrocious manœuvre. It is customary at Valencia for the band of the regiments composing the garrison, to assemble on the parade, and to accompany each to its respective quarters. The Valencians are extremely fond of music; and crowds of individuals of every class, male and female, usually follow the regiment.

Since it was known that Riego was elected president of the cortes, the music was occasionally intermingled with shouts of *viva la constitucion! viva Riego!* The artillery heard all this in silence, but it was the silence of indignation. On Sunday the 17th, the artillery on the return to the barracks, followed as usual the regiment of Zamora; the customary shouts and songs were heard, but without at first causing any disorder. When the regiments reached the house of the colonel of artillery, and were nearly opposite that of the captain-general, and consequently between the guards attached to each officer, a shout was heard of *viva Riego!* upon which



as if it had been preconcerted, the rear guard faced about and fired upon the crowd. The guards of Almodovar and of the colonel attacked the crowd with their swords, and the butt end of their muskets, and spread consternation all around. A great number of persons were wounded more or less severely. Not satisfied with this the soldiers spread themselves in every direction, striking or ill-using every individual they met; and in this they were urged on by Almodovar, who rushed out of his house like a madman. The artillerymen took advantage of this to steal a great number of articles, which they have since publicly sold.

Plasencia transmitted to the government an account of this event; and this account is so little to the point, and so full of falsehood, that the natural conclusion of it is, that Plasencia is no stranger to this infamous transaction. He stated at first that the same assemblage of rebels, which his fancy had conjured up, in order to justify his conduct on the 7th and 9th of January, had stopped him opposite the house of the colonel, attacked him with stones, and fired a brace of pistols at him.

Is it credible that people who had any design of attacking him at the head of the rear guard which he commanded, should have suffered him to proceed unmolested through narrow streets and lanes, where he would have been at their mercy, and should have waited till he was within reach of two military posts? How is it credible that regular troops armed with

muskets, which they had loaded on the parade, should be assailed with a brace of pistols? As to stones no one has complained of having been hurt by them, and no one has complained that any were thrown. Plasencia added, that the marks of the shot and slugs with which the pistols were loaded, were to be seen on the walls of the colonel's house, of that of the captain-general's, and several other persons. What a heap of absurdities in a few words!

He concludes by accusing the municipality, who, according to him, will sacrifice any thing to cause a disturbance, of having brought about this unfortunate affair. Strange that the chief magistrate of a province should dare to state that the municipal magistrates have an interest in disturbing the tranquillity of the town which they inhabit, by commotions which must expose to imminent danger their families and connexions, and endanger their own lives.

The artillery finding themselves supported continued their outrageous conduct for some days; the students of the university were the object of their attack. These young men who went in a body to meet Riego to congratulate him, and had every where accompanied him, had of course drawn upon themselves the odium of his enemies. For some days they were incessantly attacked by the artillery whenever they met out of the town, under the pretence that they shouted *viva Riego!* that is to say, that when four or five students were found in a remote place, they were generally attacked by fifteen or twenty artil-

lerymen with drawn swords, and not unfrequently wounded. The regiment of Zamora began also to take a share in these disorders.

After the exploit of the 17th, the artillery became bolder, and attacked the students in the middle of the town, the latter shouting *viva Riego!* to provoke them.

On the 20th of March, a party of cannoneers came out of their barracks, armed with swords, waiting for the hour when the students should come out of the university, which was situated near their quarters. The students armed themselves with stones, and opened themselves a passage, after having wounded some of their adversaries.

On the 21st a similar affray took place. The students at first kept their ground; but were at last obliged to shut themselves up in the university; the whole of the artillery soldiers having assailed them, without any interference on the part of their officers. Then, and not till then, Plasencia and Almodovar being ashamed of suffering children to be murdered, sent the soldiers to their barracks, and the students were permitted to come out.

I have received from the deputy Serrano an answer to my letter of the 12th of March.\* I am pleased to find that my remonstrances have had some effect upon the liberal deputies; but it appears to me

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\* Appendix, No. 10.

(perhaps, because my Spanish is not sufficiently intelligible) that he does not fully understand what I said respecting the armed force in the interior. Neither does he coincide with my opinion respecting the confederations of national militia which I proposed. The subject is sufficiently interesting to have induced me to send him the explanations which he required. I transmitted them in two letters, dated the 20th and 24th.

I observed to him, that I never meant to say that the municipalities alone should have the disposal of the armed force in the interior; this would be depriving the executive power of one of its essential prerogatives; I merely meant that the military authority should not have the right to order out the armed force against the citizens on the occurrence of a slight disturbance, without the request or the consent of the municipal authority; and that it was necessary to prevent the military authority from calling incessantly for the interference of the armed force to repress disorders, which might prove to be imaginary. But, nevertheless, on occasions of real importance the armed force must be called upon to restore tranquillity.

When the internal peace of a province is disturbed only by slight and partial disorders, which the police alone, or with the assistance of the armed force, is able to repress, no measure should be resorted to beyond the usual remedies afforded by the constitution; it is the duty of the civil authority to calcu-

late, and to call for the assistance which they may require. But on extraordinary occasions, when a whole province is disturbed, when the civil authority is disregarded, or what is not impossible, when it refuses to act, a measure might be resorted to which is pointed out by the French constitution. Let the superior authorities, both civil and military, or either of them, make a report to the government of the state of the province, and represent the necessity of resorting to extraordinary means; then let the government, after having taken the advice of the council of state, propose to the cortes that the refractory province should be put under military law; or if the cortes are not sitting, let the government decree this measure under the special responsibility of the ministers and of the council of state, submitting the decree first to the approval of the permanent commission, and subsequently to the examination of the cortes in the next session. The power of the military authorities to whom the disturbed province is confided, must of course be modified by circumstances. But this can be of no real utility, until the council of state and the ministry are composed of better elements.

As to the active militia, it is to be observed, that one of the prerogatives of the king is to bestow on whom he pleases every civil and military office; and the question is, whether the active national militia be in reality a military body; that is, whether it form part of the permanent army. My opinion is that it does not; it being nothing more than an

ordinary national militia, called upon to perform an extraordinary and temporary service. The constitution (tit. 8.) distinguishes the active militia, (chap. 2.) from the permanent troops, (chap. 1.) it is said, article 359, that the cortes shall prescribe regulations for the discipline, pay, promotion, &c. of the permanent troops: and in article 363, that they shall determine by a *special regulation, the mode of formation* of the active militia, their number and *constitution*. Now what is to be understood by the words *formation and constitution*? Is it not the internal organization, implying the appointment of officers of every rank? Is it not clearly expressed that the militia is subject to a *special* regulation, consequently differing from the regulations respecting the permanent troops? Was it not clearly the intention of the framer of these articles of the constitution to distinguish the militia from the permanent army, which alone can be considered a military body in the strict sense of the term? Moreover, if a doubt remains, the cortes have a right to choose their interpretation, (art. 131. prerogative 1.)

In what relates to the confederations, I cannot entirely approve of the opinion of the deputy Serrano and of his colleagues. The confederation, it is true, cannot openly act at present against the ministry; but for what reason? because it would appear that it is intended by keeping them secret to isolate them. As long as the cortes shall be without a national force at their command, it is clear that

their decrees will have very little effect. By uniting such a force while they have still a plausible pretence, they will prepare themselves for the open and inevitable war which will be made against them, if they do not begin it themselves. The cortes have in some measure shewn that they are not averse to it, by the honors which they ordered to be conferred on the battalion of Asturias, the defenders of the comuneros of Castile, and of the rights of Arragon. The public are, therefore, prepared to see patriotism encouraged and rewarded. But why stop there? The 2nd of May is to be a national festival;—why should not deputations from the volunteer militia of every part of the kingdom assemble on that day at Madrid?

The proceedings of the cortes on the 22d of March were stormy and interesting. The deputies of the province of Valencia had received by post a narrative of the events of the 17th, which had not been mentioned by the ministers. After some rather violent interpellations, the minister of the interior, and the minister of war, read the falsehoods transmitted by Plasencia and Almodovar. But Mr. Moscoso forgot to mention the protest of the municipality of Valencia.

The deputies who had received a copy of it, indignantly accused the ministers of treachery and prevarication in the accounts which they laid before the cortes: they were likewise reproached with the ar-

bitrary act, by which the political chief, Plasencia, had disbanded the second and third battalions of volunteer militia, on the ground that they had assembled on parade without special order: this act had also been concealed by the ministers. The deputies Marau, Adan and Beltran de Lis spoke with the greatest energy. The last-mentioned in particular insisted upon the necessity of removing from Valencia the regiment of artillery, alleging that this body was composed in great measure of the creatures of Elio; and that Valencia could enjoy no tranquillity as long as these men, who were accustomed to pillage and disorder of every kind, should remain within its walls.

These creatures of Elio, mentioned by Beltran de Lis, were freebooters, organized by that general, in order to assist him in all his sanguinary acts, to subdue and terrify the people; in a word, to perform the service of which regular troops would have been ashamed. They were a band of blood-thirsty ruffians; and many of them have in fact been incorporated in the artillery.

The serviles have caused a fresh commotion at Pampeluna. On the 18th of March, some officers were singing patriotic songs in a coffee-house; they were insulted by some students; a dispute arose, in which successively mingled the soldiers of the national militia, other students, and individuals, to whom pardon had lately been granted for treasonable



practices. The authorities sent troops to the spot; an engagement began, in which shots were fired: at length quiet was restored.

The national militia of Pampeluna is to be disbanded and newly organized. Every other part of Navarre is full of factions. Arragon is in the same predicament—Catalonia is infested with them. Madrid presents every symptom of an approaching crisis; and here we daily expect an explosion. Such is the actual situation of Spain—a desperate one indeed! The cortes alone could avert the evil by firmness and prudence. But their firmness has been paralysed; their prudence has been lulled; and their predecessors have reduced Spain to such a state, that a violent shock must be the necessary result. What will such a shock produce? I tremble to anticipate, knowing the weakness of the cortes.

I have just received a letter from Serrano, which is not calculated to give me better hopes. The majority of the cortes are forsaking, by degrees, the liberal party; and others effect a scrupulous moderation. In the early part of the month, the cortes had a secret sitting, the proceedings of which were very violent: the deputies were on the point of attacking each other.

This affair having transpired, it was reported that the debate arose upon the loss of the original of the penal code: the fact is, that the dispute originated in the measures which are to be adopted against the ministers. The cortes have impeached the ex-

minister, Salvador, and also Plasencia, who has been succeeded by an ex-deputy of the name of Don Mariano Villa; but all this will end in smoke.

On the 1st of April, ministers proposed a plan of regulation for the national militia. According to the constitution, the plan of such a regulation should have been submitted by the cortes; but ministers took the matter in hand, in order to trace the line which their creatures are to follow, without being obliged to refer at every time to their employers.

## LETTER XIII.

*Valencia, June 2, 1822.*

I Have deferred writing you till now, because the slow progress of events afforded me nothing very interesting to communicate. The government still perseveres in aiming directly at despotism, but is impeded in its march by the cortes, who without possessing energy sufficient to overthrow or to reform it, have strength enough to compel it to make use of a circuitous route. The serviles, secretly upheld by the ministers, are all ardour and activity.

The eastern provinces of Spain are a prey to faction; and almost every town in the interior is in a state of agitation. At Valencia we have been for the last month treading on a volcano which at length has burst, and exposed us to considerable danger, as I shall mention hereafter.

I am far from being satisfied with the turn which the present session seems to have taken; the majority of the cortes affect moderation, and the most liberal deputies are calumniated by inuendos imputing to them republican ideas. The insinuation is as stupid as it is insidious.

The present circumstances of Spain are very different from those of France in 1793; and the public opinion has a very different tendency.

Whatever may be the secret opinions of the liberals, called *exaltados*, I am convinced that they mean nothing more than to remove from the person of the king the evil counsellors by which he is surrounded, and to put in their place patriots of tried integrity.

Notwithstanding the moderation, or rather the affectation of it, by which the present cortes are characterized, they will not be able to avert the violent crisis which the serviles are preparing. It will come sooner than is generally expected; we had a specimen of it here, which nearly proved fatal to the cause of liberty. I repeat it, a violent shock is necessary to Spain, her dormant energies must be roused—but what will be the result? What elements will be brought into action? What will be the comparative proportion of the contending forces? I cannot, I dare not anticipate.

The anilleros are preparing with all their might an anti-constitutional movement, in order to obtain, as a modification, a house of peers.

The clergy, since the reformation of the financial department, have in many places suppressed the outward show of religious ceremonies, and thus irritated the bigotry of the people. Government fans the flame, and designedly neglects the precautions necessary to restore tranquillity. Events like those in France of 1792 or 1815 are fast approaching. The

former, if the Spanish nation can withstand the concussion; the latter, if the liberals are weak enough to yield.

When the budget was discussed, the deputy Arguellez, the most eloquent of the men of 1812 amongst the present cortes, did not fail to seize the opportunity of expressing his detestation of foreigners; he violently deprecated the asylum given by Spain to the French and Italian refugees, whom he taunted with the assistance, which (he would have it) they enjoy. He surely could not have chosen a worse time for such a declamation, when a decree of the 17th of March, issued under the auspices of the ministerial faction, with whom the affections and interests of Arguellez are interwoven, has just deprived the subalterns and some of the superior officers amongst the refugees of the miserable pittance which was granted to them in 1821. And how was this pittance distributed? It was with the greatest difficulty, and after repeated entreaties, that the most destitute of the refugees were able to obtain a third part of the amount which was assigned to them for one quarter. Nor was this proportion obtained without their experiencing numberless vexations and insults, which would not have been offered to the meanest Spaniard. Has Arguellez forgotten the generous hospitality which his countrymen met with in France, and the treatment which they now experience from the French government? May he one

day be reduced to implore in vain the hospitality which he now denies to others!

A dead calm seems to have succeeded the storms by which the cortes have been agitated; it has lasted for some days, and the liberal party seems to have the ascendancy. This new situation of affairs seems to me unnatural. I can assign no other cause for it than a manœuvre of the ministers, who are endeavoring to lull the fears of such members of the cortes as are sincerely liberal. To be convinced of this, little penetration is required. This ominous silence is occasionally interrupted by the hollow murmuring of the volcano which is ready to burst: but where will it burst? The confusion of the elements which will feed the conflagration is such that the effect which they are calculated to produce cannot be foretold, unless some skilful hand separate them, and give to each a beneficial impulse. The task is difficult, but not impossible.

Let all those who have taken a share in the revolution, bear well in mind that no compromise must be entered into with their enemies. Even those who could think it possible to purchase safety by the sacrifice of their conscience and of their honor, would sooner or later fall, if once the serviles could overthrow the constitution. Let the liberals be well convinced of this truth, and cease to weaken and to destroy each other for trifling matters of form. In the eyes of the serviles all those who wish for a con-

stitution are their enemies; let the liberals adopt the converse of this proposition.

The free-masons lean too much towards that false moderation which is always confounded with the virtue of which it usurps the name. The moderation which forbears from aggression, but knows how to repel it, and thus ensure peace and tranquillity, is a virtue: but when we are attacked and threatened with oppression by an unwearied and implacable enemy, the moderation which would paralyse or forbid the defence enjoined by reason and by nature, is worse than a fault—it is a crime.

The comuneros appear at first sight, and, comparatively speaking, too enthusiastic. But when the danger which threatens the constitution of Spain is taken into consideration; when the dark and deep plans of the serviles are fathomed; when their sworn hatred to every thing liberal, and their blood-thirsty disposition are thrown into the balance, this first impression is removed, and nothing remains but a conviction that indefatigable activity and stedfast energy, are the only means by which liberty can be preserved.

The comuneros have another great advantage over their rivals; they are not stigmatized with the aversion which bigotted catholics, and even milder devotees entertain against the free-masons, who are under the anathema of the see of Rome. However unjust the prejudice may be, an association limited in its numbers, to the few who have shaken off the yoke of superstition, must not attempt to stem the

torrent of public opinion; their business is to conciliate. An honest and enlightened man should direct public opinion, if it is in his power; but to treat it with contempt, whatever it may be, is a dangerous error.

If a union between the masons and comuneros could be effected, a most desirable object would be attained; but in the meanwhile by arming the cortes and augmenting their number, the liberals could but strengthen their cause. If the liberals will but shake off their torpor and appear on the field of battle, the victory is their own.

There has been a fresh commotion at Carthagena. The government had not forgotten the events which recently took place in that town, nor the resolution with which the inhabitants had opposed, not only ministerial measures, but the re-action which ministers had produced at Cadiz, and at Seville. Murcia, the principal town of the province, had submitted; Piquero had been traduced before the tribunal; and Abadia had resumed his functions. The government then thought itself strong enough to strike a blow at Carthagena, by causing the arrest of the principal patriots, as exaltados and republicans.

General Peon, commandant of the province, was entrusted with this mission; he therefore left Murcia on the 16th of April, accompanied by a detachment of cavalry, and followed by a strong detachment of infantry. He succeeded in entering Carthagena by surprize with his cavalry, and already made sure of



gaining his object; but the inhabitants, who knew him well, alarmed at his sudden and unexpected appearance, ran to arms and shut the gates. General Peon who had gone to the municipality was there arrested.

The cavalry was led out of the town without being insulted, and without its attempting to resist. A messenger was despatched to the infantry to forbid its proceeding farther; this order was complied with. As to general Peon, the indignation against him was such, that in order to ensure his leaving the town in safety, the magistrates were obliged to have him escorted, and surrounded by a detachment of the national militia: notwithstanding which, he was exposed to the most imminent danger. As an instance of it, *a lazo*, like that with which wild bulls are caught, was thrown at him from a balcony; luckily for him his hat interrupted the noose which was not sufficiently extended, otherwise he must have been killed. The garrison witnessed this scene without attempting to interfere. The inhabitants of Carthagena keep their doors shut as in a state of siege.

The cortes have gone through the month of April as quietly as through the month of March, that is, without signalizing it by any measure of importance. The only reformation which they have been enabled to effect, has fallen upon the clerks of various public offices. On the 25th a scale of reduction of their salaries was decreed, in order to afford some relief to the exhausted exchequer.

A few days after the opening of the cortes, a committee had been appointed to enquire into the state of the nation. Several meetings had taken place between the committee and the ministers, but without producing any result of importance. Studied delays, contradictory documents, in short, every impediment had been used to prolong the labors of the committee, and to postpone its report to the end of the session. The consequence was, that, on the 27th, when an explanation was called for by some of the liberal deputies, the members of the committee were obliged to confess that their labors were not terminated. It was proposed that the committee should be ordered to present its report: the liberal members wished to define specifically the period to be allowed for this purpose; but the intrigues of the ministers prevailed against them. The decree ordered that the committee should bring up the result of their labors *as soon as possible*: it is therefore a hopeless case.

The internal affairs of Spain have been getting worse during the month of May; this was naturally to be expected, as the session was to be closed on the 31st. The cortes decided on prolonging the session to the 30th of June, which circumstance determined the serviles to delay for a month striking the blow which they had meditated. The explosion took place, as the serviles had openly foretold, on the 30th of May, the anniversary of St. Ferdinand.

Highway robbers almost every where proclaim themselves defenders of the faith; and the standard has been displayed even in the province of Murcia by Jayme Alfonso, surnamed Long Beard. A trappist who has declared himself a defender of the same cause, near Villafranca de Panades, has already gathered round him a numerous faction; in the meantime government has taken no serious measures to prevent these disturbances. The commandant-general of Catalonia, Zarco del Valle, who was accused of tardiness and bad intentions by the inhabitants, has been sent into Arragon. He is there unceasingly in pursuit of the faction, but manages never to come in contact with them. Many people think this is to be imputed to incapacity; and, in fact, his military qualifications are much on a par with those of a capuchin friar; but for my part, I suspect something worse than incapacity. He has been represented to me as a political jesuit of the most dangerous kind. By his false manœuvres he contrived to leave Saragossa so completely exposed, that had it not been for the good conduct of baron Carondelet, who was present with a handful of men, the town would have been taken. The same wretch has to answer for the pillage of Barbastro, and the loss of Mequinenza in Catalonia; for though he was apprised of the approach of the factious, he persisted in leaving the latter town with no other defence than thirty soldiers.

On the other hand the labors of the anilleros are going on so prosperously, that the false moderation of

which I have so often had occasion to find fault with, is daily gaining ground.

I have received from Serrano a letter, in reply to what I had written him respecting the comuneros. He congratulates himself upon finding among the professedly moderate deputies a disposition to reform the clergy.

For my part I see in this nothing to rejoice at, as the proposed plan of reform embraces the lower orders of the clergy, whose condition ought rather to have been ameliorated at the expense of the bishops, the chapters, and the rich ecclesiastical sinecurists.

On the 2nd of May, a ridiculous scene took place at Valencia, on the anniversary of the patron saint of one of the parishes. Beyond the boundaries of this parish, no one thought of the saint or his anniversary, when all of a sudden a loud explosion was heard, the fire boxes having been put in requisition in token of rejoicing. Many persons imagined the noise was occasioned by the firing of guns; and it was given out that an engagement had actually taken place. The artillerymen, who happened to be in the streets the most remote from the supposed scene of action, took the alarm; and thinking they should be murdered by the inhabitants, whom they had been in the habit of daily insulting and ill-using, ran for their lives. When they met any of the militiamen they threw themselves on their knees, begging for mercy, protesting that they were liberals, partisans of Riego, and even exaltados. At the artillery barracks they

doubled the guard and sentries. But when they discovered that it was a false alarm, their behavior was as insolent as ever.

Since the affair of the 17th of March, the regiment of Zamora has been completely bought over to the servile party; the serjeants belonging to it, began shortly after to parade the streets with the artillerymen.

On the 15th of May, an assemblage of both hit upon an exploit of a novel description; they attacked with stones and drawn swords the persons who were walking on the *Glorietta*.\* The women and children were of course frightened; but some of the men succeeded in repelling the attack.

Three or four days after, the serjeants belonging to the regiments of Zamora, and to the artillery, depending upon the support of Almodovar, and the connivance of the new political chief, determined to renew the scene upon a larger scale. They went in a body to the *Glorietta*, and began insulting those who were walking there, and throwing stones at them. Several patriots drew their swords; others who were unprovided with weapons, went home with the intention of arming themselves. Blood must inevitably have flowed, had not quiet been fortunately restored by an unexpected incident. Captain Don

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\* A promenade.

Bernardino Marti, who had received orders to pursue the robbers, by whom the province was infested, happened to be on the spot with a dozen volunteers armed with blunderbusses. He threw himself into the middle of the fray, ordered the blunderbusses to be pointed at the aggressors, killed one of them with his own hand, and drove the rest back to their quarters. The factious affected to consider as a martyr the deceased, who had so deservedly lost his life; he was a serjeant of the regiment of Zamora. The serviles provided for him a pompous funeral, which the superior military commandant, and the political chief had the weakness to attend.

After this affray, the two regiments remained quiet till the day fixed upon for the premeditated blow. The explosion took place, and was all but fatal. To the stupidity and the cowardice of the serviles is the town indebted for its safety; for its surprize was complete.

On the 29th of May, in consequence of a false alarm given by the serviles, the national militia was kept under arms all night and all day. Nothing extraordinary having occurred, they were ordered back to their quarters, where they thought of nothing but repose. On the 30th, the anniversary of St. Ferdinand, it is customary in the afternoon to fire a round from the great battery which protects the external fortification of the citadel. About three o'clock a detachment of the artillery proceeded to the citadel: but this detachment consisted of eighty men

instead of forty, the usual number, and happened to be commanded by a young officer from the school of Segovia, who was on duty for the first time.

They had scarcely reached the citadel, when one of them began shouting *viva el rey neto! viva Elio! muera la constitucion!* The officer, faithful to his duty, ordered the arrest of the individual who had uttered the seditious cries. The soldiers looked at each other, and some of them deliberated whether they should kill their officer, or desire him to withdraw.

The latter, justly alarmed, made his escape, while the soldiers were liberating Elio, and went to make his report to the commandant-general, major-general Don Diego Clarke, who had the temporary command during the absence of Almodovar, who was gone to Murcia. General Clarke took a precaution, which contributed in a great measure to the safety of the town. Instead of going straight to the citadel, he made a circuit, and stopped at the barracks of the regiment of Zamora. He forbade the men to leave their quarters; ordered the officers to join their respective companies; and insisted that no one should stir without his positive orders.

By this measure he prevented the movement which the regiment of Zamora was no doubt prepared to make in favor of the rebels. From thence he went to the citadel, of which the gate was shut against him. His endeavors to bring back the ar-

tillery to a sense of their duty by persuasion were fruitless; they threatened to fire upon him, and he was obliged to withdraw. This moment was the most dangerous of all for the town's people, who were hardly aware what was going on, and remained for more than an hour without any means of defence; for it was a long while before any troops to be depended upon could be assembled. Those were confined to the national militia; the remaining part of the regiment of artillery were ripe for revolt, and were only waiting for a signal in the barracks. The regiment of Zamorá was prepared, and all the sergeants were implicated in the conspiracy. The horse artillery had an understanding with the artillerymen; some of them had taken arms at their quarters, and had despatched an out-post towards the citadel. Some ran to the park, where a battery of six field pieces had been secretly prepared, and wanted only the horses to be harnessed to them. The gaoler of the prison where the galley slaves are confined was to liberate them at the first summons, and six hundred muskets secreted in the artillery barracks were to be put into their hands.

The house in which I lodged was in the centre of this commotion, and would, no doubt, have been attacked before any other; the landlord being notorious as an exaltado.

Had Elio the talents for which the world give him credit, and any courage beyond that of an assassin,



he would have left the citadel under the care of its daily garrison, and taken with him the eighty artillerymen who had liberated him ; he would have rallied round him the foot and horse artillery ; the regiment of Zamora would have joined him without compulsion, and he would have entered the town at the head of nearly one thousand eight hundred men. No troops could have been opposed to him, since the government had taken the precaution to remove even the regiment of cuirassers.

The rebels would have met only the militia hastening to their parade, and who would have easily been overcome. The town would have been surprised almost without a blow being struck. The insurrection of the kingdom of Valencia would no doubt have followed, and would have spread its baneful influence all over Spain. Instead of this the artillery thought of nothing but indulging in boisterous mirth and getting drunk. Elio harangued them ; he spoke of the exploits which they were to perform, but came to no determination.

It may be said, as a palliation to his irresolute conduct, that he expected four thousand peasants, who were to enter the Puerta de Socorro. He needed not their assistance to occupy the town, if he had possessed the least courage ; and the next day they would have increased the number of his followers, and enabled him to overawe the province. Meanwhile the intelligence of what was going on

was spread about the town, by those persons who from the Glorietta had heard the cry of *viva el rey neto!* and seen the gates of the citadel shut. The militia without, waiting for orders, ran to arms, and united at the rallying points assigned to their battalions on the preceding day: but it was half past four o'clock before they were all assembled.

General Clarke, who could not rely upon the regiment of Zamora, whom he confined to their quarters, as well as the artillery, ordered the militia to surround the citadel.

The first and third battalions occupied the side which faces the town, and took possession of the convent of St. Domingo and the Intendencia, two points which command the citadel, and which had been overlooked by the rebels. The second battalion went beyond the walls, and crossed the river for fear of being exposed to the fire of the great battery, composed of eighteen and twenty-four pounders to the number of twenty.

The news having spread beyond the town, a detachment of volunteers came from the Grao, and the peasants attached to the liberal cause put themselves in motion.

The rebels were summoned to surrender; they replied with threats and invectives. The superior authorities were guilty of indecision; there was collusion on the part of the political chief Villa; and general Clarke was afraid of taking too much upon

himself. It was therefore decided that the artillerymen who were in the worst state of in intoxication, should be suffered to come to their senses.

The forcible remonstrances and threats of the patriots, determined, however, the authorities towards ten o'clock at night to proclaim martial law. The proclamation was met with fresh insults and threats of retaliation for the next day.

Such was the state of things till a little after midnight, at which time Elio not hearing any thing of the reinforcements which he had expected, entirely lost all self-possession. He could easily have escaped, or at least have met an honorable death in the attempt, if he had not really been a coward. The convent of Remedio facing the Puerta del Mar of the citadel was not occupied; there was only a piquet of the second battalion of militia stationed at the bridge del Mar. Elio might have left the citadel by the Puerta del Socorro at the head of one hundred artillery, overthrown all those who were likely to oppose him, and joined the factious in Catalonia, or those who, under the orders of Rambla, were in possession of Morella, in the kingdom of Valencia. The wretch preferred returning to his prison, and to await an opprobrious death. Previously, however, he advised the artillery to enter into a fresh negotiation, and to endeavor to obtain favorable conditions.

The artillery, still under the influence of wine, and the suggestions of the serviles, shewed themselves on the ramparts facing the town, and requested an ho-

norable capitulation, protesting that they alone were the real friends of the constitution, and that those by whom they were attacked were the abettors of anarchy, or at best republicans, whose object was to overthrow the constitution. This was nothing but a repetition of the speeches of Almodovar, Plasencia, and Villa.

The rebellious garrison having suffered the term to expire, which was fixed for submission by the martial law, they demanded that it should be proclaimed a second time, in order that they might take the benefit of it and escape punishment. However illegal this demand might be, the superior authorities were inclined to accede to it, and were only stopped by the fear of falling victims to popular indignation. Meanwhile the chief of the second battalion, in order to prevent a sortie, and more closely to invest the citadel, ordered the company of chasseurs, who were joined by several Spanish volunteers, and some of the Italian refugees, to occupy the convent of Remedio, which commanded the great battery.

The peasants flocked from every direction, and more than four thousand soon appeared under the walls of the citadel. Many of them were of the number of those who had been expected by Elio, but had been gained over to the liberal cause by the money of the patriots. The rebels had then no chance of escaping the punishment which they deserved. Patrols were despatched in every direction to prevent the rising of the galley slaves.

At dawn of day the authorities went up in form to the gates of the citadel, and after a fresh conference, they were on the point of allowing the rebels to capitulate, in spite of the patriots, when a lucky incident changed the face of affairs. At day-light the greater part of the artillery went to the chief battery, which in the midst of their drunken revelry they had till then neglected. They pointed the guns in a fresh direction, and prepared to fire on the troops who had stationed themselves beyond the walls of the tower. *They boasted that the rabble by which they were attacked*, would run away at the firing of the first gun, and really believed it. At that moment the captain of artillery, Don Manuel Sanchez, one of the only four officers of that regiment who had remained faithful to their duty, arrived at the convent of Remedio. This officer asked the commandant of the post where the gunners were stationed, and why they had not commenced firing? The commandant replied, that he had received no orders. "Sir," replied captain Sanchez, in a case like this, circumstances alone must be our guides. Are you waiting for the artillery to complete their positions to destroy the convent, and to bury you and your troops under its ruins? If you will not take upon yourself to order the men to fire, I will." At these words the militia and the patriots who had joined them, eagerly ran to the terrace and to the upper windows of the convent, and a brisk fire was immediately opened against the chief battery. —The posts of San Domingo, of the Intendencia, and

of the house facing the citadel, commenced firing at the same time. The gunners at the chief battery hastily fired three or four guns; but they were not pointed, and the shots passed over the trees.

After this exploit, finding that they had lost, in a few moments, one man killed and seven wounded, terrified by the shouts of the militia, who called for ladders, they ran from their guns and concealed themselves in the interior court of the fortress. That part of the garrison who were on the side facing the town, overpowered by the volleys to which they were exposed in every direction, followed the same example. In the mean time the chasseurs of the second battalion of militia, who were at the convent of Remedio, having procured ladders, scaled the chief battery with the assistance of some patriots, and a small number of peasants, forming altogether about sixty men. The gunners having thrown away their arms, were in the court on their knees imploring for mercy.

The same militia whom the calumnies of certain magistrates had represented as blood-thirsty monsters, did not hurt a single man. In the first moment of anger they merely slapped the faces of some of their prisoners in contempt, considering them too great cowards to take more serious revenge.

No excesses were committed either in the citadel, or in the town, although more than three thousand armed peasants had entered it.

The 31st at seven o'clock in the morning, no one would have supposed that a commotion had taken

place at Valencia. Elio would not, perhaps, have escaped the just vengeance of those who had taken the citadel, had not its governor, La Chica, concealed him in his own apartment. He was afterwards discovered there by the officers of militia, and sent back to prison under a strong escort. The other rebels have likewise been imprisoned. All are to be tried before a court martial of the second battalion of militia who took them.

However much I might have regretted the effusion of blood on this occasion, still I should have preferred it to the slow and studied cruelty sanctioned by legal forms. All these prisoners will be shut up for three, four, or perhaps six months, in different prisons, from which they will be dragged by three or four at a time to be sent to the gallows. This is protracting their sufferings, and confounding the instigators with the victims of their deception.

It would have been better for the patriots to have availed themselves of the rights of war, by ordering immediately to be shot the subalterns of the artillery, and some civilians who had joined them, who might be called the heads of parties. As to the soldiers they ought to be considered as having been seduced, and to be chastised merely for breach of discipline, and dispersed amongst other regiments. In this way the rebels would have been punished; and about eighty lives would have been spared.

Thus ended a revolt, which threatened to spread all over the kingdom of Valencia, and which for two hours gave me a great deal of uneasiness.

The cowardice and indecision of Elio deprived him of the advantages offered by such a combination of circumstances. As to the serviles of Valencia, who for some time had been so loud in their threats, (particularly that swarm of useless beings called the staff, who are more numerous than the army) not one of them stirred. They might, however, had made in the town a division which would have greatly annoyed the patriots.

We have just learnt that on the same day (the 30th) there was at Aranjuez, where the king had gone, a similar movement, joined by his guard. All the persons about the court down to the scullions, answered, with acclamations, the cries of *viva el rey neto!*

The Infant had appeared amongst the guards to receive congratulations and to return thanks; but the firmness of some of the officers, and the presence of the national militia, who had taken arms, prevented any explosion.

We must expect to hear of other insurrections, or attempts at insurrection, from various quarters.

I consider this first essay of the serviles as a failure; particularly as they were foiled both at Valencia and Aranjuez: but we must not believe that their designs are completely overthrown. They have still plenty of engines at work, and will soon bring them again openly into play. The moment fixed upon by them is the closing of the session of the cortes; the scene of action is to be Madrid. The serviles use no disguise, and loudly announce their



intentions. I cannot blame them; for as soon as the session is ended, and the ministers have got rid of the troublesome vigilance of the cortes, all is in their favor. Catalonia, Arragon, and Navarre, are overrun by the factious. All the superior provincial authorities are sold to the ministers, the execution of whose plans nothing seems likely to prevent.

These motives have determined me to quit Valencia, which, by its continual agitation, has become a very unpleasant residence, and a very unsafe one, by the spirit which seems to govern the peasantry of the neighbourhood.

It will be as easy for the factious to bring them against the town, as it was for the liberals to induce them to attack the citadel. I have requested leave to go to Alicante, a sea port, and a quiet town; the inhabitants of which have the credit of being patriots. I shall there wait the effect of the next commotion.

## LETTER XIV.

*Alicante, July 15, 1822.*

IN the beginning of the last month, the ministers wishing to gain time, and once more to quiet the fears of the public, which had been awakened by the events of Valencia and Aranjuez, endeavored to get up a farce, in which the king was to play the principal part. They proposed to him, in order as they said to calm the general agitation, to renew his oath of adherence to the constitution, and to address a proclamation on the subject to the Spanish nation. But the king, who repents of the first oath which he took, and expects to be released from it by the serviles, instantly refused. This private scene transpired, and has produced a disagreeable sensation. It has been rightly inferred from it, that the servile faction despairing to obtain a decisive result by partial insurrections, (particularly since the only effect of the great conspiracy of St. Ferdinand has been to expose the cowardice and improvidence of its members) was determined to make a desperate attempt. Convinced of this, I had written on the 11th June to my correspondents among the cortes, stating that the servile faction were preparing a central movement, and would place the king himself at the head of the rebels.

You will see that the event has justified the first part of my prediction ; and that if the second was not equally verified, it was from circumstances, of the peculiar nature of which you will be able to judge. The only means of preventing the violent crisis which has taken place, would have been to strike a blow at the French government, by taking advantage of the favorable disposition of the French troops composing the cordon. But in the first place, there would not have been sufficient time ; in the next, the Spanish government is repugnant to the use of this method ; and many of the liberal deputies coincide in this opinion, in consequence of the moderation which they profess. You will find by the answer of Mr. Serrana, to whom I had written, on the subject,\* that my conjectures were correct.

Valencia was the scene of fresh troubles in the month of June, occasioned by the want of precaution, or rather by the instigation of the political chief Villa. The regiment of artillery had been disbanded and incorporated into other regiments ; the town was quiet, and free from the least symptom of agitation or discontent. Mr. Villa no doubt finding too much sameness in this tranquillity, and wishing to have the opportunity of making an interesting report, that he might deserve encomiums, similar to those bestowed by government upon Messrs. Pla-

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\* Appendix, No 13.

sencia and Almodovar, devised a new method of enlivening the town. Under the pretence that the exaltados or jacobins were poisoning the public mind, he requested from government a fresh regiment, or at least an additional battalion, as though the regiment of Zamora had not been sufficient. That the ministers, however, might not be ignorant of his real intentions, he mentioned the battalion *de la princesa*, which was at Murcia, and which he designated as the best adapted for the preservation of order. Now it is necessary to know that these soldiers had been sent to Murcia, for the purpose of arresting Piquero and the principal patriots; that they had dispersed with their swords and the butt end of their muskets the people assembled for a patriotic festival, and that they were unceasingly persecuting and ill-using every individual suspected of being a liberal.

When it was known at Valencia that this battalion was to arrive, the authorities and principal inhabitants of the town represented to the political chief that its entrance would inevitably disturb the quiet so happily restored; that its conduct at Murcia was any thing but auspicious to the citizens, who dreaded seeing in the midst of them a body from whom they expected the same insults as they had experienced from the artillery. They intreated the political chief to request the revocation of the order of government; but it was not through mistake that Mr. Villa had requested this particular battalion, and the revocation

of the order in question would have deranged his plans, and prevented his becoming permanently political chief, (he exercised the functions only per interim); he was, therefore, deaf to every intreaty.

The battalion *de la princesa*, entered Valencia on Sunday, the 15th of June; the people, obedient to the exhortations of their magistrates, contented themselves with following the soldiers to the plaza de la Constitucion, and afterwards to their barracks, shouting *viva Riego! viva il pueblo Sobrano\*\*\*\** and sometimes *viva Piquero!* The battalion entered their barracks, and all was over for the day.

The next day Mr. Villa, anxious to get up the scene upon which he founded his hopes, ordered Duarte, who commanded the battalion, to make the band accompany the regiment from the parade to the barracks, which is unusual on the Monday; the regiment of Zamora received the same order. The return of the battalion was followed by about one hundred individuals, who repeated the cries of *viva Riego! viva Piquero!* and went as far as the entrance of the barracks. The officer on guard ordered the gates to be shut, nobody knows why; some stones were thrown against the windows; but the disturbance was so slight, that some bystanders were able to single out the authors of the tumult; there were in the crowd neither free-masons nor comuneros, nor any patriot known as such in Valencia; it was composed of obscure individuals of the lowest dregs of the populace.

This circumstance, and the parley held with the rabble by Mr. Villa, who suddenly appeared unaccompanied, and in plain clothes, shewed the affair in its true light.

The political chief finding that the inhabitants of Valencia wished rather to avoid than to provoke a disturbance, and anxious to create something like a tumult, had collected and bribed about a hundred wretches for the purpose, in order that he might have to make a report.

On the following Sunday, the 22d, the political chief devised a new scheme. The troops after parade marched back as usual to their quarters. Amongst the battalion *de la princesa*, there was a detachment of two hundred men armed, behind which the rest of the battalion marched with fixed bayonets or drawn swords. Mr. Villa had put himself in ambuscade at the head of the detachment of the regiment of Zamora, in a street leading to a small square which the battalion was to cross. When the troops left the parade, the cries of *viva Riego* began anew, and lasted till the moment when Mr. Villa quitted his ambuscade. The defenceless crowd was then attacked with swords and bayonets; many persons were wounded, and all more or less ill-treated. The soldiers carried these excesses so far, that the general indignation was roused; stones and kitchen utensils were thrown from every house: the political chief then put a stop to this scene: he was satisfied; he could boast, like his predecessors, of having produced tumult and bloodshed.

The restless spirit which, since the 31st of May had subsided, was revived in Valencia; the affairs of the town wore every day a more threatening aspect, till the news of the events which had taken place at Madrid on the 30th of June, called the attention of the inhabitants to objects of much higher importance. This intelligence reached Valencia on the very day of my departure, so that I remained in a painful state of uncertainty till my arrival in this town on the 6th instant, at which time the struggle had not been decided; it was only on the 11th, that the result was made known to us, though no doubt you have read in the different papers all the versions of these events. I will give you a sketch, which will at least have the merit of truth and impartiality. You will find in it several circumstances which I suspect are not to be met with in the newspapers.

Every thing being ready at Madrid for the great anti-revolutionary movement, which the serviles had been so long preparing, and the king himself having been prevailed upon, notwithstanding his timidity, to put himself at the head of it, the closing of the session of the cortes was anxiously looked for as the signal.

It appears that the first plan had been to get rid of the deputies, by causing them to be murdered in the hall of assembly on the day preceding the close of the session, while they were deliberating on the situation of Spain, and particularly on the agitation by which Madrid had been disturbed for several

days. Either because it was known that the cortes were not taking any measure likely to impede the course of this great conspiracy, or because it was apprehended that the atrocity of the act would have roused and armed too soon the patriots, the blow was not struck, and the detachment of the guards which was to be employed on the occasion received counter orders.

In the afternoon, however, several symptoms of the storm which was to burst the following day manifested themselves; the drummers and privates of the guards who were on duty at the palace, repeatedly shouted *viva el rey neto!* A youth of fourteen, belonging to the militia, who was passing the palace replied, by crying *viva el rey constitucional!* upon which the sentinel attacked him, and the soldiers of the guard murdered him under the eye of their officers, who did not interfere to prevent the atrocious deed.

The next day, 30th of June, the people began to crowd round the entrance of the hall of the cortes, and of the king's palace, without any definite object; but evidently disappointed at the result of a session which was expected to consolidate the welfare of Spain, but had promoted nothing favorable to the cause of liberty. The gloomy apprehensions which mistrust of the ministers, and the well known sentiments of the king must lead the patriots to entertain, were likewise clearly manifested. The session was closed; the king left the hall of the cortes, and



the deputies retired in silence. The scene presented a mournful aspect, which seemed to presage that the sanctuary of liberty was shut, never to be reopened!

When Ferdinand stepped into his carriage, there was a universal cry of *viva la constitucion!* without shouts of *viva el rey!* a memorable proof of the dissatisfaction which generally prevails. A single wretch who cried *viva el rey!* without any qualification, was obliged to run for his life. The serjeants of the guards ill used him, in order that the king might not appear to encourage disturbance. But Ferdinand had hardly reached his palace when disorder re-appeared, provoked by the seditious yells of some ruffians, who had only been waiting this moment to give the signal of revolt.

The drummers of the Spanish guard began shouting *viva el rey neto!* An officer of the name of Casasola, whose example was not followed by any other officer present, attempted to stop them; but they attacked and murdered him. The people, still assembled on the plaza d'Oriente, on witnessing this disorder, and hearing these seditious cries, replied by shouts of *viva el rey constitucional!* Some of the guards of the palace, and a company of grenadiers, then marched against the people; the charge being sounded, another part of the guards marched up to the principal entrance of the palace. The feeble detachment of the national guard stationed on that spot, after having been assailed, as well as the defenceless crowd, with repeated volleys, was obliged

to retire. The guards spread themselves in the adjoining streets, attacking and surrounding all they met with. Many respectable people were killed or maimed.

The son of the deputy Flores Calderon having addressed himself to an officer to remonstrate upon this outrage, was attacked by the officer himself, assisted by drummers, and some twenty of the servants belonging to the palace; they wounded him, and treated him in the most shocking manner. The very battalion which was thus giving the signal of revolt, had been a short time before, when under the command of brigadier Dublaisel, noted for its exemplary conduct, and for its love of liberty.

Meanwhile the national militia of Madrid ran to arms. While its battalions were forming, and armed citizens were hastening in crowds to join them, the aggressors, in order to avoid the approaching storm, withdrew to their barracks. Shortly after, however, they returned to the field of battle, where they began to intrench themselves. One company covered the arcade of the palace; another occupied the height which commands the plaza d'Oriente; while the foreground was protected by advanced posts.

The national militia, infantry, and cavalry, having assembled on the plaza de la Constitucion, and the plaza de la Villa, likewise sent out posts to every point which the rebels were likely to attack. So that in the evening of the 30th Madrid had the appearance of a town besieged, and preparing to resist an assault.

During the whole of the afternoon, the rebels had been plentifully supplied with wine; and the general intoxication which was the consequence still tended to increase the disorder.

About five o'clock in the evening, some soldiers more infuriated than their comrades, at the instigation of captain Goeffieu, attacked lieutenant-colonel Landaburru, a lieutenant of the guards, with shouts of *viva el rey neto!* This brave officer, known for his patriotic sentiments, and his virtues, wounded one of the aggressors, and succeeded in retiring to his company. The commandant Heron and another officer invited him to accompany them to the palace. On their arrival there Landaburru was surrounded by assassins, received three musket balls in the back, and fell, shouting *viva la libertad!* None of the superior officers, nor any other person, not even Heron, who appears to have led him to a premeditated death, made any attempt to save him. The assassins withdrew unmolested to their ranks.

The intelligence having spread over Madrid, every one ran to arms. The regiment of the Infante Don Carlos occupied the *Platerias*, supported by the cavalry regiment of Almanza. The artillery took post in front of their barracks, supported by the grenadiers of the first battalion of volunteer militia, who without waiting for orders came, accompanied by a great number of armed patriots. The rebels in the palace were surrounded on every side. The general indignation was such that they must inevitably have fallen,

if they had been attacked early the next morning, as there was every reason to hope they would be. But precisely at this moment the captain-general Morillo ordered the troops of the line to retire, and intimated to the militia that they might also withdraw. The former obeyed; but the militia replied, that they would not lay down their arms without having avenged the insults offered to the constitution and to the Spanish people.

A stratagem was made use of to liberate the guards, under the pretence of distributing ammunition to the militia; they were marched to the Puerta de los Recoletes, and there a number of ball cartridges were given to each man. During this time five battalions of the guards left the palace, and returned to their barracks without opposition; one battalion kept its station.

The whole of the 1st of July the five battalions remained at their quarters, proclaiming the absolute king, and issuing threats against the militia who remained under arms. Towards eleven o'clock at night, one of these battalions marched to the palace; the four others left Madrid armed, and went to the Pardo through the iron gate.

On the same night several patriots, many of them officers, assembled on the artillery ground, and formed themselves into a body, which assumed the name of the sacred battalion. The officers of the active militia formed a company, and in the house of Don Vincente Beltran de Lis, another company was formed

of patriots, and French and Italian refugees. The officers, subalterns, and privates of the guard, who had remained faithful to their duty, likewise assembled on the artillery ground, and composed a body of six hundred men. The infantry regiment of the Infante Don Carlos, the cavalry regiment of Almanza, and the mounted national militia, took their station near the same spot. Out of five pieces of ordnance they kept three, and sent two to the plaza Mayor, where the volunteer infantry militia and the cavalry regiment del principe were posted. General Ballesteros and Alava, and brigadier Palarea came to the artillery ground to offer their services: but as the command of the troops was a privilege annexed to the title of captain-general, their offer was declined.

The patriots evinced great discontent at not being placed under the orders of these patriotic officers, whose well known opinions were a pledge of the sincerity of their intentions.

General Morillo had just been appointed colonel-general of the insurgent guards, a title which seemed incompatible with that of captain-general. This motive of distrust was strengthened by several other causes; he had been in the barracks of the guard at the very moment of their departure; he was as often in the palace, and in the midst of the rebels, as in the ranks of the armed patriots. He had given orders that the soldiers of the two battalions, which occupied the palace, should be allowed to pass and repass unmolested from thence to their barracks, under

the frivolous pretence of carrying utensils. To sum up, on the morning of the second, brigadier Palarea having marched with two companies of the regiment Don Carlos, and a detachment of the regiment of Almanza, in order to reconnoitre the positions of the factious, Morillo, by whom he was sent, had given him orders not to suffer a gun to be fired.

On the second of July, general Riego who had quitted Madrid on the morning of the 30th of June, and who on the news of the rebellion had hastily retraced his steps, appeared on the artillery ground. He was received with the greatest enthusiasm, and the most lively demonstrations of joy. After having exhorted the citizens to be steady in the defence of liberty, and having promised to sacrifice his life in the cause if it were necessary, he called upon the different authorities.

It is reported, that in the course of the night two different attempts were made to assassinate him. While this was going on in the town, the guards who were in the palace, gave themselves up to excesses and disorders of every kind. The promoters of the rebellion caused wine, segars and money to be distributed to them in abundance. It is said, that upwards of one hundred and fifty thousand piastres were circulated on the occasion. Proud of the favors thus heaped upon them, and of the tokens of approbation of the king and the infantes, they considered themselves as promoted to the rank of officers, and swore vengeance against the patriots. The marquis

de las Amarillas, the duke del Infantado, count de Castro Terreño, and a few others, who are generally considered the chiefs and leaders of the rebellion, were in the palace.

The first object of the conspirators was to make with the six battalions of the guards an attempt to restore absolute power to the hands of Ferdinand.

To gain this end they aimed at no less than murdering the national militia, and erecting scaffolds for the execution of the most distinguished patriots, beginning of course with Riego. If foiled in this plan, they were to try to procure the escape of the king from Madrid with the guards, and establish him safely in one of the provinces; from which he was to issue proclamations to the nation, and to promise a constitution with two chambers.

They reckoned upon the assistance of the regiment of Don Carlos, and the cavalry regiment of Almanza; they even supposed that the greater portion of the population of Madrid would join the court party. All these schemes were defeated.

You will no doubt enquire what the ministers and the chief authorities were doing in the midst of all this disorder, and under the banner of which party they arranged themselves, while the town presented the aspect of two camps opposed in hostile array to each other.

I have already told you that Morillo commanded both armies, and went continually from one to the other. The ministers were acting a treacherous

part, not openly so, it is true; but surely those deserve the name of traitors who do not avert the danger which threatens their country, when it is so evidently in their power. Certain it is that the ministry were deliberating and giving their orders in the midst of the rebel guards, and under their influence. Who, after that, can doubt of their treachery?

Liberal ministers would have said to the king, "we are servants of the constitutional king: the constitution no longer exists within the precincts of your court; either your majesty is a prisoner, or you have ceased to be a constitutional king: in both cases our relations with you must cease, and we retire to the place where the constitution still holds her empire."

The political chief, Martinez St. Martin, had endeavored, during the first days of the revolt, to sow discord among the liberals; he made use of all his oratorical powers to persuade the municipality and the battalions of the different militias that their ranks contained among them a faction aiming at anarchy, and consequently hostile to the constitution, necessarily more dangerous than the guards, who according to his opinion had taken arms for no other purpose than putting down anarchy. Vexed, however, at the contempt bestowed by his auditors upon his person and his speeches, he gave up the attempt. On the 6th he entered the palace, which he left with tears in his eyes on the 7th, when the rebels were defeated.



You will naturally enquire what the permanent deputation of the cortes, this corner stone of the constitutional system, was doing all the while, and what it has done since.—That it has done nothing useful to the state, must be the answer. In fact, what could be expected from the productions of Arguelles and the system-mongers, of whom he is the prototype.

The strict and literal sense of the constitution pointed out a very clear line of argument. Either the king approved or disapproved of the conduct of his guards and his courtiers. Admitting the first supposition, the king had violated the contract by which he was constituted chief of the nation; he had forfeited his right to the constitutional throne; and, in fact, had ceased to be a king. Admitting the second supposition, he was the prisoner of a faction.

It is morally proved, that the first hypothesis is the right one, since it is impossible to imagine that courtiers, of whom meanness and servility are the characteristics, should have dared to attack the constitution in contradiction to the wishes and intention of their master. But to carry as far as possible the respect due to the inviolability of the king's person, the second hypothesis might, and in a political sense ought to have been admitted: it was necessary to choose between the two horns of a dilemma which was not to be avoided. In order to keep aloof from anarchy, and to give some uniformity to the march of affairs, it would have been necessary to remodel the constitutional government, by the appointment of a

regency and a new ministry, as though the king had fallen into the hands of foreign enemies.

The permanent deputation of the cortes did nothing of all this; they did not even attempt it, in spite of the remonstrances of a great number of deputies. As I have said before, he who is aware of the danger which threatens his country, and does not avert it, is a traitor.

In the evening of the 2d, the rebels attacked a detachment of the militia, headed by colonel Selles. The patriots ran to arms—Riego hastened to the artillery ground, and began to give directions for a movement. The cannoneers were at their guns when Morillo appeared; he spoke to Riego in rather an angry tone, upon which the latter withdrew, saying to the patriots, “the cause of liberty is lost, if we do not face our enemies with resolution. We are threatened with the most imminent danger.” *We are betrayed*, was the cry heard in every direction; but the defenders of liberty did not lose courage, they swore to die in defence of the constitution. Morillo ordered the sacred battalion to the plaza de Santo Domingo, where it could be of no use, and with that his operations terminated for the day, though he allowed an armed detachment to go from the palace to their barracks, under the pretence of taking some equipments.

The troops on either side remained inactive till the evening of the 6th. The rebels were preparing a new system of attack, while the patriots were kept

back, and as it were fettered. Morillo continued to command both armies: the ministers were amongst the factious, negotiating and intriguing; the permanent deputation remained inactive: in fact, Madrid was in a state of anarchy, although the patriotism and real spirit of order which animated the armed liberals, preserved tranquillity and the semblance of an actual government.

In the interval which elapsed between the 2d and the 6th, the king, without requiring the approval of the ministers, transmitted to the council of state four diplomatic despatches. They are a living testimony of the real intentions of the monarch, as well as the ignorance and duplicity of those by whom he was surrounded.

The first despatch merely related to the conditions of a treaty with the rebels, and this at a moment when the rebels themselves were preparing to overthrow liberty by a combined effort.

The first part of the second despatch was an apology of the rebels; it was insinuated therein that the guards intended nothing more than defending the life of the king, which was threatened by an anarchical faction. But where had any symptoms of a plot against the king manifested themselves? The guards, on the contrary, had been the aggressors; and was it necessary to proclaim the king absolute in order to defend him?

The second part of the despatch was still more strange: the king was made to say, *that in case his*

*safety was not guaranteed, the social pact was destroyed, and he resumed his rights.* And what rights can he have without the social pact, which alone can constitute him the chief of the nation? The social pact once dissolved, the nation resumes her rights, and the king is in the same predicament as any other individual in the kingdom would be. These are principles, which courtiers alone who are bred in the very atmosphere of slavery, can be unacquainted with.

The third despatch was a monument of the hatred which the court bore to Riego. The king states in it, that Riego should not have come to Madrid, except in a military capacity, and with his permission; and accused him of having come with the intention of taking the command from the authorities. Now, as deputy, general Riego had a right to remain in Madrid, or to return thither, without asking leave from any one. As a military man, it was his duty to hasten, as he did, to place himself in the ranks of the defenders of his country. As to the last accusation which I mentioned, unfortunately he did not deserve it; he would have rendered a great service to Spain, if he had taken the command of the patriot troops, instead of the chief colonel of the rebel guard.

In the fourth despatch the king requested the opinion of the council of state. How this request could have been made, it is difficult to conceive: the council of state could only answer, by referring to the

constitutional laws, or else it ceased to exist as a constitutional body.

Such was the state of things till the evening of the 5th, when it was announced that the four battalions of the rebels, which had taken their station on the Pardo, had advanced as far as the iron gate, and threatened to enter Madrid. This first hostile movement occasioned the affray of the 7th, of which I shall give you a detail in my next letter.

## LETTER XV.

*Alicante, August 1, 1822.*

I Told you in my last letter, that it was announced that the four battalions at the Pardo had arrived at the iron gate, and were preparing to enter the town. General Morillo took, however, no measures of defence. He sent out no advanced guard, and placed no sentries at the gates, which thus remained in the power of the rebels. On the contrary when the commandant of the place was making his rounds in the night, he said at the different points where the troops were assembled, that there was no danger, and that he was going to rest. The rebels, however, entered Madrid without opposition. By a fortunate occurrence, a patrol of the sacred battalion, commanded by Miro, formerly one of the body guard, fell in with the enemy towards two o'clock in the morning, in the street de la Luna. Miro's men fired, and obliged the intruders to retire. In their retreat, they met another company of the guards which had no doubt been sent to take by surprise the patriots of the plaza San Domingo. The two detachments not

recognizing each other immediately fired, and thus all the patriots were warned of the approach of the enemy. Meanwhile the guards were advancing in columns along the street Jacometrezo but having met with a centinel at an outpost, they thought that a considerable body of troops was ready to oppose them, they returned by the street del Arenal towards the plaza Major.

Brigadier Palarea was there conferring with the chiefs of the two first battalions of militia, and the regiment *del principe*, on the plan of defence to be adopted.

When first the firing of guns had been heard, the troops had hastened with the greatest order to occupy their respective posts. Palarea rapidly inspected every position. A moment after the guards attacked the plaza Major at three different points. At the head of the hostile columns were the grenadiers of honor and the sappers, most of them veterans. The chasseurs of the militia opened a brisk fire upon the aggressors: but the impetuosity of the attack brought the guards close to the plaza. The column which had advanced through the street de Boteros penetrated even farther, although they thus exposed their flank to the fire of the chasseurs; the latter then attacked the guards with their bayonets, routed them, and drove them out of the plaza. Neither had the two other columns, which had advanced through the streets de la Amargura, and del Enfierno been able to sustain the well supported fire

of musketry and grape shot directed against them ; they retired likewise in disorder. The three columns fell back as far as the Puerta del Sol, leaving the streets covered with their dead and wounded.

While this was going on, a squadron of the regiment del principe had taken the direction of the street d'Atocha, in order to establish a communication with the third battalion, which was on the plaza d'Anton Martin.

No chief had been as yet appointed, but Palarea had been spontaneously obeyed. He wished to march towards the Puerta del Sol with two companies of grenadiers and of chasseurs, and a piece of ordnance ; but the officer of artillery durst not part with one of the two guns intended for the defence of the plaza ; this, however, could not be imputed to any evil design, since the officer in question had hastened to his post in spite of a strong paroxysm of fever, and performed the part of a brave soldier. An aide-de-camp of general Morillo shortly arrived with an order that the oldest officer should take the command ; this happened to be Palarea. Without loss of time he posted soldiers in the houses situated near the inlets of the plaza, and being still bent on attacking the plaza del Sol, he ordered the third battalion of militia to join. As he was on the point of marching, general Ballesteros made his appearance. This general on hearing the first discharge of the guns had gone to the artillery ground. General Morillo sent him to the plaza Mayor with the cavalry militia, and two



pieces of ordnance, and ordered him to take the command of that station.

Ballesteros approved of the intentions of Palarea ; he therefore prepared to take the direction of the Calle Mayor with the two pieces of artillery, the second company of grenadiers, and the first company of chasseurs of the national militia, while Palarea was to march along the street Carretas on the right with the third company of grenadiers, a detachment of the second company of chasseurs, and a squadron of the regiment *del principe*. As Palarea had a long circuit to make, general Ballesteros ordered his two pieces of artillery to be stationed in the Calle Mayor, and halted for some time. General Riego appeared shortly after ; Ballesteros joined him, and both remained at the head of the troops. Meanwhile the guards had formed themselves into a column ready for attack in front of the post-office, and returned to the charge. The company of the chasseurs of the national guard advanced to take them in flank, protected by the porticos situated near the spot ; the artillery at their guns ready to fire.

The column of the guards had an imposing appearance, and in point of numbers were immensely superior to the handful of brave men who came to oppose them.

The discharge of the artillery was answered by a brisk but ill directed fire of musketry. The fire of the chasseurs of the militia was fortunately more effective, and threw disorder amongst the detachments

of the enemy, while the artillery drove back and shattered the front of the column ; the rebels were obliged to give way, and fled in confusion. They attempted a second attack, but met with so warm a reception, that they once more fell back in disorder.

During this conflict Palarea was coming down the street de Carretas, but the firing in the Calle Mayor prevented his further advance ; and when he had an opportunity of appearing, the enemy had already fled.

After this second attack, it was easy to perceive that the rebels were trying to find a shelter, and thought of retiring to the palace through the street del Arenal. No doubt of this intention could remain when the firing of the grenadiers stationed at San Gines was heard. The intrepidity of these patriots obliged the hostile column to return through the plaza San Martin, in order to gain the small gate of the eastern court of the palace. Their retreat was so precipitate, that a piece of cannon which was sent to San Gines to intercept their flight arrived too late. Those of the guards who in their flight took the direction of the street de la Montera, were assailed with stones, and even kitchen implements showered upon them from the balconies, which caused them to retreat. If at that moment the guard of the regiment of Don Carlos, which was stationed in the post-office, had poured a few vollies upon the rebels, it would not only have annoyed them, but it would have silenced the firing in the Calle Mayor, and Palarea would have been able to complete his triumph.

The chasseurs of the militia came down to the street del Arenal, and advanced as far as the Puerta del Sol, where they took several prisoners. The ladies of Madrid equally distinguished themselves on this day. In the midst of the firing, many of these patriotic females were seen carrying refreshments to the champions of liberty, and inspiring them with fresh enthusiasm. Amongst them ought to be mentioned the countess d'Ognate, whose husband, a lieutenant in the militia cavalry, although laboring under indisposition, left the couch of sickness, to fight in the cause of his country.

The rebels having been completely defeated, general Ballesteros marched towards the palace through the Calle Mayor. The enemies of liberty were then completely in the power of those men, whom they represented as sanguinary monsters. The king himself, the object of public indignation, would shortly have been at their mercy; but they did not proceed.

Whilst the plaza Mayor was the principal scene of action, *the sacred battalion* had a slight engagement at the plaza de San Domingo. The two van guards of the rebels, against which Miro had fought, and which had, through mistake, subsequently fired upon each other, near the bank, arrived on the plaza de San Domingo, but they were driven from it, and marched towards the plaza Mayor. Shortly after general Alava arrived, and Morillo sent there two companies of the regiment of Ferdinand the seventh, a squadron of the regiment of Almanza, and a piece of

ordnance. It was during this time that the conflict took place at the plaza Mayor, which induced general Alava to strengthen the advanced post of the plaza de *l'Oriente*.

The order had scarcely been given, when the guards were seen making a disorderly retreat towards the palace. The advanced post of the sacred battalion kept up a brisk fire upon them. The guards who were in the palace, sent a strong detachment to cover the retreat of their comrades; an engagement took place, which lasted till the arrival of general Ballesteros.

In order to support the movement of the guards, and to excite, if possible, a commotion amongst the people, the duke Del Infantado had raised and armed some hundreds of the lowest rabble, who had assembled near his house.

The small battalion of patriots, armed and headed by Don Vincente Beltran de Lis, who had been joined by his brother, the deputy Don Manuel, attacked and dispersed these wretches; and thus the palace was completely invested on the town side.

General Morillo had taken his station on the artillery ground: the first guns had scarcely been fired, when two officers came from the plaza de San Domingo to apprise him that the guards had entered the town, and were skirmishing with the advanced posts of the sacred battalion. What must have been their surprise when they were addressed as follows—  
“You are anarchists: you wish for disorder, but you

will not succeed." Morillo then ordered them to be arrested. Four other officers who came with the same intelligence were treated in a similar manner. A quarter of an hour afterwards the general received the official reports, announcing that the guards were in Madrid, *and that they had been defeated at several points.* Upon this Morillo ordered the officers to be liberated, saying, *that he had made a mistake;* and then, and not till then, he took the measures which I have described.

The battalion, formed of the guards who had remained faithful to their duty, was ordered to take possession of the stables of the palace: a detachment of the battalions, stationed in the interior of the palace, came with the same intention. The rebels were driven back, and obliged once more to take refuge in the palace.

At dawn of day another battalion of the rebel guard attacked the artillery ground, but the guns were fired with so much quickness and precision, that the aggressors were thrown into confusion, and took to hasty flight.

Meanwhile the four battalions of the Pardo took refuge in the palace in consternation and disorder: general Ballesteros, who closely pursued them, was soon in front of the palace. In order to complete his triumph, he ordered his nephew, Don Luis Corral, to attack the palace with the artillery and two battalions of the national militia. At this moment a messenger appeared, who stated that he was the bearer

of an order of the king to stop the firing, because the life of his majesty was in danger. The following was the very remarkable answer of general Ballesteros—"Let the king order immediately the factions who surround him to lay down their arms, or else the bayonets of freemen shall follow them to the door of his apartments." He, however, ordered the firing to cease, and the messenger to be conducted by his aide-de-camp, Lopez Pinto, to general Morillo.

The latter having asked the messenger whether the guards were surrendering their arms, and having been answered in the negative, sent to the palace the same Lopez Pinto, the colonel of the regiment, Infante Don Carlos, O'Doyle, and other officers, to declare to the king that all the liberals were ready to defend his sacred person; but that it was necessary that the guards should instantly lay down their arms.

When these officers arrived, the king was by no means exposed to the danger which had been mentioned; he was in the midst of his family, with the marquis de las Amarillas, the duke Del Infantado, count De Castro Terregno, count De Casa Sarrias, and several other generals and courtiers. They all tried to inveigle colonel O'Doyle, and to persuade him to join them with his regiment. Their attempt was fruitless; and had it been more successful, it would not have benefited their cause, since, had O'Doyle been weak enough to yield to their entreaties, his

regiment would certainly not have followed his example.

The deputation soon returned to Morillo, bearing for answer that the king was ready to do all that was in his power for the happiness of the Spanish nation, but that hostilities must cease, and persons must be named to treat with his majesty. Thus the king virtually declared himself the chief of the factions.

In order to enter into a capitulation, a commission, composed of two members of the permanent deputation of the cortes, two counsellors of state, two generals, and three members of the municipality, were assembled in the building called the Posaderia. This assembly was a kind of provisional government, which, monstrous as it was by the heterogeneous elements of which it was composed, was the natural result of the present circumstances, and inspired a certain degree of confidence. It was then that the liberals cursed the apathy, the shameful dereliction of duty exhibited by the permanent deputation of the cortes, who forgetting what was prescribed by the constitutional laws, had refused to frame at the proper moment a new constitutional government. It would, perhaps, have been objected that the French ambassador had declared that if a regency were appointed he would withdraw. In the first place, it is by no means certain that such a declaration had ever been made; in the second place, why should any attention have been paid to it? Was it not evident that if the guards had been subdued by force, if the chief conspirators

and their agents had been arrested and punished, as they deserved, the face of affairs would have been altered; many hostile plans would have been destroyed; and many obnoxious schemes defeated, which time will only ripen.

Count Casa Sarrias, and the chief of battalion of the guard, Heron and Salcedo, presented themselves before this semblance of a provisional government. They required, in the name of the king, that hostilities should cease. They had the impudence to add, *that it appeared inconsistent with the decorum and dignity of the throne, that the guards should lay down their arms.* Thus the name of the king was connected with that of the rebels, and his plenipotentiaries pronounced him the chief of the factions. The advisers of the king were not aware that the proposals which they made, were in themselves diametrically opposed to the dignity of the throne. They despoiled it of its moral dignity, and from that moment it could represent nothing more than the gaudy trappings surrounding a chief of rebels, who meanly begged for mercy. They were not aware that real decorum required that the king should have no representative emissary in a treaty in which none but rebels could seek to capitulate.

While this treaty was negotiating, the patriots flattered themselves for a moment that energetic and effectual measures would be taken, which were said to have been decided on the preceding day, and which had been proposed by a great number of the deputies.



This was but a delusive ; hope the most valuable time was lost in verbal litigation. At length early in the afternoon it was agreed that the four battalions of the Pardo should lay down their arms at four o'clock, and that the two battalions which had been stationed in the palace, should retire with their arms to Vicalvaro and Leganes. One can hardly conceive how such terms could have been conceded by men in their senses. Had the battalions in the palace taken a less personal share in the conflict than the others ? They seem to have been considered as having merely protected the person of the king ; but why were not the gates of the palace shut against the rebels ? The fact is, that the convention was dictated by the same spirit of intrigue which formed the bond of union between the anilleros and the serviles ; it is a convention diametrically opposed to the interests of the nation, and will soon, I fear, produce fatal results.

The only capitulation capable of presenting any advantages, would have been that which in conformity to the principles of the constitution, should have struck the real criminals, and thus laid the axe to the root of the evil.

With the exception of the sacred person of the monarch and his family, all those who were in the palace were rebels, and became amenable to the law of the 17th of April. The whole of the six battalions should have been compelled to lay down their arms ; it was even necessary as a measure of safety to the soldiers themselves, a class of men who are

easily corrupted by the proffer of gold, or the prospect of honors, and whose services might still have been secured in the cause of liberty. As to their chiefs, the generals and the grandees who surrounded the king, they ought to have been all given up to military justice, in order to be tried by a council of war as the law directs. The least deviation from this line of conduct is either a weakness or a piece of treachery. It was not, however, pursued; and if any punishment is inflicted, it will fall upon the privates and subalterns of the guards, whilst the more exalted criminals will fearlessly carry on their plots against liberty.

When this capitulation was generally known, the patriots manifested their indignation at thus being deprived of the reward of their toil, and at witnessing the triumphant impunity of crime.

At about half past three the troops who had been victorious put themselves in readiness to witness the due performance of the capitulation; those who were stationed at the artillery ground were waiting with Morillo at their head, the moment when the rebels should defile and lay down their arms before them. When they had been waiting for some time, a brisk firing was suddenly heard in the principal court of the palace. To the surprise caused by this event, succeeded that occasioned by learning that the four battalions which were to lay down their arms laughed at the capitulation, and were retiring through the principal outer staircase which leads from the great

court of the palace to the field of Moro and the gate of la Vega. The firing then began in every direction, but it was too late to keep within the precincts of the palace the rebel band, who made their retreat by the road of Alcorcon. General Morillo then sent in pursuit of them general Copons to the gate of St. Vincent, with two squadrons of the regiment of Almanza, the squadron of the national militia, the company of the officers of the active militia, and two pieces of artillery. The regiment of the Infante Don Carlos, and the battalion of the guard who remained faithful to their duty, proceeded to take possession of the palace.

General Ballesteros was at the same time coming up the Calle Mayor with a battalion of the national militia, to witness the performance of the capitulation. As soon as he heard the firing, he hastened to the end of the street, immediately attacked the rebels, drove them from the edifice of Credito Publico, and arrived at the arcade of the palace, as the regiment Don Carlos was entering the principal court in another direction.

In this skirmish a great number of the guards left the ranks of the rebels. General Ballesteros immediately marched in pursuit of them with a squadron of the regiment of the Prince, and one of the regiments of Almanza. He likewise ordered in pursuit of them brigadier Palarea with a detachment of eighty men of the same regiment, and some cavalry, giving him at the same time positive orders

to avoid as much as possible the effusion of blood. In another direction, where part of the guards attempted to make their retreat in a column composed of detachments, the patriots under the orders of the two brothers, Beltran de Lis, attacked their flanks, and fired upon them with so much execution, that the column was soon broken and put into confusion. The rear guard covered the retreat as long as they were able; but they were also routed and closely pursued by the patriots.

General Copons pursued the factious farther than any other, and completed their dispersion. Brigadier Palarea compelled three hundred and fifty men, a chief of battalion, and six officers, to lay down their arms. They were barricadoed in a country-house, from which they had considerably annoyed the division of general Copons; prisoners were taken in every direction. The standard of the first company was taken at La Venta de Alcorcon, as well as the guard, who protected it, by twenty grenadiers of the militia, headed by the ensign of the second battalion.

This day witnessed the total destruction of the four battalions of the Pardo. Besides the killed and wounded, there were twelve hundred prisoners. Of the feeble remnant some fled into the country, some concealed themselves in Madrid, others came over to the ranks of the liberals, and very few succeeded in joining the two battalions that were on their road to Vicalvaro and Leganes. The soldiers of these battalions broke the constitutional pillar at Vallecas.

To crown this memorable day, when general Morillo presented himself before the king, he was ordered *to pursue the rebels till they were exterminated*. No doubt this was to punish them for not having succeeded in their attempt; unless the king wished to avenge himself of the fright into which he had been put.

Slaves of despots mark the lesson! Such was the consequence of the plans pursued by the ministers and the faction by which they have been upheld since 1820.

But upon prosecuting the true liberals, whose enlightened patriotism they dreaded, and upon keeping at any price possession of the power which had been conferred upon them, they had intentionally overlooked the encroachments of the armed rebels in Arragon, and other parts of Spain. Not only had they implicitly confided the administration of the war department to the marquis de las Amarillas and his creatures, but to gain an accession of strength against these patriots, the objects of their fears and their persecutions, they had entered into a criminal and imprudent compact with the serviles. Flattering themselves that they should be able to establish a constitution, admitting of an upper and a lower house, in which they should occupy the foremost ranks, they used all their endeavors to overthrow the constitution such as it existed. Their egregious folly did not allow them to perceive that the serviles, whose cause they were serving by betraying the liberals,

would never allow them to take the lead. In order to modify the constitution, it would have been necessary to poison the public mind with respect to its present state, by setting forth that it is not adapted to the civilization, the habits, and the character of the Spanish nation; in fact, by crying down the present system. This they endeavored to do without being aware that they were accusing and condemning themselves. Any constitution which is not diametrically opposed to the rules of common sense, can be carried into execution; and if the constitution which they had created, and of which they had undertaken the direction, was impeded in its course, their stupidity and their treachery are the only causes that can be assigned. Neither do they seem to have been aware that they were preparing their own destruction, since the king and the serviles are averse to a constitution of any kind; and the first overthrown, the second would be treated as the offspring of a bewildered imagination. The result was as might have been expected; the guards who had been remarkable for their fidelity, loyalty, and subordination, were suddenly transformed into a band of ruffians; the royal palace became a den of rebels. A government which ought to have been constitutional was the promoter of a revolution; whole provinces were in a state of anarchy; and the public rights were every where invaded.

But if the conduct of the ministry on this occasion was criminal beyond a doubt, Morillo can hardly be cleared of reproach and suspicion. If we take a

review of the late events, the following charges may fairly be brought against him.

First. In the evening of the 6th it was publicly known that the rebels of the Pardo had advanced as far as the iron gate, and were preparing to enter the town. When general Morillo used so shamefully the officers who came to announce to him the entrance of the guards, he either was or was not aware of the circumstance. On the first supposition what can be said in excuse for him? On the second, how is it possible to overlook his imprudence, in not despatching emissaries to ascertain the fact?

Second. There were neither advanced posts, nor sentries, nor guards stationed near the gates, through which the rebels might make their entrance.

Third. The commandant of the place went on the night between the 6th and the 7th to the artillery ground, the plaza de la Constitucion, and the plaza San Domingo, and told the troops nothing was to be apprehended; that general Morillo had retired to rest, and that the guards were not moving. Why was this precaution taken on the night of the 6th for the first time? Can it be supposed that the commandant of the place was acting without the orders of his general?

Fourth. The troops who were to defend the artillery ground, were placed by Morillo in a position where they were completely exposed to the fire of the guards from the windows of the king's stables.

Fifth. He neglected to take regular possession of the Puerta del Sol, a central position of more importance than any in the metropolis.

Sixth. During the six days, while the state of warfare lasted, no chiefs were appointed to command the different points where the troops were united.

Seventh. He accepted the appointment of colonel-general of the rebel guards, without making use of the power thus conferred upon him, to prevent the assassination of Casasola, Landaburru, Florez Calderon, and others.

Eighth. He continually gave the same watch-word and rallying sign to the rebel guards and to the patriots, and refused to alter them on the evening of the 6th, when an officer represented to him that the guards might avail themselves of the watch-word to surprise the posts of the patriots.

When we come to reflect upon this conduct of general Morillo, and the well known intentions of government, it is impossible not to suppose that a plan had been formed to take the patriots by surprise on the night between the 6th and the 7th; a plan which was only defeated by the vigilance of the patriots, whose patrol discovered the rebels in time, although they had contrived to pass the vaults without either being seen or heard.

While this tragedy was performing at Madrid, a rehearsal was attempted at Cordova. The royal carbineers revolted, and proclaimed the absolute king,



as their brothers in arms had done at Madrid. The other troops having refused to join them, they quitted Cordova for the capital: troops have been sent in pursuit of them, and as they are detached they must soon be defeated.

At Madrid the national guard, exasperated at finding that the most dangerous and the most exalted of the criminals were likely to escape, by dint of intrigue, the punishment which they deserved; refused at first to lay down their arms; but by manœuvres, delusions, and promises, they were induced on the 9th to return to their homes.

The ministers, consistent in their system of treachery, not only neglected to proclaim martial law, but did not even call in troops from the neighbourhood of Madrid. General Espinoza having been informed of what was going on at Madrid, assembled a few troops, and proceeded towards the capital without waiting for orders. His zeal was condemned as a work of supererogation, and he was ordered to stop at some distance from the town.

At Alicante a scene was got up by the anilleros. The political chief named there, in consequence of the new division of the provinces, is the ex-deputy Golfín. This man is totally insignificant, both in a moral point of view, and as to his personal appearance. As an anillero, he declaims against any exultation, and has constantly in his mouth the words order and moderation. There is always in his tone something

so lamentable, and so whining, that Golfín has been nick-named Jeremiah.

In the early part of July, in consequence of the impulse given from Madrid, there was a revolt at Orihuela and its vicinity. The political chief of Murcia had recourse to those of Alicante and Carthagena, and requested a reinforcement to enable him to see his orders duly performed. This request was a mere form, since the military commandant of Murcia had at his disposal the battalion of the active militia of Lorca, whose assistance he did not call to his aid. The political chief of Alicante kept back as long as he could the reinforcement which had been demanded of him, under a pretence that he wanted precise information on the number of militia whom he could spare without weakening the garrison too much. Meanwhile the patriots of Orihuela, were obliged to fly, and came to seek refuge at Alicante. Public indignation then caused a slight commotion, which compelled Mr. Golfín to fix the morning of the next day, the 17th, for the departure of the troops; he, however, called together only one hundred and seventy militia out of twelve hundred. To strengthen this detachment, which was evidently too weak, several patriots who were joined by Italian refugees, offered their services under the orders of colonel Bazan. Thus a small column was formed amounting to about four hundred men. On the same day Golfín was obliged to bring out two pieces of artillery.

which were to accompany the expedition. But they had hardly been prepared when the officer of artillery was ordered to take them to Crevillente, where they must have fallen into the hands of the rebels, as there would have been no infantry to defend them. Fortunately the commandant of the column fearing a sudden attack, would not part with them. On the 19th his fears were realized ; but he beat the rebels, and drove them as far as the gates of Orihuela. Golfín, in order, no doubt, to punish the chief of battalion, Bernabeu, for this victory, deprived him of the command, and went in person to the column. Finding, however, that colonel Jaramillo who had taken the chief command of the expedition was as staunch a patriot as Bernabeu, and that intrigues would be of little avail, Golfín returned to Alicante on the 22d.

On the same evening having assembled a dozen of the wretches, to whom he complained in his usually lamentable tone, that the exaltados wanted to assassinate him; he contrived to produce a commotion, which was hastily joined by a few of the most notorious serviles. This party, which the addition of some of the would be moderates, increased to the number of about fifty individuals, presented themselves before the town hall. The political chief called together the members of the municipality, part of whom were entirely devoted to him, and a resolution was passed, which cannot be otherwise designated than a revolutionary measure. In the name of a few

brawlers, who were dignified with the title of the inhabitants of Alicante, it was decided that the gates of the town should be shut upon the volunteers who had marched against the rebels; the epithets of jacobins and anarchists were bestowed upon the patriots; the most distinguished amongst them were arrested: in a word, Alicante appeared to be in the hands of the insurgents.

On the 23d, the column of patriots was again attacked by the rebels, who, however, were completely routed. The inhabitants of Orihuela began also to reflect on the situation in which they were placed. On the other hand, the political chief and the military commandant of Murcia finding that the Madrid conspiracy had failed, came to Orihuela, which they pacified by a method of their own; that is, by requesting the patriots to withdraw themselves from it. Golfín having heard that the anilleros faction, which composed the government, was losing its influence, changed his attack.

The proscription which had virtually taken place at the municipality on the 23d was quashed, and on the 27th the column composing the expedition was received in triumph; the political chief complimented the volunteers, whom two or three days before he wished to exile.

At Valencia, the trial of Elio is carried on with as much activity as is compatible with the impediments thrown in the way by the serviles, and the difficulty of unravelling a plot so complicated and extensive.

On the 19th the fiscal terminated his proceedings : and the advocate of Elio is to begin the defence.

At Madrid twenty-seven officers of the guards made prisoners on the 7th, have been put on their trial ; but so many delays are created, that it is impossible to guess when the business will end. Palarea has been sent with a body of troops to Toledo, in order to stop the carbineers, who no doubt unaware of what took place at Madrid, are marching upon the capital. Brigadier Valdecanas who left Cordova in pursuit of them, is said to have met and defeated them.

In the kingdom of Valencia the faction of Morella commanded by Rambla, has increased to the number of fifteen hundred men, and intercepts the communication with Catalonia.

On the 19th I had written to Serrano, enclosing a memorial on the formation of a foreign legion, and reminding him of the plan of the European federation. If I have thus outstepped the reserve which I had hitherto prescribed to myself, during the influence of the anilleros, it is because I know that the ministry which is composed of them, will be completely changed ; Lopez Banos is already appointed to the war department. Serrano's answer\* gives me some hope. How far it will be realized time will shew.

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\* Appendix, No. 14.

## LETTER XVI.

*Alicante, September 11, 1822.*

NOTWITHSTANDING the defeat of the rebel guards at Madrid, Spain was for a whole month in a state of anxiety and smothered agitation, as painful as it is dangerous. The number of political chiefs, military commandants, and other functionaries, belonging to the party of the anilleros, or the serviles, was such that the public opinion was every where kept down. Most of the above-mentioned persons had thrown off the mask, and afforded more or less protection to the serviles and the rebels. Had this state of things continued much longer, we should soon have witnessed a fresh conspiracy, more fearful than the first, because it would have been better planned. The victorious patriots of the 7th of July have suffered themselves to be lulled by intrigue, and the specious word of moderation. Let them, however, be upon their guard; there is no time to lose if they wish to control events, which if they relax in their vigilance will be soon beyond their power.

If we consider for a moment the steady progress of the factious, we shall be convinced that they are secretly protected in their machinations. They are

in possession of the Mequinenza; they fortify themselves at Irati in Navarre, and at Urgel in Catalonia. The other day they nearly surprised Peniscola in this neighbourhood, which colonel Ulman was to deliver up to them for twelve thousand piastres: fortunately this was discovered in time. Ulman has escaped; and will add another name to the list of the rebel chiefs.

At length on the 9th of August, the new ministers were named. It had been agreed between the masonic lodge, and the general assembly of the comuneros, that the two societies should share the new ministry equally between them, as they had shared the operations and the dangers of the 2nd of July. Each of these societies had meetings to make up the list of the ministers, which they were respectively to furnish. But the hierarchy of the free-masons gave them the advantage in point of quickness and unanimity of decision, an advantage which their jesuitical spirit did not suffer to escape.

While the comuneros were deliberating, colonel San Miguel, a most active member of the masons, formed a list, at the head of which he had the modesty to put his own name. This list was submitted to the king, to whom the masons represented the urgent necessity of signing it without delay. His majesty complied; and the comuneros were excluded from a share of the promised boon.

The ministers at whose hands Spain expects her prosperity are as follows. Secretary of state, Don

Evaristo San Miguel ; minister of the interior, Don José Gasco ; for the colonies, Don José Vadillo ; minister of war, major-general Don Miguel Lopez Baños ; minister of justice, Don Felipe Benicio Navarro ; minister of marine, Don Dionisio Capáz ; minister of Finance, Don ——— Egea.

The comuneros loudly complain, and not without cause, since the manner in which the ministry has been composed, seems to forebode that the government has fallen into the hands of a faction.

San Miguel, more than any other, is accused of having adopted the puritanism of moderation, and of having entered into a pact with the anilleros. As a proof of it, his conduct in the trial of the rebel guards is adduced. On that occasion he was appointed fiscal ; and he evidently endeavored to remove out of the sphere of danger the more exalted criminals, objecting to all the measures which would have led to the arrest of the chiefs and authors of the conspiracy, and giving up exclusively to the sword of justice the subordinate agents. It remains to be seen how the ministry will act. The masons proclaim that the individuals of which it is composed are the only men who can consolidate the fabric of liberty ; the comuneros, notwithstanding their disappointment, do not inveigh against this ministry, because they acknowledge that its members have all given pledges of their attachment to the cause of liberty, and that Spain may reasonably expect to be benefited by their administration.



We must not, however, include in this eulogium Egea, who is a mere financier, or more properly speaking, an accountant of very limited capacity. Mina has been appointed general in chief of the army of Catalonia. This choice has been universally applauded by the patriots. With a liberal ministry, and Mina at the head of the troops in Catalonia, it is surely not unreasonable to expect that some energetic measures will be taken, such as may consolidate the destinies of Spain.

To persevere in the present system of tolerance towards the French government, is but to pursue the series of useless endeavors to stifle the flame of civil war. When rebellion has been put down in one province, it will raise its head in another. The *cordon sanitaire*, which hovers round the frontiers of Spain, and is daily gaining strength, is a protection upon which the rebels may always depend; and it is not necessary to enquire whether the remonstrances which the Spanish ministry pretend to have made to the French government are real or supposed, to assert that this cordon will not be withdrawn. A government which steadily aims at overwhelming the feeble remnants of a constitution, which still exists in its own country, will never put up with the liberal constitution of a contiguous territory. The French government must always consider the Spanish constitution as a secret appeal to the French, to shake off the yoke of aristocratical

despotism, which daily becomes a more grievous burden. The other members of the holy alliance have the same interests and the same intentions. Their professed object, as the treaty of the 20th of November, 1815, sufficiently shews, is to stifle every where liberal ideas. It is, therefore, certain, that the French government, in spite of all its protestations will continue to supply the factious with arms, with money, and, perhaps, 'ere long with men.

It may be deduced as a consequence, that as long as France shall be without a liberal government, and a constitution more nearly assimilating to that of Spain, the latter will always be in a state of convulsion, and threatened with a violent counter-revolution. In so precarious a situation, it is impossible that a rupture should be avoided; sooner or later it must occur, and the result will of necessity be to the advantage of the power which makes the first attack. Should Spain overlook the advantage to be reaped from a change in the internal political system in France, and neglect the present opportunity when every chance is in her favor for bringing about such a change, she will soon be reduced to a passive state, and be completely at the mercy of her enemy.

It will be of little use to the Spanish government to speak of its moderation, and to try to avert the storm by setting forth that it has never interfered with the internal administration of other countries. The civil war itself, which is fomented by foreign

foes, and of which the sphere will be extended, and the duration prolonged, will be a pretence for interfering in the affairs of Spain; in order to *restore tranquillity*. If the Spanish government understands its real interests, and has sufficient energy to avail itself of this last resource, this is the moment for raising a foreign legion, which would include the French and Italian refugees, the deserters who are in Spain, and those who would soon forsake the cordon, when the existence of such a legion should be known. There is no doubt but that before three months have elapsed, this body would exceed in number three thousand men. This is the substance of what I wrote a month ago to Serrano and general Mina.

The month of August has elapsed without any transaction of the least importance. The changes so imperiously called for among the political chiefs and military commandants in the provinces, have not taken place; the new political pilots seem to be asleep at the helm. The *ánilleros* are still every where employed, and pursue their usual course, heedless of the ministers. This fatal apathy induced me to transmit a few days ago fresh remonstrances to the liberal deputies, through the medium of my correspondent Serrano. This unsteady conduct, or rather this culpable weakness, encourages the serviles, and will end by disheartening the liberals who are every day exposing themselves, and wasting

their days in fruitless efforts to retain their precarious position. It is time that Spain should quit this equivocal situation, and should hasten to the solution of the great problem of liberty. The nation must soon be exhausted by the unnatural state in which it has so long been; its moral strength is declining—its physical strength is daily decreasing—and it is threatened with that fatal atrophy, which is the precursor of political death. Factions and insurrections are spreading all over the peninsula; and the systematic plans of the enemies of liberty can be every where traced as their cause.

When faction is disseminated, the forces requisite to repress it are necessarily subdivided; and thus Spain is reduced to a state of weakness, which will justify and strengthen the interference of the holy alliance.

It is but fair to say, that the ministers are fully occupied even by what is passing at Madrid. They are surrounded by court intrigues, which naturally impede the march of affairs. They are uneasy in consequence of the plans to carry off the king, which have been all but put into execution.

The evasion of the king would, perhaps, be an evil with respect to the moral sensation which it would produce upon the nation; although one of its results would be to place the liberals in front of the danger against which they shut their eyes, and to call forth their courage and activity. As to the relative position

of Spain and the holy alliance, such an event would only modify it, by giving a different coloring to the motive of interference.

If Ferdinand can contrive to escape beyond the Pyrenees, he will protest that he was compelled to accept a constitution *which the sound part of the nation hates and detests*; and that he craves the assistance of the *holy alliance* to ensure the welfare of his loyal subjects.—Vide the Neapolitan revolution of 1821.

If Ferdinand remains at Madrid, the holy allies will then declare that he is forcibly detained in his capital, and that they are imperiously called upon by a sense of duty to avenge the cause of kings, and to assist *faithful* subjects in rescuing their sovereign from the *hands of a band of rebels*.—Vide the Brunswick manifesto of 1792.

The government and the liberals must be convinced that they will not be suffered to plead illusion, and that nothing remains for them but to grasp with energy the only weapons by which Spain can be protected from the evils with which she is threatened.

Liberty can be upheld by liberty only;—the revolution of one country can be countenanced only by a similar revolution in other countries. These undeniable principles should never be lost sight of by the liberals. The Spanish ministry will vainly seek in the peninsula itself the means of pacifying the peninsula; they are to be sought for beyond the Pyrenees; and the liberties of Spain will never be

consolidated, unless the liberty of France and of Europe be likewise consolidated.

I find by the answers which I have received from several friends, that it will be difficult to remove the veil which covers the eyes of many well meaning liberals. Ministers themselves appear to be the dupe of illusions, which must seem inconceivable to those who have any knowledge of politics.

The good intentions of the chief minister, San Miguel, cannot be doubted; but a young man educated to the military profession, and naturally self-willed, is easily made a dupe of. Moreover it would be requisite that the zeal and experience of the chief agents of the ministry should supply the deficiencies of their principal; here unfortunately it is the contrary. These agents are the same who were in the pay of the late ministry; they are consequently still under the guidance of the faction which that ministry represented; some of them are even stipendiaries of the French government.

The cortes seem to share in the false security which paralyzes the ministers. Riego is hostile to any measures which will give the holy alliance a pretence for beginning the attack. Salva (according to what he wrote to me) and the whole party of free-masons will not believe that France meditates the invasion of Spain, and consequently they do not see the necessity of resorting to any extraordinary means of defence. They are confident that nothing is to be apprehended from external foes; and, there-

fore, aim at nothing more than the speedy suppression of the rebels.

Serrano, Beltran de Lis, and the comuneros, are of my opinion; and are pressing as much as they can the attack, which I have been urging so long, as necessary for the safety of Spain.

The rebels of Catalonia have established their quarters at Seu d'Urgel, where there is a regency superintended by baron d'Eroles. Cervera has, however, been retaken from them. The arrival of Mina is anxiously expected; he left Madrid on the 10th of August.

I mentioned to you that the trial of Elio was nearly terminated; and that his defence was to be heard without delay. His advocate being prepared with it, the council of war was called together on the 28th of August. Elio was unanimously condemned to the punishment of strangulation (*garotte*) pursuant to the first article of the law of the 17th of April, 1821; as convicted of being the chief of the rebellion which broke out at Valencia on the 30th of May. Sentence having been pronounced and declared conformable to the law by the *AUDITOR de Guerra*, it was necessary that it should also be approved and signed by the chief military commandant. Baron d'Andilla, who had succeeded Almodovar on the 12th, being ill, gave up the command. General Clark declined it, and remained at Jativa, to the command of which place he was appointed. Thirteen general or superior officers who were at

Valencia, and not on active service, likewise declined ; and the duty devolved upon lieutenant-colonel Don Vicente Valterra. The free-masons wished to wait for the arrival of brigadier Espino, colonel of the first regiment of cuirassiers, who commanded at Murcia, and who had been requested by letter to take the command of the division stationed here. The comuneros wished that no time should be lost.

At length the municipality having written to Valterra, that the public tranquillity was endangered by the exasperation which was produced among the people by the delay of the execution, he signed it on the 3rd of September. Elio was executed on the sixth in the morning, out of the town, on the plaza del Real ; the crowd was immense, but the criminal was not insulted ; only a universal shout of *viva la constitucion !* was heard when the execution had taken place.

We have here a new political chief, Don Louis del Corral, a nephew of general Ballesteros ; he is a young man, full of activity, and of whom great hopes may be entertained.

At Valencia, Villa has been superseded by Don Juan Abascal, an excellent patriot, and fully competent to do justice to the appointment ; but Villa has been sent to Pampeluna, where he will do a great deal of mischief.

At Jativa, where a bad spirit was beginning to manifest itself, the marquis del Moral has been



appointed political chief; this is also a very good choice.

We have just heard that generals Carlos O'Donnel and Sarsfield, colonel Freyre, and several other officers, have gone over to France to join Eguia and his band of rebels. This transmigration is a worse omen than is generally thought, by the very reason that people laugh at it, and say that the riddance of so many scoundrels is rather a gain than a loss.

Notwithstanding the apparent truth of this remark, the sudden resolution taken by so many officers of rank, who were not persecuted in any shape, proves, in the first place, that the court of Madrid has given up the idea of succeeding in its designs by internal commotion, and that it now depends entirely upon foreign aid. I am confirmed in my opinion, when I see the internal faction passing towards the frontiers. In the second place, it is not at all likely that superior officers, tranquil possessors of handsome fortunes, should adopt so desperate a resolution, and run the risk of losing their all, if they had not the positive assurance of being brought back by a French army. O'Donnel had apparently less reason than any other for taking such a step, since his brother count d'Abisbal, has just been appointed inspector-general of infantry.

Morillo had left Madrid in a way which caused a general surprise. He has been arrested in spite of his disguise, in a village of Estramadura, and brought back to Madrid, where he is imprisoned. His flight

proves that he feels himself guilty, and that he fears the issue of the trial of the 7th of July, which the fiscal who superseded San Miguel, carries on with vigour. Do not believe, however, that he will meet with the punishment which he deserves; a new incident begins to diversify the scene. The society of the anilleros are dissolving, but its members are negotiating with the free-masons to incorporate the two factions. The free-masons wish to keep the power, and to fix it irrevocably in their own hands. The comuneros are increasing every day in number and in popularity; the anilleros are between both, and the addition of their weight will give the preponderance to either party. I have, therefore, no doubt that they will end by being incorporated with the free-masons; perhaps at the moment that I am writing the union has taken place; if so, I fear it is a great misfortune for Spain.

## LETTER XVII.

*Alicante, December 1, 1822.*

I Have been long without writing, because I have had nothing worth communicating; this will no doubt surprise you, as you must naturally take, as a criterion of the march of the Spanish government, the situation in which it is placed: I am the more convinced of it, that I who am on the spot am at a loss to account for the lethargic apathy that I witness. How is it possible to account for it after the events which have taken place at Madrid, and when every act of the French government breathes of hostility? It was natural to conclude, that the Spanish government would send to the frontier the troops of the line, and the active militia which are already equipped, that is to say, about six thousand men; that the volunteer militia would be organized in every district, and marched through their respective provinces, in order to maintain tranquillity; that the army would be speedily put upon the war establishment; that the requisite funds would be established; in a word, that every thing would be in readiness for beginning the war this present winter if necessary.

France is sending troops to the Pyrenees, and secretly organizing the means of attack. The congress of Verona is assembled, and is carrying on its deliberations ; and Spain is not represented by a faithful and intelligent agent, to penetrate the real mystery of this hastily convened and ominous assembly. Ministers have, it is true, submitted to the cortes plans for the recruiting of the army on the war establishment, and for raising fresh battalions of militia ; for the assignment of the funds requisite for the various branches of the administration, especially for the war department, in order that the army may be ready to begin the campaign ; but how are all these plans carried into execution ?

The recruits are to be marched to different central depots, and from thence to their respective corps ; in the mean time the various corps of the permanent army remain at their stations in the different provinces. This is an error ; it would have been much better to have marched the regiments, already formed, towards the frontiers, and to have sent the recruits to join them. To be convinced that it would be a great saving of time, it is sufficient to be acquainted with the interior of Spain. I will take, as an example, Alicante, from which I am writing. The conscripts will arrive here in the course of next month, in pursuance of the decree lately issued ; that is, they will begin to arrive, for the depot of Alicante does not include the province alone, but extends to Murcia,

La Mancha, part of Castile, and a greater portion of the kingdom of Valencia.

A fortnight must be allowed for the journey of some of the recruits, a fortnight more for their allotment to their respective corps ; we shall then be at the middle of February ; and before they have reached their destination, a month more will have elapsed. It is likewise to be remarked, that the depot of Alicante being intended for the service of the army of Catalonia, the conscripts of the province of Castellon will have to retrace their steps by a march of ten days.

It is every where exultingly said, that the conscription is better understood in Spain than it was in France ; but I am far from being convinced of it. If after having assigned to each corps the provinces from which it should draw its recruits ; recruiting officers were despatched to bring them to head quarters, a month would be gained, not to speak of the delay occasioned by the laziness and ignorance of the commanders of the respective depots.

The contracts for the clothing of the troops ought 'ere now to have been concluded ; and as the manufacture is of course Spanish, it ought to be in hand, in order that the troops might be equipped immediately after their arrival. Nothing of the kind has taken place. Will it be said that the legislative authority of the cortes was necessary for this measure ? Why then did the ministers call them together so late as the month of October, instead of the

beginning of September? Is this delay to be imputed to folly, or have the present ministers inherited the despotic spirit of their predecessors? Time will shew!

As arms cannot be found in Spain, they must necessarily be provided elsewhere; but the plan which has been adopted is a very foolish one. The expenditure for arms, and for the general equipment of the army, has been included in the loan which the government is obliged to make for such expenses, as cannot be paid in ready money. This is a check, because the loan must be completed before bills of exchange for the payment of the supplies of arms can be disposed of. Moreover, a contract has been entered into with an English merchant, who will be under the necessity of contracting with the manufacturer, whom, I confess from his character, and his connexions with the hostile party, I look upon with suspicion. At all events this transaction involves a loss of time; the simplest method would have been to make of the expenses necessary for the equipment of the army, a particular head of expenditure, and to have entered into a direct negociation with the English manufacturers, through the medium of the Spanish embassy in London. A loan of four hundred thousand reals has been concluded on terms *apparently* advantageous. If the advantage be real, and such as the Spanish government sets forth, the English government must be favorable to this loan; and one can hardly suppose that the neutrality is

strictly observed; for under present circumstances how could a banker take so decided a determination? Such is the idea with which an English merchant, who is at Madrid on a mission, neither connected with politics, nor the loan in question, lulls the ministers.

The majority of the Spanish nation entertain the same opinion, with which I should fully coincide, if I could suppose that politics were shaped according to the real interests of nations.

The overthrow of the Spanish constitution must be followed by the political domination of France over Spain, and the re-establishment of the family pact. An immediate consequence of such a result would be the loss of the influence which England had attained in 1808, and a farther step towards the separation of that country from the continental system. Though England can no longer find a field for her armies in Germany, Spain would serve her purposes, if her commercial interests induced her to enter into a continental war, as it did when she fought Napoleon. If France once establish her dominion over Spain, England loses this eminent advantage.

The British government ought, however, to reflect that the French government, which its tendency to aristocratical despotism has made a vassal of the holy alliance (in spite of what the ultras may say) will be forced into hostilities against England, without being able to retrograde, under pain of meeting the revolu-

tionary phantom, which according to the principles of the holy alliance, is to plunder, to desolate, and to deluge with blood the whole of Europe, like Attila of old; and which is sure to preside at every congress. We shall see what part the British government will take; and thus be able to determine whether the present political system is that of nations or individuals.

In the early part of September, and shortly after the death of Elio, government banished to different places out of the peninsula, the generals and superior officers who had refused to take the command of Valencia.

I cannot help noticing a circumstance, which although trifling in itself, proves how difficult it is for a man to divest himself of the spirit of his profession. A proclamation addressed to the Spanish nation, and which has been circulated in every part of Spain, was signed by the king on the 16th of September. After assuring his subjects of the *sincerity* with which he signed the constitution, and of his *firm intention* to preserve it; after having thundered against the anti-liberal designs of the rebels and their adherents; after having exhorted the army to fight in the cause of liberty, and the military, civil, and religious chiefs to unite their efforts in impressing the love of the constitution upon the hearts of the citizens; the king addresses the journalists in these terms:—"And you, public writers, who command opinion, that arbiter of nations; you who so often supply the deficiency of the laws, and correct the



errors of the administration, devote your talents to the national cause with more zeal than ever, &c." Now you must know that Mr. San Miguel is the principal editor of the journal called *l'Espectador*, in which he is assisted by some of his colleagues and several deputies.

I told you in my last letter that the anilleros would probably incorporate themselves with the free-masons. This has taken place; and it now remains to be seen the spirit of which society will prevail. On the other hand the society of the comuneros is agitated by violent dissensions; its moderate members wish no alteration in the present order of things; the enthusiasts of the party are anxious that more activity and energy should be infused into the government; and rather than suffer any change dictated by a spirit of moderation, they would almost resort to measures of violence. They are, perhaps, not so much to be blamed; for in a revolution when the march of affairs is in appearance at a stand still, it is in fact retrograding.

This jarring of interests causes the cortes, the government, and the secret societies to think of nothing but their private interests, and to forget the public weal. I had mentioned to you a plan formed in the general assembly of the comuneros, and my hints respecting a treaty between them and the French patriots. Amongst these dissensions the plan has been altogether lost sight of.

On the 14th of September, I had addressed a fresh memorial to the minister Lopez Baños, on the necessity of forming a foreign legion, composed of the French and Italian refugees, of the deserters who might be collected in Spain, and the foreigners whose assistance might be called. I transmitted to him, with this memorial, a plan of formation by which this legion might have been carried in the course of a month to four battalions. I had likewise taken the precaution to transmit these documents to the deputy Serrano, requesting him to communicate them to the minister of the interior, Gasco, and his colleagues.

I knew that a preceding memorial, dated the 19th of July, had been put into the hands of Lopez Baños on his arrival at Madrid. Notwithstanding all this, I placed but little dependence on the efforts of the minister of war, from the description which had been given to me of his character. Devoid of instruction, narrow minded, headstrong, and affectedly mysterious, he is not capable of appreciating the advice which is given to him; and he refuses from pride to listen to the opinion of persons approaching his rank. Thus he is completely influenced by subaltern agents, to whom in his difficulties he addresses himself, and who of course advise those measures which they know to be palatable to their master. I therefore determined to address myself directly to the cortes, who in this predicament ought to remedy the tardiness of government by taking the first step.

With this intention I sent a memorial to the secretary of the cortes, and wrote to Serrano and Beltran de Lis, that they might urge its presentation and discussion, and give it the support of their friends and of their party. *Caveant ne quid detrimentum res publica capiat*, is an admonition, which not only the patriots of Spain, but the patriots of all Europe, should address to the representatives of the Spanish nation. In reminding them of it, I am fulfilling the duty by which every freeman is bound to watch with a jealous eye the proceedings of the enemies of liberty.

The influence of the cortes must not be confined to the limits of the Spanish empire. To believe that the cause of liberty in Spain can be separated from the general cause of European liberty would be a fatal error. Spain cannot hope to enjoy peaceably her institutions, if Europe is not free; and the freedom of Europe is at least adjourned, if Spain be deprived of her's. This constitutes the question which the Spanish congress will have to solve; and its solution presents this striking dilemma; either the representatives of the Spanish nation will acquire immortal fame by laying the foundations of European liberty, or the cause of liberty is lost in Europe for many years, and Spain oppressed and desolated will curse the memory of the present cortes for their base pusillanimity.

An upright and enlightened man can no longer be deluded; and those who still pursue the wrong path, and can still suffer themselves to be dazzled,

must either be egregious fools, or traitors. Who at this time can doubt the intentions of the French government? Are they not clearly manifested by its internal political proceedings, and even by its interests? To insist farther upon this subject, is purely a work of supererogation.

The congress ought chiefly to direct its attention to the real means of averting the danger with which Spain is threatened by the French government. The first measure to be taken is no doubt the subjugation of the factions which overrun the provinces near the Pyrenees; but once more, their total destruction would not restore tranquillity to the peninsula. When the rebels are defeated, they will always find a rallying point behind the lines of the army of observation. The Spanish troops will refrain from violating the French territory, and the rebels whom they have expelled will find means to return at the first opportunity. The anti-liberal faction will not stop there; disturbances will be created in the remotest provinces, in order to force the government to call back the troops from the frontier, or to make new levies. The former of these measures might cause the loss of Catalonia, Navarre, and Arragon; the latter would require time, and prolong to an indefinite period the critical situation of Spain. Force alone can bring about the dissolution of the army of observation; the object of which is to second the efforts of the factions by undermining the Spanish constitution.

The French government, I repeat it for the twentieth time, will spare no sacrifice to arrive at this end; its own existence is concerned in the measure. Nor can Spain reckon upon the assistance of any other power. But let the representatives of the Spanish nation examine attentively each of the European cabinets, and judge for themselves. On the other hand, how long will it be necessary to maintain a ruinous war establishment, which is only keeping Spain in a critical state, sufficient of itself to endanger the best constituted government. Let Spain make use of the weapons with which she herself is attacked; it is folly and not generosity to make use of arms inferior to those of our enemies. The French government wishes to interfere in the affairs of Spain upon a principle advanced by the holy alliance, because it is pretended that the constitutional government of Spain tends to the destruction of the actual government of France. The same argument may be made use of in favor of Spain, and in a much more plausible manner. Of the respective tendency of the two governments there cannot be a doubt; the right of mutual interference cannot be admitted; and the question can only be decided *vi et armis*. The result cannot be foretold; the odds are in favor of Spain, if she begins the attack; against her, if she awaits it.

Beltran de Lis entirely approves of my plans; he promises to hasten the discussion, and to support my propositions. Serrano's answer is rather more

reserved; he states that the committee are not yet come to a decision on the manner in which the proposal ought to be framed; and thus proves that the liberals are not unanimous, or that there are still delusions and prejudices to conquer. Another friend informs me that from a conversation which he has had with the ministers they seem to wish that I should go to Navarre, and are anxious to confer with me on my road from Madrid.

This underhand conduct of the ministers is really pitiful; either they intend to adopt the plans contained in my memorial, or the political system which they have adopted will not admit of it. Granting the first supposition, they might invite me to Madrid, and a single conference would be sufficient to mature their designs. If they are averse to my plans, where is the necessity of my being at Madrid at all? You know that motives of propriety, or rather of political delicacy, keep me away from the metropolis. If the Spanish government wishes to avert the war by a negociation, my appearance in Madrid would only create suspicion, by putting on the alert all the agents of the diplomatical police; would injure the cause of government, and be disadvantageous to myself. I think, however, that Messrs. San Miguel and Lopez might have condescended to write to me; and without exposing a mystery of which no one is the dupe, it would have been sufficient for them to say—*we are willing to act, and require your presence*, or else—*we cannot accede to your proposition*. But really it

appears to me that they do not know what they wish, and that they are alternately prompted by a desire to act and restrained by fear. The declarations of the congress of Verona have still increased their indecision; perhaps they cannot make out the mystical sense which these declarations contain, or if they do, they seem willing to cling to the literal sense; for indolent men it is certainly the most convenient plan.

On the 11th of November, the deputies Serrano, Saavedra, and Gonzales Alonzo, leaving aside my memorial, proposed to the cortes the formation of a foreign legion on the plan which I had submitted. This proposal was strongly supported by an eloquent speech of Galiano, by Beltran de Lis, and several of their colleagues among the liberals. Arguellez attacked it with all the virulence of party spirit, and with those irrelevant flights of declamation of which he is never sparing. He went so far as to say, that the foreign officers would be too happy to serve as privates in the ranks of the Spanish army. The party of Arguellez took the same side of the question; and the discussion was becoming warm, when the ministers gave it a new turn. They hinted that the plan itself was a good one, but that the present political circumstances required temporizing; and that it would be better to adjourn the subject till the government could take upon itself to submit the plans.

This was adopted; and the ministers are on the verge of a precipice, against which they obstinately shut their eyes.

I have been again invited to go to Biscay or Navarre, but I have peremptorily declined. What could I do there?—go and act the part of a liliputian Alexander at the head of one hundred men? When Napoleon landed from the island of Elba he had nearly one thousand men, and his name alone was an army. Would it not be the height of folly and presumption in any individual to endeavor to outvie such a man?

It is manifest from the declaration of the ministers that they will not, for the present, accede to the formation of a considerable force; and it would be in any one the act of a madman (however great you may suppose his talents and his courage) to undertake what cannot be performed without the support of the government. With a small number of men, nothing is to be done; and how is an individual to assemble, arm and pay a great number even during a short period.

After all, I wish that the Spanish government may not be mistaken as to the real situation of Spain. The ministers fancy they have nothing to apprehend from the foreign interference—I am of a different opinion; and the intelligence which I have just received tends to confirm it.



## LETTER XVIII.

*Alicante, February 1, 1823.*

THE proceedings of the ministers are characterized by the same tardiness, and the same inconceivable self-delusion. I try all that I can, I will not say to tear the veil, but to remove the scales which seem to obstruct their vision. I write by almost every post to my correspondents among the cortes, to induce them to admonish and arouse the government, whose torpor (I had almost said whose incapacity) becomes every day more deplorable. My warnings are verified one after the other: but they are not more attended to on that account. The *cordon sanitaire* is become an *army of observation*; this army is daily increasing. The congress of Verona is a rehearsal of the congress of Laybach: and yet the Spanish ministers are so little alarmed at it, that one would think they are not at all concerned in the matter. A letter which I wrote in the early part of December, ran as follows—"Say what you will, I maintain the correctness of my statement: France is appointed to rule the affairs of Spain; and in case of need she will be assisted by Prussia and Austria. England will observe a neutrality, which may be

considered as compulsory, on account of her financial situation, which is such as to make her believe that *her private interests* will be best consulted by avoiding a continental struggle.

“ There is one chance against the execution of the plan devised by the aristocracy of the continent, viz. the opposition of Monsieur De Villele, who is against the war. He has caused the assembly of the French chambers to be postponed from the 4th to the 28th of December, in order to negotiate with the new deputies, whose disposition is not yet known, and to secure to himself a majority. Should he succeed, there will be no war ; if he fails, a war must take place.”

The answer which I received to this letter, contains a remarkable passage, which proves that neither my observations, nor the nature of the congress of Verona are understood. I had spoken in my letter of the assistance which in case of need the other members of the holy alliance had promised to the French government : but not of the passage of the troops of the holy alliance through France. I had even said that the introduction of foreign forces into France appeared to me an impracticable plan, and that if it were proposed, the French government would decline it from obvious motives of policy. Would you believe after this, that the reply of my correspondents contained the following passage—“ We cannot credit your information respecting the passage of foreign troops through France: we have heard nothing about

it, nor does it appear that the government has received any intelligence of the kind. The affairs of Russia, of Turkey, of Greece, and of America, are too important not to divert the attention of the holy alliance from the affairs of Spain."

Now this illusion must have vanished, and the intentions of the holy alliance, as well as the result of the congress, must be known; and yet the Spanish ministers do not seem to be thoroughly convinced, and are still deceiving themselves with respect to France.

A question of a different nature, and not a little perplexing for Spain, has increased the number of its difficulties; in fact, all seems to combine for the destruction of this wretched country.

Previous to the second proclamation of the constitution, the British ministers had intimated to the cabinet at Madrid, that if they did not acknowledge the independence of South America, Spain must consent to a free commerce between Great Britain and the insurgent provinces. The cabinet refused to abolish the prohibitory laws, but hinted that a free trade should be tacitly allowed. Notwithstanding this, several English vessels, especially since 1820, were taken in consequence of the blockade on the coast of South America. This measure was much complained of; and the Spanish government was highly blamed. Appearances were certainly against the Spanish ministers; for there seemed to be a tacit violation of a tacit agreement; it is even said that

Mr. San Miguel acknowledged as much: but he might have given a much more plausible answer. The permission given extended merely to trade; but the trade, carried on as it was, supplied the insurgent colonies with arms, ammunition, and military accoutrements, the produce of British manufactories.

Thus England, without absolutely infringing the secret treaty, lent its assistance to the enemies of Spain. This might and ought to have caused a more specific agreement to be drawn up.

The departure of Sir William A'Court for Madrid was consequently hastened, and he received instructions relating to this particular object. The first note of the British ambassador not having been answered in a manner satisfactory to his government, he presented a second, stronger than the first. He informed the Spanish government that two squadrons had sailed from Portsmouth, one for Porto Rico, and the other for Porto Cabello, with orders to capture Spanish vessels to the amount of the claims of the British merchants, which were valued at about twelve millions of francs.

This declaration compelled the cabinet of Madrid to adopt decisive measures. The negotiation could not be prolonged without the complete destruction of a feeble remnant of commerce which Spain still enjoyed; recriminations could not be made without incurring the risk of a rupture with a power which had promised a neutrality of so much importance. A correspondence on this affair was therefore submitted

by the government to the cortes, who were requested to take it into consideration without delay. The cortes entrusted it to a committee, who concluded that the Spanish treasury should be chargeable with this debt.

On the 2nd of January the cortes decreed that a joint commission of Spaniards and British should be appointed to meet in London, in order to examine and liquidate the claims of the parties concerned. It was further decreed, that the claims thus established should be inscribed on the registers of the Spanish national debt, and that the blockade of the coast of South America should be raised.

I shall not enter into an examination of the conduct of the British government on this affair. It is no doubt its duty to protect and defend its commercial interests, and to take care that the property and enterprizes of the British merchants shall be unmolested. This is the rule which the British government has constantly followed, and which is in fact the chief cause of its prosperity and of its power. But in this instance there appears to me a selfishness which does not speak favorably for the hopes which the Spaniards persist in entertaining. Had this remonstrance been accompanied by a note relative to the actual system of the customs, and to the impediments with which it fetters the trade between England and Spain, there might have been some hope of interference on the part of England, or at least, of

a favorable neutrality, which the commercial interests of England would naturally have produced.

I am at a loss to understand how this observation was not made by the Spanish government; and how the ministers could neglect to bring about a combination, which though not offered to them would hardly have been rejected.

As long as France and England were both friendly powers of Spain, and presented themselves on equal terms, it was natural for Spain to treat them in the same manner: but now the equilibrium is destroyed since France is in hostile array. This circumstance alone pointed out a different line of conduct, which now would be far from premature.

What the Spanish government must now most ardently desire, is to see her ports filled with English ships; not so much for the merchandize they would bring, as for the arms, the ammunition, and the other implements of war, of which Spain is destitute. The sale of the produce of the soil would supply the pecuniary deficiencies of the government; and the custom-house duties would also afford fresh resources. But all this requires time; the new commercial arrangement must be known in England, orders must be despatched, goods shipped, independently of the voyage; and, I think, that three months will not elapse before the declaration of war. Once more, therefore, the measures of which I spoke could not be considered as premature.

The well-wishers of Spain must indeed deplore the apathy and blindness of her ministers. They stand inactive in the face of danger, which they think to avert by shutting their eyes, instead of encountering it by energetic measures, or avoiding it by dexterity.

The difficulties which seem to threaten a rupture with England, having been got rid of, the most determined patriots seem to think, that there is now little to fear from France. Beltran de Lis, in a letter dated the 3rd of January, states, that the appearance of hostilities with France having subsided for the present, an attack of any nature upon this power must not be thought of; hence you may conclude that the blindness of the liberal party is universal. The elements of a political convulsion are all in readiness; and every thing tends to prove that Spain will suffer herself to be lulled and taken by surprise. If she shakes off her lethargy without loss of time, all may yet be right; but if she waits till the last moment, the best intentions on the part of those who wish to serve her must be ineffectual.

I had scarcely written these last words, when I received from a friend at Madrid a letter, dated the 13th of January, of which the contents are certainly extraordinary; and they are a proof of the errors and folly which are the result of pusillanimity and ignorance. I am told that the government does not coincide with my ideas respecting the present situation of Spain, and the means of relieving its difficulties. *Nevertheless it has been decided that as soon as the*

*ministers shall have completed the organization of their plans, and be able to send to the frontiers an army of eighty or one hundred thousand men, the revolution of France shall be thought of.*

The holy alliance will certainly not have grounds for convicting Monsieur San Miguel and Co. of a revolutionary conspiracy; since they can never go farther than to make an abortive attempt at it. I am also told that the Spanish government is organizing small bodies of French troops, but with secrecy sufficient to prevent immediate hostilities. But these troops, raised with so much mystery, amount to a handful of men, under the orders of Major C—— at Bilbao, where they are employed against the rebels. This is what may be called a manifestation of an hostile spirit, with a wish to disavow it. I have been requested to act a part in this farce, which I have of course declined. When a plan is once formed, it should be executed with vigour, or not at all. A hundred times have I told the liberals that if they attempted a revolution in France, they committed themselves, and took a step which could only be executed by securing commensurate advantages; and that an ill-concerted plan would put them in an awkward position. There was a time when a thousand men would have been sufficient; that was the time of the *cordon sanitaire*: three thousand men would now be requisite; and when the French army is concentrated, a Spanish army, equal in numbers, must be ready to meet it.



At length the storm is burst, and the Spanish ministers ought to be completely undeceived. It appears, however, that their eyes are not yet thoroughly opened, and that they are running into the snare laid for the French government. On the 4th of January, the French ambassador communicated to San Miguel instructions, dated the 25th of December, and which he had received the day before. You must have read them in the newspapers; they are drawn up in an ambiguous style, calculated to deceive by the tone of moderation which pervades them.

It appears that sufficient attention has not been paid to a few sentences which I will recall to your memory, and which, in my opinion, cannot be well misunderstood—"A constitution which king Ferdinand never acknowledged, nor accepted, *when he resumed his crown*, was subsequently imposed upon him, *by a military insurrection*. The government of the king (of France) entirely participates with the allies in the firm resolution to repel by every method *revolutionary movements and principles*. You will be pleased to inform the Spanish government that when tranquillity shall be restored to Spain, it may depend upon the sincerely amicable disposition of its neighbours."

Now has not the holy alliance advanced, as a principle, that no constitution is to be admitted which is not granted by the sovereign himself? The above quotation is therefore to be interpreted as follows—

“ France has agreed with her allies to reject the *revolutionary principles* of a constitution *imposed by an armed insurrection*; and when tranquillity shall be restored, by the king resuming his right to grant a constitution if he chooses, then, and not till then, the French government will be on amicable terms with Spain.”

The next day, the 5th, other notes were transmitted to the Spanish ministry, by count Bulgary, the Russian ambassador, and by the charge d'affaires of Prussia and of Austria. The sentiments contained in them are similar to those in the French note; but their expressions are stronger, and they have each a different character. The Russian note, the most violent of all, is full of vague accusations; the only remarkable thing in it is the appellation of *perjured soldiers*, bestowed upon the arms of the *Isla de Leon*. The Austrian note which is more moderate, states, however, that in order to preserve the amicable relations subsisting between Spain and the other powers, the liberty of the king is a *sine quâ non*, and that he will not be free till he can supersede an order of things acknowledged to be impracticable even by those whom vanity and egotism prompt to uphold it, by another order of things, such as will unite the rights of the monarch, and the interests and the wishes of every class of the nation. The Prussian note advances as an axiom, that a revolution, which is the offspring of a military insurrection, uproots the foundation of the social order. It concludes by

stating, that although foreign courts have no right to prescribe the institutions most suitable to Spain, they cannot but foresee the consequences which such an event must produce; and have a right to regulate their determinations according to the said consequences.

Indignation was the first sentiment which prevailed in the breast of San Miguel, who is naturally of an irritable temper; and his first intention had been to send to the three ambassadors of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, their passports, without waiting for their request to that effect.

In fact, it must have been an effort for a man of honor, not to exceed the bounds of moderation on the perusal of diplomatic documents of such a nature. An indifferent acquaintance with the Spanish revolution, and the causes of the present situation of this country, is sufficient to shew that these notes, are an assemblage of imaginary or perverted facts, of admissions as groundless as they are insulting, and of calumnious inculpations which offer no precise meaning, and state no tangible grievances. A retrospective glance at the invasions of France, and the invasion of Italy, would, it is true, be sufficient to give a clear idea of the intentions of the allied powers; but surely fair dealing (if there be such a thing in politics) required that these intentions should be expressed. Sir William A'Court acted on this occasion the part of a mediator, which was in fact that which befitted the ambassador of a nation, whose avowed neutrality

had no wise altered its amicable relations with Spain. He prevailed upon San Miguel to take time, and reflect before he came to a final rupture, for which (unfortunately for the credit of its ministers) Spain is ill prepared. The sudden dismissal of three ambassadors would inevitably have caused the departure of the French ambassador. It would, therefore, have been necessary to have on the frontiers an army of fifty thousand men, the vanguard of which might pass the Bidassoa immediately after Monsieur de la Garde, and attack the corps of observation, which is not yet concentrated. San Miguel resolved, therefore, to promise to the ambassadors an answer to their communications. It was hardly possible to doubt the departure of the ambassadors of Russia, Austria, and Prussia; as to the ambassador of France, the ambiguous style of his instructions did not betray any symptoms of a sudden retreat.

The Spanish ministers, after having reflected more maturely upon the position in which they were placed by declarations entirely unexpected, adopted the plan which they thought most becoming to their dignity, to the constitutional system which they defended, and the responsibility to which they were liable. They determined on submitting to the cortes in a public sitting, the notes in question, and their intended reply. They were chiefly induced to give publicity to their proceedings because France had first given the example by ordering the instructions given to Monsieur de la Garde to be inserted in the

newspapers. This important communication to the cortes took place at the sitting of the 9th of January. The prime minister after having read the notes delivered by the four ambassadors, read likewise a circular addressed to the Spanish ambassadors at the different courts, which was likewise to be transmitted to the representatives of the holy alliance at Madrid, as an answer to their notes. It was easy during this reading to trace on the features of the deputies, and of the small number of spectators who were in the galleries, the sentiments of horror and indignation, naturally produced by declarations unheard of in the annals of history. The explosion of these sentiments could not even be kept down when certain passages were read, more particularly some contained in the note from Russia. When the reading was over, the president instead of answering according to the usual form, *the cortes have heard, and will take into consideration*—said, “the cortes have heard the communication made to them by his majesty’s government; faithful to their oath, and to the nation which they represent, they will admit of no alteration, or modification of the constitution, in virtue of which they are assembled, unless in obedience to the will of the nation, and in conformity to the law. The cortes will furnish the government of his majesty with the means necessary to repel the aggression of those powers who should dare to attack the liberty, the independence, and the honor of the heroic Spanish nation; the dignity and splendor of the constitutional

throne." This noble and dignified answer was received with universal applause.

Although this communication from the government did not require any debate, since there was no question before the assembly, the deputy Galliano ascended the tribune; he proposed an address to the king, to declare to his majesty, that "the cortes were determined to support the honor and independence of the constitutional throne, the supremacy and the rights of the nation, and the constitution in its present form; that to obtain this sacred object, they would answer for every sacrifice on the part of the nation, being convinced that the Spaniards would consent to every sacrifice, and would prefer all sorts of evils to a compromise with those who should dare to attempt to sully their honor, and attack their liberty." These words were followed by enthusiastic shouts of applause. The motion was unanimously adopted, and confided to a committee; but on the proposition of Arguellez, and the observation of Galliano, that "the discussion would not be sufficiently temperate on that day," it was decided, that forty-eight hours should elapse before the committee brought up its report.

On the same day the Spanish government transmitted to the ambassadors of the four above-mentioned powers, the answer which had been promised. There was a separate note for France, drawn up with a degree of moderation, notwithstanding the animosity which seems to pierce through the following

sentences—"The army of observation which the French government keeps at the foot of the Pyrenees, cannot remedy the disorders with which Spain is afflicted. Experience has proved that the existence of this *cordon sanitaire* which has just assumed the name of the *army of observation*, has only increased the hopes of the fanatics who have spread through our provinces seditious rumours, by propagating the idea of an immediate invasion of our territory. The only assistance which the French government can at this moment afford to Spain is of a negative nature, that is, by disbanding the army of the Pyrenees, expelling from its territory the Spanish rebels, and silencing by energetic measures, those who are spreading the most atrocious calumnies against the Spanish government; the law of nations demands as much, a law respected by every civilized state.

To say that France is anxious for the welfare of Spain, when she is feeding the elements of destruction, which prey upon the vitals of the Spanish constitution, is to fall into a strange contradiction."

The answer addressed to the courts of Petersburg, Vienna, and Berlin, is much shorter, and characterized by a studied precision; it is a simple enunciation of facts and of principles, amongst which Spain denies the right of any power to interfere in her affairs.

The three ambassadors to whom this note was transmitted, asked for their passports on the 10th, and

received them on the 11th. The letter of count Bulgary, and the reply of San Miguel are conspicuously deficient in the usual etiquette of diplomatic forms.

Notwithstanding the patriotic enthusiasm which prevailed at Madrid, and the indignation naturally awakened by so flagrant an outrage against an independent nation, these ambassadors were not insulted.

M. de la Garde, in pursuance of his instructions, still remains at Madrid. I consider this delay as a fresh snare laid for Spain. In the first place, by feeding the deceitful hopes still entertained by many Spaniards that an accommodation is possible, it tends to confirm the slowness which has hitherto been so fatal in the organization of the means of defence: in the second place, it gives time to the troops which are marching from every part of France to the Pyrenees to arrive there, and to complete the dispositions of the army.

On the 11th, the committee to whom had been confided the drawing up of a message to the king made their report. The deputy Saavedra opened the debate, by a speech replete with force and eloquence; the deputies Canga, Joaquin Ferrer, Arguellez, and Alcala Galiano, spoke with equal energy. Several other deputies were likewise anxious to declare their sentiments; but the debate was closed by the cortes, and the message was agreed to, and carried up. When the deputies left the hall, the people took hold of Galiano and Arguellez, and carried them



in triumph for some distance ; at length they contrived to escape, and took refuge in the coach of the president.

The proceedings of the cortes, and the conduct of the government on this occasion, produced a magic effect, not only at Madrid, but throughout the kingdom. The spirit of patriotism, still heightened by the insult offered to the national pride, seems once more to pervade every rank. The firmness which the ministers have shewn seems to result from the security with which they expect the contingency of an invasion, and this security pre-supposes them to possess the means of resistance. Such must naturally be the argument of the Spaniards ; and they consequently must rejoice at the approach of a struggle from which the ministers seem confident of coming off victorious.

This is the very ground which I take for blaming the conduct of the ministers, which appears to be stamped with that precipitation which is one of the effects of anger. Not but that in the first instance I entered fully into the sentiments, which must arise in every feeling mind, on witnessing the noble indignation of a free people, of an independent nation, insulted in a manner unheard of in the civilized world ; basely calumniated and threatened with a disastrous war, merely because she refuses to bend to the yoke which despots wished to impose upon her ; not but that I applauded the proud spirit with which

she repelled the outrage, and appealed to arms and the justice of her cause. Even now I can hardly defend myself from the exaggerated influence of such feelings; and I grieve while I submit to the chilling examination of reason, the glowing sentiments to which had given birth a scene which does honor to human nature.

The formation of the French army of observation, the little that had transpired at the congress of Verona, the notes of the four allied powers—in fact, every circumstance must have proved to the Spanish ministers that the holy alliance intended to overthrow the constitution. War was therefore unavoidable; but the Spanish government was not prepared, and its first object should have been to gain time, which could only be effected by negotiation. Instead of a sudden rupture, it was necessary to shew a more yielding spirit, to suppress for the moment the expression of a just indignation, and to appear ready to give way: this did not present many difficulties.

The declarations spoke of an order of things incompatible with the system adopted in every other part of Europe, and of the necessity of establishing a different one. One of these declarations (the Austrian), went so far as to state that this new order of things ought to be such as to connect the rights of the sovereign with the wish and interests of the nation. These indefinite terms might have caused a clearer explanation to be required, in order that the

government and the nation should know precisely what was required at their hands. By this middle course, time would have already been gained. Moreover England might have been requested to interfere in this explanation, or at least to interpose her good offices; in a word, numberless diplomatic finesses might have been resorted to, which could not have failed to delay the threatened aggression. It is very certain, that the allied powers will not allow even a modified constitution; the avowal should have been drawn from them. Instead of that, the gauntlet of defiance has been thrown by Spain, while her armies are still unorganized, and to the eyes of an attentive observer a scene worthy of the purest age of Rome cannot disguise a series of remediless evils, if the ministers do not repair by redoubled activity the negligence of which they have hitherto been guilty.

On the 20th of January, lord Fitzroy Somerset and lord Leyison Gower arrived at Madrid; the purport of their mission, it is said, is to suggest to the persons who have the greatest influence with the government, and among the cortes, that a modification in the constitution is indispensably necessary to avert the impending war. It is even reported that the duke of Wellington entrusted them with a memorial to the same effect, and that they have had a conference with general Alava. The result of this attempt at pacification remains to be seen. I cannot believe that the British government is guilty of a

sinister intent ; but surely it must have been duped by the French cabinet, since the holy alliance, I repeat it, will not hear of a constitution of any kind in Spain. Only recollect what took place in Piedmont, and at Naples, and the suggestions of modification which preceded each invasion.

Moreover these negotiations may be said to have had the effect of carrying water to the stream, as far as regards the anilleros. The plan of modification which they have so much at heart, and for which they have been striving so long to prepare the public opinion, has received fresh vigour from this circumstance, and a pamphlet has appeared on the subject.

Among the thousand reports which have been spread, it is said that England has suggested a modification provided for by the Spanish constitution ; this plan is as follows—the anilleros, who most of them are neither dukes nor marquisses, do not want a chamber of peers, which would naturally be filled by the grandes and the titled aristocracy ; they want one in which patents of nobility shall not be requisite. By an attentive perusal of the constitutional charter, they have found out that the cortes have a right to determine the privileges of the council of state. The cortes have consequently the power to confer upon the said council of state the privilege of revising the laws and the decrees, before they are submitted to the sanction of the king, and to increase the number

of its members ; there is at once a chamber of peers. Unfortunately the anilleros have forgotten that if a counter-revolution takes place in favor of the aristocracy, and confines itself to the creation of two chambers, the aristocracy must find its place in one of them.

The town is overflowing with recruits, as it is one of the chief depots where they are to assemble to be distributed to their respective divisions. They are in general a very fine race of men ; and it would be difficult to find men more fond of the profession for which they are intended. They enter the town laughing and singing patriotic airs, though the weather is dreadful, and they are drenched with rain, and covered with mud. They are sometimes suffered to remain for two hours on the parade, before they are sent off to the different companies of the regiment of Navarre, to which they are temporarily attached. Nothing seems to check their hilarity—nothing chills their ardour—they march to their barracks with the same gaiety. The same cheerful spirit animates them in every branch of the service in which they are employed. Their exercise is taught them, that is to say, the first rudiments of it ; and when they are called at sound of drum from the recreations which occupy their leisure hours, they run laughing and singing to their ranks. What could not be made of men so disposed, by officers acquainted with their profession, and taking at heart the interest of the soldiers under their care. But these recruits are

utterly neglected, and even those who have been here for a month, are yet without uniforms.

I was formerly surprised, and not without reason, at the confidence reposed in count d'Abisbal, when he was nominated inspector-general of the army ; and now cannot conceive how the ministers suffer him to retain the situation. All his operations are diametrically opposed to what they ought to be. It is sufficient to read his circulars to be convinced that they have for their object the disorganization of the army, and the relaxation of discipline.

Amongst the circulars which have been read to the troops, is one in which the officers are requested to treat the soldiers, when out of the ranks, with the *fraternity and the regard* due to other citizens, and not to object to meet them in public places : I forbear making comments upon this. The other transactions of D'Abisbal are equally objectionable : this is entirely the fault of the government which has sanctioned them.

The chief depots for the assembling of the recruits are not those where their accoutrements are made, so that they remain half naked till they join their regiments. In consequence of the indolence and the neglect of the administration, they are suffered to accumulate in these depots for a month at least before their destination is known. The kind of instruction which they receive amounts to nothing, because the officers and subalterns, whose duty it is

to give it, take no interest in men who are not to remain under their orders. All these delays, and the distance which separates their native province from the depot, and that between the depot and their regiment, must require at least two months before they can reach their final destination, after which they must be armed, equipped, and instructed.

## LETTER XIX.

*Alicante, March 5, 1823.*

THE investigation of the political circumstances of Spain, contained in my last letter, prevented my mentioning a bold attempt of the factious upon Madrid: I now proceed to give you an account of it. In the early part of January, the rebel chief, Bessieres, who had been obliged to quit Catalonia, had established himself in Arragon, whence he spread his forces over the provinces of Huesca and Saragossa. He was joined by Ulmann, who on leaving Peniscola, had raised a small body of rebels in the province of Castellon, and by a certain Chambo, who had succeeded Rambla in the command of the rebels of Morella. These three bodies of factious might amount to about five thousand infantry and five hundred lancers. Their chiefs made an attempt upon Saragossa, which they attacked on three different points without success. From thence they marched upon Calatayud, which they likewise attacked. The small garrison of this town made a spirited resistance, but must have fallen, if general baron Carondelet (the same who had twice defended Saragossa) had not hastened to its assistance. The rebels retired after having left a few men on the field,



besides fifty taken prisoners. But instead of returning to Arragon, or throwing themselves into the kingdom of Valencia, they marched upon Segovia, which they endeavored to take by surprise, but without success. At length on the 17th of January, Bessieres and Ulmann fell back upon Medina Celi, still threatening Guadalajara.

This unexpected intelligence spread consternation in Madrid, and gave no little uneasiness to the ministers themselves. It can hardly be doubted that these movements of the rebels were concerted with the serviles of the capital; either because they intended to facilitate its entrance to the factious by a planned insurrection; or because they intended to take advantage of the moment when the troops should be despatched to meet Bessieres. Various movements which took place in the palace led to the supposition that the serviles intended taking the king from Madrid to put him at the head of the factious. The prowling of Bessieres and Ulmann around Madrid for a fortnight, seems to confirm this opinion. Orders were given for troops to march towards the capital, and for the Valencian troops to advance towards Cuenca. General Velasco was recalled from Arragon with his division. The political chief, Palarea, took measures for the internal safety of the metropolis; and the ministers ordered troops to reinforce general O'Daly, commandant-general at Guadalajara. On the 20th he left Madrid with a column of one thousand five hundred infantry,

five hundred of them belonging to the militia, sixty of the military cavalry, one hundred and fifty of the regiment of Alcantara, and four pieces of cannon. These troops having reached Guadalajara, about three hundred militia went to join general Don Juan Martin, called Empecinado, who occupied with a body of cavalry Torrija, and other positions on the right. On the 23d, Bessieres and Ulmann had advanced as far as Brihuega, where they took up a strong position, their front being covered by marshy ground. On the 24th, O'Daly and Empecinado, moved on a preconcerted plan, and Bessieres detached nearly half his troops to meet the latter. Notwithstanding this, Empecinado attacked with vigour, and routed the troops opposed to him, and after having taken eighty prisoners, he obliged the enemy to retreat upon Brihuega; but the nature of the country which was hilly and intersected with ravines, prevented a close pursuit. Meanwhile O'Daly had reached Brihuega with two hundred infantry militia, and sixty horse, one thousand six hundred men of the active militia of Bujalance and Guadalajara, about one hundred and fifty horse of the regiment of Alcantara, and his four pieces of cannon. Without having reconnoitered the position of the enemy, or waiting till Empecinado had joined him, he determined upon an immediate attack. Without any apparent reason he divided his troops into three columns; he detached to the right part of the militia of Bujalance,

with one piece of cannon; he sent to the left a great part of the militia of Guadalajara, supported by the cavalry of Alcantara; he advanced himself on the high road at the head of the remainder of his troops with three pieces of cannon. The column on the right succeeded in taking possession of the heights before it, but having imprudently advanced into the valley on the other, was charged by a body of lancers. The soldiers of Bujalance threw down their arms, and betook themselves to flight, so that this column was routed before O'Daly knew of its being attacked. The left column was at first successful, but the rebel chiefs having nothing more to oppose them on their left, brought fresh troops to the attack, and succeeded in routing their adversaries. O'Daly's central column was, therefore, obliged to fall back in haste, leaving in the power of the rebels two pieces of cannon, which the general had foolishly taken with him to the marshy part of the ground. The rout of the active militia was complete; but the volunteers of Madrid protected the retreat as far as Guadalajara.

This day cost the constitutionals a considerable number of prisoners; amongst whom was brigadier Plasencia, formerly political chief at Valencia. We have just heard that he has been liberated on parole. The soldiers of Bujalance taken prisoners, have joined the rebel standard; this is not to be wondered at, as it was well known that the regiment in question was no-wise friendly to the constitution.

When the retreat of the central column had been ordered, the firing of the troops of Empecinado was heard; he attacked Brihuega, but his troops being chiefly cavalry, and not being supported, he was obliged before night to retreat a short distance. On the 25th Bessieres and Ulmann occupied Guadalajara.

When the news of this disaster reached Madrid, the government immediately put the national militia under arms, and took the necessary measures of defence. The free-masons on this occasion were exposed to considerable danger; the ministry of their creating, was accused of culpable improvidences in not having discovered and prevented the movement of Bessieres and Ulmann. The comuneros thought to profit by this circumstance to take the direction of affairs. The national militia of Madrid, and the armed patriots, amounting to more than six thousand men, were in their favor. Fifteen hundred infantry and five hundred cavalry, all of them comuneros, were to arrive from Toledo. It is indisputable that with this force they might have overthrown the free-masons, who had no other defence than a feeble garrison. All was prepared for movement, arms were to be taken on a signal given; that is, when the sacred battalion had hoisted the flag of Padilla. Ministers must inevitably have fallen; all depended on Ballesteros, to whose hands the comuneros had entrusted the execution of this plan. Whether he shrunk at the idea of a revolution, which was to put him at the head of the affairs, I

know not, but certain it is that he hesitated, and a failure was the consequence.

The ministers were partly informed of the plot, and consequently took precautionary measures, which, however, would have been insufficient if the conspiracy had been boldly carried on. Means were also provided for the defence of the capital against any possible attack of the rebels, by forming into regiments all the corporate bodies capable of bearing arms. The clerks of all the public offices, the treasury, customs, excise, &c. made up a corps of one thousand eight hundred and fifty-four men, fully provided with arms and ammunition. The retired officers, with those on half-pay, and several patriots, made up another of eight hundred men; the students, one of one thousand five hundred, a third of which only was armed. The volunteers of the national militia raised, in consequence of the last act of enrolment, joined to those who had returned with O'Daly, amounted to four thousand infantry and two hundred and fifty cavalry. The government took the command from O'Daly, and gave it to count Abisbal; Ballesteros was appointed commandant-general of Madrid.

Abisbal left Madrid on the 25th with one hundred and fifty horse, and went to Alcala, where he assembled the troops under his command. On the 26th he advanced upon Guadalajara, which Bessieres evacuated in three columns, one of which appeared to take the direction of Cuenca. On the 27th, Abisbal

fell back upon Alcala, under the pretence of protecting Madrid from a surprise. The Empecinado being a comunero was sent back to the active army at Sigüenza, the station under his command. General Velasco, being ill-spoken of in the newspapers of the free-masons, and accused of dilatoriness, gave in his resignation. Meanwhile the rebel chiefs finding that Cuenca was occupied by Valencian troops, fell back upon Huete, where they concentrated their forces. Abisbal who had collected about six thousand infantry and one thousand five hundred cavalry, invested them in the latter part of January. It was daily expected that Huete would be taken by storm, or obliged to surrender at discretion; but Abisbal, under the pretence of insuring the junction of the forces, which he called the troops of Cuenca, and between which and the enemy he was stationed, made a retrograde movement. The rebels took advantage of this, and decamped, leaving behind them the prisoners they had taken and their artillery. Bessieres marched towards Burgos; Ulmann and Chambo took at first the direction of Teruel, on which they made an unsuccessful attack, and thence retired into the kingdom of Valencia: such was the end of this expedition.

While this was taking place, another storm was preparing in the council of state against the ministers. The counsellor Ciscar proposed to address a representation to the king, to request of him to change the ministers, because, in the first place, they

thought of nothing but persecuting all those who did not share in their political opinions, or did not belong to the same political sect; secondly, because their imbecility, and their carelessness, had encouraged the attack of the rebels on the capital. Balasteros opposed this proposition, by observing that he was the first to blame the ministry; but he thought the moment ill-chosen for a revolution in the cabinet; and he was for delaying a decision till the rebels were driven from the neighbourhood of Madrid. This opinion was carried; but it is easy to foresee that a change of ministry must take place ere long.

On the 26th the French ambassador received despatches from his government; all that has hitherto transpired relative to their contents is, that they are accompanied by a note to be communicated to the king, of which the tenor, it is said, is nearly as follows—"That the king of Spain, freed from his captivity, should advance as far as the Bidassoa, where an everlasting peace should be negotiated, and the old union of France and Spain cemented by fresh bonds, and the fleets, armies, and resources of France, placed at the disposal of his catholic majesty; that France did not pretend to prescribe the nature of, or limits of the modification which the Spanish constitution must undergo; but in order not to be accused of an insidious reserve, she declares that she will not renew her amicable relations with Spain, until, with the consent of the king, and in concert with him,

such a system has been established as will ensure the liberties of the nation, and the privileges of the sovereign; nor until a full amnesty has been granted to all those who had declared against the constitution of 1812."

The absurdity of the above diplomatic document surely needs no comment. On the 27th it was transmitted to San Miguel, who rejected it with indignation. Count de Lagarde demanded his passports, and quitted Madrid on the 30th.

As early as the month of January, and shortly after the departure of the three northern ambassadors, the Spanish ministers had requested the friendly interference of Great Britain to prevent a rupture with France. The French ministers were consequently given to understand, that England was anxious to bring about in Spain a state of things agreeable to France, and that the negotiation might be carried on through the British minister at Madrid. The answer of the French government was vague, and evidently intended to decline the proposed interference, being interlarded with invectives against Spain, whose ministers it was said instructed their agents abroad to assume the language of moderation, while the popular political assemblies at home were endeavoring to fan the flame of rebellion in France. The British cabinet, however, thought that the answer, such as it was, implied a wish, that the rebel Spaniards should be pardoned by a general amnesty, and that the constitution should be modified by an



increase of power being given to the king. Such was the spirit of the notes transmitted on the subject to the Spanish ministers by Sir William A'Court.

The speech of the king of France at the opening of the chambers, in which he advances, as a principle, that a *constitution must emanate from the sovereign*, and that his subjects can receive it from him alone, altered in some measure the preconceived opinions respecting the system adopted by France towards Spain. But the French ministers having endeavored to soften the principle advanced in the above speech, by declaring, that it was not to be understood absolutely, but merely intended *that the constitution was to be modified with the consent of the king, and in concert with him*; having, moreover, represented that the warlike preparations which were carried on with the greatest activity did not preclude a negotiation, the British cabinet was willing to believe that an accommodation was still possible. This required success in a very delicate undertaking, namely, that of prevailing upon Spain to accept a modification which should not appear to have been forced upon her. A short time afterwards the almost unanimous opinion expressed by the British parliament on the injustice of the war which France was about to declare against Spain, induced the French ministers to take one step more to deceive the British cabinet. They gave out that, if through the interference of England, Spain could be induced to propose the adoption of a second chamber,

there would be sufficient ground for opening a negotiation, and for suspending the preparations of war. This was annulling the effect of the good intentions of the British ministers, by setting them in pursuit of an imaginary object; since it was well understood in Paris, that not only the thorough constitutionalists, but even the tamest of the serviles, would not hear of any modification of the Spanish constitution.

In the early part of February, as soon as Sir William A'Court had received this fresh suggestion of the French cabinet, he communicated it to the Spanish ministers. It might easily have been foreseen that the proposition would be rejected. In the first place, the ministers by their declarations to the Spanish nation, had taken a position, from which they could not honorably retreat. On the other hand, in the exasperated state of all classes, it was hardly to be supposed that any ministers would dare to propose so unpalatable a compromise; all parties would have spurned with indignation a modification thrust upon them with menaces. San Miguel replied, therefore, that a war was unavoidable; and that he was prepared to meet it; that he was, however, unwilling to give up all hopes of pacification, but relied entirely on the friendship and good offices of Great Britain.

The forces intended for the defence of Spain were divided into four armies. By a decree of the 4th of February, Mina was nominated commander-in-chief of the first army in Catalonia; Ballesteros

of the 2nd in Arragon and Navarre; Morillo of the 3rd in Galicia; and Abisbal of the army of reserve at Madrid. These armies were merely nominal, with the exception of Mina's, which might amount to about twenty-five thousand. The recruits had not yet joined their respective corps: a great number of them, either bribed by the serviles, or disheartened at being left without arms or clothing, had deserted their depots, so that there did not remain above thirty thousand to distribute among the garrisons of the kingdom of Valencia, and that of Cadiz, for a fresh army formed in Andalusia, and for the armies of Morillo, Abisbal and Ballesteros, each of whom had therefore six thousand men.

At the same period the Spanish government feeling the want of pecuniary resources, applied to the cortes for authority to dispose of the sinking fund, which had been deposited with other monies appropriated to the liquidation of the national debt. The cortes refused their assent, but empowered the ministers to levy in advance the contributions for the three remaining quarters of the current year.

This pecuniary deficiency of the Spanish government, arose from the failure of a negotiation for a loan, which was to be supplied by a Spanish house. The contractors did not fulfil their engagement; the contracts for arms with British and German manufacturers fell also to the ground; and the recruits remained unprovided. This was the time for organizing and calling into active service the militia volunteers, who throughout Spain offered to defend the

independence of their country. They were clothed, armed, and in some measure disciplined; and at Valencia, at Madrid, in Catalonia, and other parts of Spain, they had given proof that they could and would fight. But the majority of them were comuneros; and the baneful influence of party spirit once more prevailed over the interests of the nation.

The ministers, once convinced that an invasion was unavoidable, they could not but be aware that the small force at the disposition of Ballesteros would be incapable either of offering any resistance, or of protecting Madrid. They thought therefore of putting the court and the cortes beyond the reach of danger, by removing them as far as possible from the point of attack. The most eligible spot was Seville; as in case of necessity, the seat of government might easily be transferred from thence to Cadiz, where the means of defence would be sufficient, even if a national war were to be kindled in the provinces of Spain.

On the 15th of February, the cortes decreed, on the motion of the ministers, that the government was authorised to transfer its residence to another town, and that, should circumstances require it, his majesty should be pleased to appoint between that day and the closing of the extraordinary session, the place which he chose for his residence.

The ministers hastened to submit this decree to the approval of the king; and in the evening of the 18th they went in a body to the palace, with a memorial, stating the motives of the proposed removal,

and representing the necessity of an early decision as to the future residence of the court, in order to give time for the necessary preparations. The king's only answer was—"I shall not quit this spot as long as I am alive: leave my presence." The ministers in vain endeavored to remonstrate; they could get no other reply, and were obliged to withdraw. The same night they again proceeded to the palace to tender their resignations, which were not accepted. The next day, the 19th, the king being seized with an attack of the gout, could not close the session of the cortes in person.

The plan of a change of ministry was resumed in the council of state, as soon as the rebels had left Huete and dispersed. This plan was encouraged by the opinion given by Sir W. A'Court, namely, that the present ministers could not treat with France and the allied powers, nor enter into a negotiation, which England still flattered herself might be brought to a pacific result. In fact, the authors of the notes of the 6th of January, and those of the replies of the 9th, could not be brought again into contact, without violating the rules of propriety prescribed by the usual diplomatic forms. In a private audience which he gave to Sir W. A'Court, the king commenced by expressing a wish that the difficulties which had arisen between Spain and France should be amicably settled, and appeared anxious to listen to the advice of the British ambassador, or rather to sound his opinion. Sir William stated without reserve that the preliminary step towards a negotiation

should be the dismissal of the present ministers, who, however enlightened and patriotic they might be, were necessarily obnoxious to the allied powers, and the appointment of new ministers, against whom the same objection could not be made.

This explicit declaration had the desired effect; and on the 18th a new ministry was formed, as follows: minister of state, Cevallos; minister of war, prince d'Anglona; marine, Romaratt; justice, Romaniño: the duke of Frias was also to be one of the number.

Although some of the ministers were counsellors of state, there was nothing irregular in their appointment, as the cortes had, on the 25th of January, passed a decree, authorising the nomination of such individuals. But the actual ministers having been apprised of the conversation of Sir William A'Court, and of the king's resolution, caused the above decree to be reversed, through the intervention of such of the cortes as belonged to the masonic party. Thus the projected ministry which was to begin its functions on the 19th, fell to the ground, before it was brought into play.

The king nevertheless persisted in his determination to get rid of the actual ministers; and on the 19th, at one o'clock in the afternoon, he transmitted to the minister of finance, Egea, an order, announcing that all the other ministers were dismissed; and that their functions were to be filled up by the chief secretaries belonging to each department, till their successors were named.

In less than three hours this event was known all over Madrid, without appearing to create any other sentiment than that of curiosity, as to the formation of the new ministry, whose members every one was attempting to guess at. But the free-masons assembled, and the influence of their well regulated hierarchy enabled them to get up an insurrection calculated to keep the power in their own hands. Towards seven o'clock in the evening, small parties composed of individuals of different classes, came from various parts of the town, and assembled in front of the king's palace. Their numbers did not exceed four or five hundred; they were, however, soon joined by about as many indifferent spectators; when they all took their station under the windows of the king's closet.

A few persons attempted to penetrate into the palace; they were however opposed by the guards, who closed the doors against them. About the same time the alarm was sounded; the national militia ran to arms, and took a regular position in front of the palace; the crowd was in some measure dispersed; but those who had received their instructions, still uttered indiscriminately, shouts of "The ministers for ever!" "a regency!" "down with the tyrant!" "we will have his blood!"

About nine o'clock at night, an extraordinary council was convened in the king's ante-chamber, to deliberate on the state of affairs. The municipality of Madrid also sent a deputation to the king, for the purpose of conveying to him a most energetic repre-

sensation, requesting the reinstalment of the ministers; they were joined by a pretended deputation, consisting of about twelve of those who had been shouting in front of the palace. At ten o'clock the king issued a decree, partly annulling the first, inasmuch as it directed, that the ministers should resume their functions *pro tempore*, and that the municipality should cause this measure to be known in order to restore tranquillity.

Thus the king of Spain was virtually declaring that he was not a free agent, and justifying the assertions of the holy alliance. To force upon him this measure (to which he was particularly repugnant, because he flattered himself the new ministers would oppose the removal of the government) it was necessary to persuade him that the whole population of Madrid was in a state of insurrection, and was ready to destroy the palace: so far from this being really the case, the town was generally quiet, and by eleven the crowd had disappeared.

The next day, the 20th, the cortes held their first preparatory junta, previous to the ordinary sessions. A crowd composed of similar elements to the one which had assembled the day before, met in the same tumultuous manner before the hall of the assembly, shouting "*a regency*," and "*the immediate convocation of the extraordinary cortes!*"

The municipality sent a deputation to make a similar request. The reply was, that the meeting of the extraordinary cortes was fixed for the 1st of March, and that the order prescribed by the consti-



tution could not be altered. The mob continued to vociferate for some time, and then went through the same scene in front of the municipal hall. When they had sufficiently indulged in these riotous proceedings, a table was brought, on which was spread a representation to the cortes in favor of a regency. The subscribers, however, were not so numerous as the principal actors in this farce had anticipated; the table and the representation were therefore removed, the crowd dispersed, and tranquillity was restored.

The ministers and the masons made an erroneous speculation, into which they were led by the thirst of command, or by the advice of evil counsellors. In the first place, the downfall of the present ministry must be the inevitable consequence of the scenes of the 19th and 20th; and, moreover, they have strengthened the hands of the holy alliance by justifying its allegations. On the other hand, the comuneros have missed the opportunity of overthrowing and superseding their adversaries. It required no great ingenuity to perceive that the insurrection was got up by the free-masons, and the comuneros could not but be aware of it; they might easily have checked it by organizing a counter-insurrection, but the formality and length of their debates once more threw them in the back ground; and, as I have before mentioned, Ballesteros betrayed them. Meanwhile Spain is all but in a state of anarchy, between

a temporary government and that which is in embryo.

I subjoin two letters on the subject of these events; one from Serrano, and the other from Beltran de Lis.\* The former individual is a man without guile or suspicion, who has not looked beyond the factious assemblage which came immediately under his eyes; the latter has taken a more extensive and correct view of affairs.

The remaining part of the month of February was rather stormy, in consequence of the shock which the ministers themselves had given to government on the 24th. The provincial deputation, at the instigation of the free-masons, made a fresh attempt towards the definitive restoration of the ministers; but the representation addressed to the king on this subject was ineffectual.

While this was going on at Madrid, the ministers pretending that a conspiracy had been got up by the comuneros at Cadiz, sent thither a battalion of the regiment of San Marcial, one of those which had proclaimed the constitution, and was entirely composed of free-masons. This battalion entered Cadiz on the 10th of February, shouting *viva Riego!* It did not meet, however, with a very good reception; and the comuneros, who abound in Cadiz, replied,

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\* Appendix, No. 15 and 16.

by shouts of *viva Padilla!* But the intrigues of the political chief, Gutierrez Acugna, and the troops which he had at his disposal, stifled the expression of public opinion. The ministers withdrew from active service two battalions of infantry, and the battalion of artillery of the national militia. Thus the comuneros were defeated. The object of the ministers in sending to Cadiz troops devoted to their party, was to ensure complete dominion in case they should be compelled to seek a retreat in that city.

The spirit of dissension, which the conduct of the ministry and of the free-masons is calculated to create, has infested the comuneros. Ever since the formation of the masonic ministry, it has been evident that one part of the general assembly of the comuneros was particularly exasperated against the free-masons. This aversion increased with each attack of the ministers upon the comuneros, and with this aversion, which was but too well justified, the enthusiasm of patriotism, and the call for energetic measures against all the enemies of liberty.

The breach which separated the two parties of the comuneros was widened by the events of 19th and 20th of February; and on the 24th a separation was completed. A great number of the comuneros, most of them members of the cortes, or in the pay of government, withdrew; and after two preliminary meetings, constituted themselves into an assembly, under the name of *constitutional comuneros*.

Thus the comuneros are becoming, while on the other hand the free-masons are losing ground in the public opinion. Add to this the formation of other societies of free-masons, of various sects of Carbonaris, &c. and you will have an idea of the anarchy of this unfortunate country.

On the 28th Sir William A'Court transmitted to the Spanish government a fresh proposal, in the shape of an ultimatum, which the French ministers had communicated, or rather suggested to the British ambassador. It is but another aim at making a dupe of the British government, and lulling the apprehensions of Spain, as it must be evident to any one who is at all acquainted with the intentions of the French ministers. However this may be, the proposals in question are as follows:—first, that a term be fixed for the modification of the Spanish constitution, and that the ministers give a proof of their sincerity, by allowing the king the personal enjoyment of his physical liberty, and suffering him to go to his different palaces, or to any place of public resort which he might choose:—secondly, that a general amnesty be granted to all the rebels:—thirdly, that the liberty of the press be checked:—fourthly, that the ministry be changed.

San Miguel replied, that the British ministers were mistaken, if they supposed that a modification were possible; and that it was easier to overthrow the constitution than to alter it.

The same day a council of state presented a list of new ministers for the approbation of the king; this list was as follows. Minister of state, Don Alvaro Florez Estrada; minister of the interior, and temporarily for the colonies, Don Antonio Diaz del Moral; marine, Don Jose Romai; war, Don Jose Torrijos; justice, Don Jose Zorraquin; finance, Don Lorenzo Calvo de Rosas.

On the 1st of March, the cortes opened the ordinary sessions. I shall only mention one passage of the speech from the throne—"I once more pledge myself to co-operate with the national congress, in order to realize the hope conceived by the friends of liberal institutions in Spain, and to use all the means in my power by opposing force to force. My departure and that of the cortes from a town exposed to all the dangers of the war is requisite, to prevent in the operations of the government a delay of which the effects would be felt all over Spain."

It is sufficiently ridiculous to hear the king talk of the necessity of his departure, when it is well known that he refused to quit Madrid, and that he has never retracted his refusal. On the same day the king accepted the resignation of the ministers, enjoining them, however, to continue their functions till they have presented their memorials to the cortes. Those whose names I mentioned were appointed to succeed them.

In consequence of what was written to me by Serrano, and Bertran de Lis, I have again submitted

to the cortes my proposal of the 5th of October last. I have represented to them the danger which threatens Spain, and the misfortunes impending over every one of them. I entreat them to hasten their operations, because time presses, if it is not already too late. I have also written to my other correspondents amongst the cortes. What effect my letters may produce, I know not; but I fear it is a hopeless case.

## LETTER XX.

*Alicante, May 11, 1823.*

I Had told you in my last letter that the royal decree for the formation of the ministry, stipulated that the new ministers should enter into office as soon as their predecessors had presented their memorials to the cortes; an intrigue organized by the party of the free-masons amongst the cortes, has rendered this decree nugatory. On the 3d of March, when the minister of state was preparing to enter into an account of his administration, he was stopped on a motion of the deputy Canga, that subjects of higher importance required the attention of the cortes. Thus the old ministry remains at the head of affairs, and Spain has fourteen ministers; in spite of which she cannot boast of a very brilliant administration. In this state of things, the new ministers, with the exception of Torrijos, sent in their resignations: the king accepted them all, save that of Florez Estrada. He was the more tenacious of his constitutional privileges, that the cortes endeavored to annul them, and he appointed persons to fill up each of the vacant situations.

The cortes and the whole party of free-masons really appear under the influence of madness; every

step which they take seems to be an argument in favor of the holy alliance, and adds to the unsteadiness of the march of affairs. Either they thought themselves strong enough to get rid of the royal authority, and they ought to have done it without loss of time, or else they must have imagined that public opinion required that Ferdinand should remain seated on the constitutional throne, and in that case they should have acted with more caution, and not have thus publicly suspended, or rather destroyed, the most important of the royal prerogatives.

A few days after, the minister, San Miguel, asked Sir William A'Court what were precisely the conditions required by France, in order that they might be communicated to the cortes, if they should request it from the ministers. Sir William repeated what he had said on the 28th of February, and gave him an extract of the note relating to the subject. San Miguel observed, when he received it, that he would not make use of it, unless the cortes questioned him, and determined upon negotiating: the fourth article of the note could not experience any difficulty, since he would not be a party to the transaction.

Meanwhile the ministers took into consideration the terms offered by France. The situation of the ministers, and of their partisans, the free-masons, is rather delicate. They cannot but be aware that the frontiers of Navarre are not in a state of defence, and that Ballesteros has no army to oppose the



French columns which present themselves : but they are restrained by motives of pride, and are ashamed to recant after having assumed so high a tone in their preceding declarations. After having themselves fanned the flame of enthusiasm, and induced the nation to call for a war, they could not make up their mind to declare immediately that the warlike resources of Spain were exhausted. They might have got rid of this difficulty, by retiring and leaving to others the task of retrieving the nation from its present desperate situation. But in the first place they were unwilling that the power should be transferred, and from their party to a rival faction ; and, moreover, they dreaded the moral responsibility, which would necessarily press upon them. On the other hand the retreat of the government to Seville, and under more desperate circumstances to Cadiz, gives them time, to gain which is of equal importance in politics and in war. They reckon that in case the French army should meet with no opposition, it cannot reach Cadiz before the expiration of two months : but if Ballesteros in Arragon, and the kingdom of Valencia, and Morillo in Galicia, should each of them succeed in raising a small army, the French being obliged to meet them with adequate forces, and checked by the troops of Abisbal, and the body of reserve to be established at Cordova, would be still farther delayed ; during such a period many unforeseen events might happen.

The perseverance of the British government in trying to obtain from the cabinet of the Thuilleries a formal avowal of its pretensions, in order that the British ambassador may communicate them to the Spanish ministers, and offer his mediation; the state of public opinion in England, which is highly favorable to the cause of Spain; all concurs in shewing that the Spanish government excites an interest, upon which the ministers think they may depend. The respective positions of England and of France, and their relative interests with regard to Spain, are so widely different; that the Spanish ministers imagine that they can turn this difference to their advantage. There is no doubt, but that if the French government come off victorious in the struggle, its first object will be to re-establish in Spain the influence which the family pact conferred upon France. This influence must necessarily be baneful to England, whose commerce in the Mediterranean it tends to destroy. It will have another effect, viz. that of reducing England to the state of a mere insular and naval power, by precluding her from any direct participation in the continental wars. The confederacy, and political views of the holy alliance, has deprived her of the arena offered to her by Italy and Germany; the tendency of the present war is to deprive her of another field for her armies, viz. of Spain, and perhaps of Portugal. The ministers have repeatedly, it is said, called the attention of the British govern-

ment to these observations; and seem to think, that their representations will not be without effect. It is certain, at least, that they flatter themselves with the idea that England would take a share in the war, if Spain be too hard pressed.

But admitting for a moment that the Spanish ministers are not building castles in the air, they have indisputably committed a great error, in not adopting the plan which I mentioned in my last letter but one, viz. that of opening their ports to foreign trade, and courting commercial relations, by offering to merchants advantages which must in the end have a beneficial result for Spain.

In the present juncture, besides the political motives which should induce the ministers to act in this manner, with England at least, they must feel the propriety of such conduct in a more direct way from the want of money to defray the expenses of the war. The contributions lately received are already spent; the arrears will come in but very slowly; the taxes to be levied in anticipation more slowly still; the loan attempted abroad has been abortive, and at this moment another is not to be thought of. What then must government do? I know but of one remedy, that of levying forced loans upon the great proprietors and the merchants. The former will yield but little money, which will only be obtained by compulsory sales of their goods, because they are all enemies to government. Recourse must therefore be had to the merchants, but commerce must be pro-

tected, since it can only afford supplies out of its profits ; but the commerce of Spain is far from being in this flourishing state, and the extravagance of the financial laws will finally extinguish it.

The enormous duties on articles of foreign manufacture, without regard to the want of industry, and the poverty of Spain, put upon the fair dealer restraints which daily diminish his profit. The quantity of merchandize, which by going through the customs contributes to the public revenue, is insignificant ; and at this moment the customs hardly yield enough in any part of Spain to pay the officers employed in collecting it. Most of the articles of foreign manufacture being introduced into Spain by a system of smuggling, of which Gibraltar is the centre, the custom-house officers who are badly paid, are at little pains to conceal their connivance at the system in question, and are therefore the great supporters of the prohibitory laws, which they enforce in the most vexatious manner in every port. The greatest part of Spain is supplied from this source it is true ; but as it can only be carried on by petty transactions, small dealers alone are concerned in it, and consequently are the only gainers. The system is at all times prejudicial, and most particularly so at this moment ; one of its results is the scanty produce of the customs, which, however, are the only source of revenue left to Spain. Another result is the ruin of commerce on an extensive scale, and the consequent inability of the merchants to afford that assistance,

which under other circumstances, might be expected from them. I cannot but wonder at the ignorance with which the scale of custom duties was drawn up. Losing sight of the maxim, that the surest method of encouraging those who contribute to the revenue by their trade, is to increase as much as possible the profits which that trade may produce ; and forgetting that penalties are of little avail, when temptations are more than adequate; the framer of the revenue laws seems to have limited the profits of the fair dealer, and encouraged roguery, by making penalties insignificant in comparison to the gain upon which the smuggler may calculate.

Another drawback upon commerce, is the exorbitant rate of tonnage dues on all foreign vessels. The Spanish legislature thought, I suppose, that the commercial fleets of Spain were capable of carrying on its own trade, and that of all the world as well. At Alicante, however, where I am now residing, the sad effects of these regulations is but too apparent. The chief article of exportation of this country is barilla, which is collected in the neighbouring districts in great abundance. The storehouses are crammed with it ; and the dealers cannot get rid of it, because no foreign vessel will come to barter for it, as the tonnage dues would absorb the greater part of the profits.

The nature of this situation has not, however, escaped the attention of the members of the administration ; indeed the symptoms were such, that they

could hardly be overlooked. There is a deficiency in the revenue of the customs, and the apprehension of repeated forced loans has spread consternation among the merchants; several have sent their capital out of Spain, others think of leaving it altogether, and of establishing themselves elsewhere. Other seaports are in the same predicament; and the defects of the commercial system produce every where the same painful result.

To remedy these evils, it has been proposed—first, to abolish the extra tonnage dues—secondly, to diminish the duties upon foreign manufactures—thirdly, to allow the free importation of implements of war of every description. In order to diminish the duties, a plan had been thought of, certainly preferable to any other. By a calculation carefully made it had been ascertained that the expense of smuggling amounted at least to twelve per cent. including the insurance. It had consequently been resolved to fix at fifteen per cent. the maximum of the duties claimed by government, it being morally certain that few merchants would indulge in illicit traffic, when they had only a profit of three per cent. against the risk of detection. The provincial deputations were invested with powers authorizing them to adopt such a measure; but indolence and indecision have once more impeded the completion of this laudable scheme; and they are now waiting for a general order to that effect, which will either not come at all, or come too late.

But I now revert to the resolution of the Spanish government, respecting the communication of Sir William A'Court. After mature deliberation the ministers resolved not to accept his proposal. Consequently two days after the conference, that is, on the 11th of March, Mr. San Miguel declared to Sir William A'Court that Spain would not treat with France upon a basis which seemed to admit of the right of interference. He did not venture to mention again the difficulty of proposing a modification, as in fact the suggestions of those who had belonged to the anilleros, and a pamphlet which had been widely circulated in Spain, had produced a singular alteration in the public on that subject.

I shall not stop to discuss the good or bad effects of a modification, violently thrust upon Spain, and which would pave the way for any other inroad upon the constitution. My opinion is, that the French government does not want a modification of any kind, and aims at nothing short of the re-establishment of absolute power; but of this I am certain, if a modification had been proposed, particularly that which I indicated, and which might have been effected by forcing a little the constitution, it would even then have been accepted; it would now be adopted much more readily, but too late to be of any avail.

While this was going on, ministers did not fail to press the king to fix upon a place for the removal of the government. The first intention of the king had been to designate Alicante, not on account of any local

advantage, since the town does not contain a building sufficiently extensive for the court and the ministers, but in the hope of falling sooner into the hands of the enemies of Spain, whom he is himself inviting. In fact, with the French in possession of Old and New Castile, La Mancha, and a French squadron to blockade the port of Alicante, a retreat upon Cadiz would be impracticable. As, however, it was represented to his majesty that the kingdom of Valencia was infested by the rebels who threatened Cuenca, and as the necessity of retreating (in case of a siege) into the citadel situated on the summit of a high rock, was spoken of, he altered his opinion, and named Seville; he refused, however, to fix a day for his departure, saying, that the time was not yet come.

When at length it became necessary to mention a period for commencing the journey, which the ministers urgently requested, the king had a severe attack of the gout, and his physicians objected to the journey, which they pretended would be extremely prejudicial to the health of his majesty.

The ministers laid the circumstance before the cortes, and it was ordered that the bulletin of his majesty's health should be presented every day to the assembly. The first bulletin which appeared was sufficiently alarming; and their progressive tendency clearly shew the wish to exaggerate the situation of the king, in order to prevent, or at least to retard his departure. This intention could not escape the observation of the cortes, and the deputy Rico exclaimed



from the tribune, that there existed a general conspiracy, the focus of which, in his opinion, was in the palace; and that the time was arrived for declaring the king to be under the *physical impossibility of reigning*. This proposition was not seconded, but no deputy spoke against it; which would tend to prove that the majority share the same opinion.

Meanwhile, ministers, in order to put an end to all uncertainty, appointed four other physicians to examine the state of the king's health. In the report which they made, three of them gave their opinion that far from being prejudicial to the health of his majesty, a journey would contribute to its re-establishment. Ministers laid this report before the cortes on the 12th; and on the motion of the deputy Galliano it was submitted to a committee, of which such of the deputies as are medical men became members.

On the 13th, in consequence of the report of the committee, a deputation was sent to the king to request his majesty to fix upon a day before the 18th for his departure from Madrid, in conformity to the decree which had already been rendered, and the words of his majesty contained in the opening speech of the session. The king replied, that he should be ready to quit Madrid on the 17th, if circumstances required it; but that if the cortes were of opinion that there was no absolute necessity for his leaving Madrid before the 20th, he wished his departure to be postponed till that day; he added, however, that if any unforeseen and urgent circumstance impe-

riously demanded it, he should be ready to start even before the 17th.

You are, perhaps, at a loss to imagine why the king has in this instance departed from the plan which he has hitherto adopted, viz. that of pretending to be a prisoner, constantly watched by his gaolers, and obliged to move, or to remain inactive according to their will; for he has certainly given the cortes on the present occasion, an opportunity of showing their regard for the royal person. His motive is to be traced to superstition, but to superstition of a political nature.

The 19th of March, the festival of St. Joseph is remarkable in the annals of Spanish history, by the events which it has witnessed at different times. The king fancied that on that day the party who wished to oppose his departure might rise and prevent it. This is not an idle tale; for a man of great sense, educated out of Spain, distinguished by the importance of the diplomatic situations which he has held, and who has been three times minister, assures me that he entertained the same opinion. He told me seriously that he was fully persuaded that a political movement would take place at Madrid on the 19th. However that may be, the cortes acceded to the wish of the king; and the departure of the court was fixed for the 20th of March.

An anonymous proclamation, addressed to the inhabitants of Madrid, was widely circulated. The prejudicial influence which this removal would have

on the metropolis was pointed out, and the inhabitants were called upon to prevent it. The free-masons imputed it of course to the comuneros, who they say were anxious to oppose the king's journey. This was a falsehood; the comuneros did not disapprove of the removal of the government from the risk of falling into the hands of the enemy, but they maintained, and not without reason, that the execution of the measure was premature; it ought to have been delayed at least till after the invasion, which would only be hastened by the king being dragged like a captive to the extremity of the kingdom. Such at least would be the interpretation put upon the king's removal by the enemies of Spain. In fine, it was discouraging the nation by a measure, which by being adopted before a declaration of war, seemed to announce to the people that all hope of defence was given up. For my own part, I am of opinion that the proclamation emanated from the palace, unless it be admitted, that the ministers themselves circulated it in order to sound the public.

As to the object of the ministers in hurrying the journey, besides the reasons mentioned above, there was another arising out of the circumstances of the moment, and the peculiar position of those who had planned the scheme. It did not escape the ministers, that in spite of their manœuvres they must at length be called upon to read their memorials, and to make way for their successors. They wished, therefore, to hasten the removal, in order to preserve

their influence, or at least that of their party. In furtherance of these views they had despatched on the road to Andalusia troops, of which the chiefs and the officers being all free-masons, are entirely devoted to them. Cadiz was also occupied by troops equally under their influence, and the comuneros were kept in the back ground. Thus whether the seat of the government were transferred to Cadiz, or to Seville, it would be equally under the command of the present ministers, who flattered themselves that if they could not retain their situations, their successors at least would belong to the masonic party.

The day for the departure once fixed upon, they thought of collecting funds to defray the expenses of the journey, and for the payment of the additional escort. The loan had failed by their own fault, in having employed a Spanish house instead of the British merchants, who had offered their assistance; they had drained the provincial chests, and the public coffers were empty. To raise money they had recourse to the following expedient. In the first place, a great part of the king's plate was melted; next, they laid their hands on the sums deposited in the chest of the junta del credito publico, and ended by seizing funds of about two millions of reals, which the agricultural society, called lamesta, had placed in the hands of different bankers of Madrid.

After these financial measures, the ministry and the cortes began to think of providing for the

defence of the state. The administration of Madrid would be left without authorities. Count Abisbal, general-in-chief of the army of reserve, was also invested with the authority of political chief. An extraordinary commission was formed in each province, under the name of *junta auxiliar de defensa*, to which was deferred the authority of the government in every thing relative to defensive measures, the administration, and the right of levying contributions in kind, and even in money. It was also decreed, that when the communication between the capital and the provinces should be interrupted, the *juntas* of defence, and the provincial deputations, should combine the legislative and executive powers. To sum up, it was agreed that in the districts and provinces, which should become the theatre of war, the military chiefs should be invested with the supreme authority.

The 20th, at eight o'clock in the morning, the king and the court left Madrid without the least tumult. A considerable crowd, attracted by curiosity, had assembled near the gate of Toledo, through which it was thought the escort would pass, as it was the direct road; but it made a circuit, and the assemblage quietly dispersed. The ministers and the cortes followed on the 23rd. Besides the guard composed of regular troops, government had provided another, which may certainly be depended upon. A few days before the time fixed for the journey, it was announced that the government officers, and the national guards, willing to accompany

the court and the cortes to Seville, should receive an indemnity of five reals a day, and they were directed to have their names registered in order to be formed into regiments. Not only those whom duty compelled to march, but about two thousand men of the militia volunteers of Madrid enrolled themselves. Among the latter there were many certainly not in want of the pay of five reals, but they were obnoxious to the servile faction, and were not anxious to fall into the hands of the French army; they, therefore, very readily seized the opportunity of joining the military division. Till the month of March, the neighbourhood of Valencia had enjoyed tolerable tranquillity. The factious on account of their weakness, remained on the outskirts of Morella, and on the banks of the Ebro towards Mora, threatened Vinaroz, Benicarlo, Peniscola, and Castellon, without venturing, however, to make an attack; but now we are nearly in the same position as Catalonia.

After the flight of the factious from Huete, Besieres had retreated towards Siguenza and Burgos; the other chiefs after an abortive attempt upon Teruel had separated. Chambo had returned towards Morella, and Ulmann, with very few troops, had made for Arragon. In the early part of March, an individual, of the name of Samper, with the assistance of count Castelar, an inhabitant of Valencia, began recruiting in the mountains of Castellon, a faction, which being joined by Ulmann, amounted to some thousands. On the first intelligence of this insur-

rection the free corps levied by the ex-monk Nebo, known as a chief of Guerrillas, under the name of *el Frayle*, was despatched against Samper. Nebo was soon obliged to retreat upon Valencia, and the troops of Castellon, which had marched to his assistance, also fell back.

On the 10th of March, the factious appeared at Algar; and the 11th they levied on the town of Segorbe a contribution of eight thousand rations of provisions, thirty thousand reals, and a great number of beasts of burden. To protect the town of Valencia on that side, five hundred men had been sent for who were at Jativa (*San Felipe*) and at Carcagente. The other troops of the kingdom of Valencia had joined the army of Abisbal.

This small column being on the 11th near Segorbe, its chiefs, deceived by the false report of an *alcade* announcing that the factious were not more than four hundred, suffered themselves to be attacked. They were soon surrounded; the column was dispersed with the loss of two hundred men, and its two chiefs, one of whom was killed, and the other taken prisoner. On the 12th, the factious were masters of Segorbe, and sent outposts as far as Torres Torres; on the 14th a vanguard of one hundred men appeared before Murviedro.

Upon this intelligence, the colonel of horse artillery, Mugnino, was immediately despatched from Valencia with the second battalion of militia, and a battery to protect Murviedro. Colonel Mugnino kept

his position till the 18th, with his outposts towards Torres Torres. On that day a strong column of the factious moved in that direction, and drove back the advanced posts of the militia. Another column extended itself towards Liria, Helva, and Requena, threatening to attack Valencia, and cut off the retreat of the small body opposed to them. The peasants of the *huerta*, or country, near Valencia, were beginning to rise, and had even arrested already two officers and a few militiamen on the road to Murviedro. Colonel Mugnino determined, therefore, to fall back on Valencia on the 18th, and the same day the factious entered Murviedro. The castle held out against them, and annoyed them by its battery; but on the 19th the veterans composing the garrison revolted, imprisoned the governor and their officers, and opened the gates to the factious.

On the night of the 20th the vanguard of Samper, who had been declared the chief of the factious, with the title of lieutenant-general, appeared in the plains of Valencia. Almost all the peasants, naturally prone to robbery, allured by the hope of plundering the town, joined the rebels, and assisted in the blockade. On the evening of the 26th, Samper having brought two mortars and a few cannon from Murviedro, marched upon Valencia, completely invested it, and made every preparation for the attack. The town had no other garrison than the national militia, a squadron of horse artillery, and about one hundred and fifty cavalry; a great party of the



materiel was outside the walls. The commandant-general, Castellar, was a blockhead, more likely to create confusion than to give proper directions; fortunately the political chief, Abascal, was a man with a cool head, and a stout heart. The materiel was brought into the town; all those who were capable of bearing arms, were armed and disciplined; the ramparts were supplied with cannon; and the sailors, a great number of whom were in town, were employed to man them.

On the 29th and 30th, Samper began his attack on Valencia, by the gates of Serrano and St. Vincent. The contest was kept up with vigor for two days; but the factious having suffered considerably were obliged to retreat. They threw about one hundred shells into the town, but fortunately caused no damage. Meanwhile colonel Bazan, military commandant of the province of Castellon, who had received orders to march to the assistance of Valencia, having assembled about one thousand infantry, most of them Catalonian chasseurs, and two hundred cavalry of the regiment d'Espagne, was advancing upon Murviedro. Upon hearing this, Samper raised the siege of Valencia, and advanced to meet him.

On the 2nd April, colonel Bazan fell in with the factious between Murviedro and Almenara, to the number of six or seven thousand men, with three pieces of cannon. Without giving them time to reconnoitre, he rushed upon them with his cavalry, fol-

lowed closely by the infantry. The cavalry of the factious was overthrown, fell back upon their infantry, which was routed. In less than two hours the factious were dispersed, leaving on the field six hundred dead, and two hundred prisoners. The same day Bazan entered Valencia in triumph.

But things have sadly altered since. On the 5th Bazan left Valencia to return into the province, there to join some troops which he expected from Catalonia, and to attack the factious with greater force, and obtain a more complete victory. Castellar was to accompany him with a few troops as far as Murviedro, to take a position within reach of that town, and protect the movement of Bazan, in order to avoid a second conflict. This was but imperfectly executed. Castellar took his position on the heights of Murviedro, and summoned the garrison of the castle. Bazan marched along the high road, and was consequently in sight of the factious. But Castellar, without waiting till he was beyond the risk of an attack, and without even caring for an answer to his summons, quitted his position, and fell back upon Valencia. Samper caused him to be followed, and watched by a small detachment, and marched with the remainder against Bazan, whom he surrounded. The latter made his dispositions to resist the shock, and ordered his cavalry to charge that of the enemy, which protected a battery that Bazan intended taking, and might have taken. But the same cavalry which had fought so gallantly on the second, being

disheartened by the cowardice of its chief and some of its other officers, suddenly gave way. The infantry advanced in close column, forced the factious to withdraw their guns, and made their way, leaving behind them about two hundred men; most of them, however, returned to Valencia with the cavalry. Bazan carried along by the cavalry, and separated from his infantry, reached the Grao, where he threw himself into a boat which landed him at Vinaroz; there he collected his troops.

On the 10th, Samper again appeared before Valencia, and renewed the siege. But the town was in a better state of defence; there had been time to erect new batteries on the ramparts. The convent of Remedio, as well as the outer park of artillery, and the buildings adjoining the suburbs of Serrano, Quarto, and Rosafa, had been demolished. Provisions had also been procured.

We have just been freed from a pest, which had annoyed this province for several years. The notorious Jayme Alfonso, called *el Barbudo*, a chief of bandits, who generally resided in the mountains of Crevillente, from whence he levied contributions on the provinces of Alicante, Murcia, and Chinchilla, has surrendered. As he fought under the banners of the faith, he took advantage of the amnesty, and presented himself on the 25th of March before the alcade of Junilla. The whole of his band, with the exception of his brother, and some of the most ferocious, have followed his example. He is not without

some merit in his way; he was generous, and never guilty of the wanton effusion of blood. His chief revenue consisted in the contributions which the dread of his name made it easy for him to raise. He had the good sense to spare, and even to protect the inhabitants of the districts in which his head-quarters were established; and the peasants were so much attached to him, that he could always calculate upon agents and signals to warn him of all the measures that were planning against him, and of the approach of any hostile troops. On the 13th of April he arrived at Alicante, where he distributed eight reals to every pauper; his arrival was quite an event. He has obtained permission to raise a body of five hundred men to fight the French. He certainly is not inferior to the generals of the army of the faith.

I have just learnt by letters received from Bilbao, that a small body of French refugees had left that town for Tolosa, with the approval of the government, with the intention of marching on to Irun, and to shew themselves on the banks of the Bidassoa with the tri-coloured flag.

A small number of French officers who had sought a refuge in Spain, had been at Bilbao and St. Sebastian for some time. When the factious infested Biscay, and more particularly since the 7th of July, the political chief of Bilbao took the opportunity of employing those who were near him, and they made themselves useful by fortifying different points. In

the mean time the province raised for its internal defence a company of sharp-shooters, in which the French deserters were admitted, as they began to arrive in greater numbers since the Spanish government had ceased to give them up as in 1821 and 1822.

A short time ago colonel C—— left Madrid, to put himself at their head; and organized besides, apparently with the permission of government, a separate body composed of French and a few Italians, amounting altogether to less than two hundred men. These troops left Bilbao on the 20th of March, to go to Torlosa, and from thence to Irun. They hoisted the tri-coloured flag, and left Bilbao, shouting "*Vive Napoleon II.! vive la liberté, et l'union des peuples!*" amidst the approbation of the patriots, who indulged in the most sanguine hopes. This is certainly an act of devotedness which cannot be too much applauded; but I fear these brave soldiers will be victims of their enthusiasm; and I also fear that those who planned the scheme have been somewhat blinded by ambition.

It is not the first time that the reputation acquired by one or more deeds, sufficiently brilliant in themselves, have been mistaken by vanity for a title to immortal renown, and the most unbounded confidence of the deluded victims whom they have unwittingly led to destruction. Instead of a further comment, I shall content myself with enclosing the copy of a letter which I have written on the subject

to my friend Serrano,\* and which accompanied another, much to the same effect, written to general Zarco del Valle, a general officer, and attached to the ministry. This first step has been followed by others, a short time after a small detachment left Madrid under the same auspices. Colonel F—— has also left Madrid to put himself at the head of this expedition, which might be termed a fool's errand; and on the 7th of April another detachment quitted the metropolis for the same destination, under the order of the chief of battalion A——

We learnt on the 15th of April, that the French army had crossed the Bidassoa, on the 7th in the morning. The small column of the French patriots, and of Italians, having at its head colonel F—— and colonel C—— bravely presented itself on the banks of the Bidassoa near the bridge, which had been partly destroyed. The vanguard of the French army opened a brisk fire of artillery and of musketry upon these deluded victims of a few ambitious men, and shortly killed twenty of them. The Spanish regiment, *Imperial Alexander*, which was in their rear, having been ordered to march to St. Sebastian, faced about, and forsook them. It would have been the height of folly to remain before a whole army with one hundred men: they therefore commenced a retreat, which, the brisk fire kept up by the enemy, rendered very disorderly. Such was the end of an expedition, which

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\* Appendix, No. 17.

was as unfortunate, as might have been anticipated, from the rashness with which it was undertaken.

A short time ago one of my correspondents at Madrid, a Frenchman, and a man of sound judgment, wrote me as follows—"Let us not deceive ourselves; France in its present state is no longer what she was from 1789 to 1796; if, however, she were supported by forces collected under the tri-coloured flag, or if even a few French columns, tolerably strong, and commanded by generals of good reputation, could penetrate into France, I cannot help believing but there would be a spontaneous explosion."

To this I have nothing to add, except that it is the general opinion, that the appearance of the small detachment above-mentioned hastened the invasion. It is given out as certain, that in the council of war, assembled on the 6th, at the head-quarters of the duke D'Angouleme, where the question of the invasion was discussed, the duke decided it, although the artillery appointments were not complete: observing that the revolutionary focus should not be suffered to increase near the frontiers.

This report is not improbable, if it is considered that the departure of a number of Frenchmen from Madrid must have been known, and that this number would not fail to be exaggerated, as is usual in Spain.

We have heard of the arrival of the king in Seville, on the 11th of April. His reception was any thing

but warm ; indeed his entry was more like a funeral procession, than a royal pageant. The troops were under arms, and some few of them shouted *viva Riego!* and still fewer, *viva el rey constitucional!* These shouts were not repeated by the crowd. The cortes and the ministers have likewise arrived at Seville ; and the legislative session was to re-open on the 23rd.

On the 16th the king published a declaration of war ; the ground of which is the invasion of the French army. This declaration, which was solemnly proclaimed in every town, has somewhat roused the public spirit. The organization of the armies has once more been altered. Count Abisbal's army is to be called the third active army ; Morillo's the fourth ; and at Cordova, an army of reserve is forming, which is to be commanded by general Villacampa.

The siege of Valencia still continues. The inhabitants have made two sorties ; one of them was extremely brilliant, and enabled them to take from the factious a piece of cannon, and to procure a fresh supply of provisions and forage. The peasants of the neighbourhood, although abettors of the factious, are, nevertheless, useful to the Valencians ; when they have received their pay they join in the attack ; but as soon as they have spent their money, they come and sell provisions at the gates of the town.

The factious having spread towards Xucar, in order to procure provisions, and given reason to apprehend



movements in their favor in the provinces of Alicante and Murcia, a battalion of the regiment of Navarra of the garrison of Alicante, and the depot of Zamora, were sent towards Alcira; these troops, added to a few volunteers of the province, amounted to fifteen hundred men: but without any superior officers to command them. On the other hand, about five hundred infantry and cavalry, under the orders of colonel Martin, of the cavalry regiment of Espagna, were arriving from Madrid. When the whole of this column had reached Alcira, an attack was decided upon in order to liberate Valencia on that side. Unfortunately colonel Martin was seriously wounded at the beginning of the action; for the want of a proper understanding amongst the other officers, was fatal to this affair. The batalion of Navarra, being abandoned while it was engaging the enemy, was almost entirely destroyed. A few days afterwards a colonel of artillery, Miranda, took the command of the column, and order was restored.

On the 4th of May, an individual was arrested, who was the bearer of letters from Samper to a certain colonel Don Diego Ortiz, one of the old favorites of the queen, mother of Ferdinand the Seventh.—Samper in these letters thanked Ortiz for what he had done, and requested him to persevere; talked of seeing him a few days after at Alicante, and called for fresh proclamations to be obtained from a printer of the name of Miralles. The latter and Ortiz were both arrested: but the authorities having neglected

immediately to seize their papers, these documents were destroyed. Colonel Miranda left his troops to superintend the arrests : the necessity of such a measure I am at a loss to understand.

During his absence, the factious attacked Alcira, while, in the mean time, they were attempting to cross the Xucar lower down. On the 7th, the troops and their officers were struck with a panic, although the enemy had been twice beaten ; and on the 9th, the whole column of Alcira was under the walls of Alicante. On the other hand, the factious had not proceeded farther than Alcira, and had contented themselves with sending outposts to Jativa. Samper had just received intelligence that Ballesteros was retreating upon Valencia, and that he had reached Segorbe on the 7th. He therefore withdrew his troops on the 9th, and dispersed them in different directions. The 10th Ballesteros entered Valencia, having left a division before Murviedro.

Nothing prospers here, nor is likely to prosper under the present authorities. The military commandant, Valdecagnas, is weak almost to imbecility. The polical chief is, in my opinion, a very dangerous man, in spite of his apparent exaltation, which I am willing to believe sincere.

Here we see, on a small scale, what must be the case all over Spain, since so many obscure individuals, fostered by assurance and free-masonry, have taken possession of all the appointments, and obtained an unlimited authority. The people are

oppressed without mercy; and all must bend beneath the sway of these mushroom despots.

Whenever the articles of the constitution have been quoted in opposition to some arbitrary act, the reply of the political chief has been, "*at the present moment my will and pleasure is the constitution.*" The civil authorities are in his favor; the military commandment is a cypher; he, therefore, acts without control. The prisons overflow with village alcades, whom he causes to be arrested, because the peasants are unable to pay their arrears of taxes and the contributions for nine months to come; which at this time of the year cannot be wondered at. Commerce is paralysed by a repetition of forced loans, of which, however, the produce is squandered. To give you an instance of it I shall merely quote the following fact. The number of troops receiving pay amounts only to one thousand two hundred men; the expenses attending the preparation of the artillery and the fortifications are paid. On the 30th of April, the public chest contained upwards of six hundred thousand reals; the 5th of May, a forced loan to the amount of three hundred thousand reals more was paid into it. Would you believe, that on the 11th there did not remain in it enough to pay their soldiers their daily allowance; and the clerks and other civil agents of government have not been paid for these four months.

The departure of the French consul produced a rather curious scene. He had embarked on board

a Swedish vessel bound for Marseilles. The captain had purchased from the cashier, at the treasury, a number of pigs of lead, which had passed through the custom-house, and were publicly shipped. Two days after it was recollected that this lead would be carried to France. A privateer was therefore despatched after the Swede, and the lead and the French consul were brought back. The latter was treated with every respect by the political chief, and is to take his passage by a Spanish vessel. As to the other Frenchmen who have resided here even for a considerable time, they have been put under arrest, and their goods have been sequestered by the political chief, in spite of the opposition of the tribunal armed with the constitution, and the 192d article of the penal code. Even the few French deserters he could lay hold of have been sent to prison.

The cortes have at length issued a decree for the formation of foreign legions; I send you a copy of it,\* that you may judge for yourself. Every thing that I proposed is either disfigured or inverted. Spain is half over-run by a foreign power, and they talk of forming four legions, after having refused to raise one when it was in their power! I am about to quit this place and go to Seville, to try if any thing can be made out of this blundering scheme. In my opinion it is too late to do much good, and foreign

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\* Appendix, No. 18.

troops cannot perform under the Spanish flag what might otherwise be expected from them.

Another reason urges me to take my departure ; affairs are taking here a very bad turn, and the spirit of the inhabitants is materially altered. The first movement of Ballesteros will leave the town unprotected ; and I have no wish to be caught in the trap with the political chief, of whose talents I entertain no very high opinion. The impossibility of travelling by land (the roads being infested by robbers and bands of the factious) obliges me to go by water. The political chief throws difficulties in my way, and talks of the necessity of obtaining an order from the government ; but I am aware of what is to be done, and to-morrow I embark at Torre Vieja, in order to avoid the French cruisers.

## LETTER XXI.

*Gibraltar, August 8, 1823.*

I Have been long without writing to you, not knowing how to find a conveyance for my letters. I am now in a free port, and will make up for my late silence, by giving you an account of the progress of political events in Spain. Do not expect, however, any detail of military operations, with the exception of those which are immediately connected with the movements of the Spanish government ; the others are not worth mentioning, for in every province, save Catalonia, they seem to have consisted in quiet marches, much more like the mimicry of war than its stern reality. Beardless youths, officers whose military school was the drawing-room, and generals whose name is unknown in the annals of war, may boast of the triumphs which gold has purchased, and erect triumphal arches to commemorate them ; but the laurels for which we fought during five-and-twenty years with the Austrians, the Prussians, and the Russians, were rather more dearly bought. I am convinced that the old soldiers were ashamed to follow the banners which victory has forsaken for nearly half a century ; and I am still more firmly persuaded, that if the French army had been opposed by veteran troops of any nation but the Spanish, it would have

met with the same success which signalized the French arms at Ramilies and Rosbach.

My passage was neither speedy nor agreeable ; we suffered both from contrary winds and a boisterous sea, and did not reach Algeiras before the 24th of May. I stopped there a few days to refresh myself, and make a little excursion to Gibraltar, in the hope of obtaining information more to be depended on than what I could learn on the coast.

It was at Gibraltar that I was informed of the treason of Abisbal. I was not so much surprised at it as you might suppose, because I never placed any dependence on the man. It is undeniable, that by his manœuvres he retarded the arrival of the recruits at the divisions which they were to join, and left them without clothing, while the government was at a loss to supply them with arms. The treachery of Abisbal has, however, had a sad effect upon the state of public opinion, and has spread general consternation. The actual loss of men it has occasioned is trifling, since with the exception of a small number of officers, the whole of Abisbal's army remained true to their duty, and left Madrid under the orders of general Casteldosrius. But an event of this kind must always shake the confidence reposed in the leaders. The more than suspicious conduct of Morillo on the 7th of July, is recollected with dismay ; and in addition to this, Villa Campa has been removed from the command of Barcelona, as being in treaty with the adverse party.

When Madrid was evacuated on the 26th of May, a trifling action took place, of which, however, I proceed to give you an account. It had been agreed, that Madrid should be protected by the rear guard of the Spanish army; and consequently, general Zayas remained in the town with one thousand five hundred men. The band of Bessieres, amounting to six thousand men, who preceded the French army, made its entry first; but being kept in awe by the troops of Zayas, they refrained from robbery and murder. But contests soon arose between his soldiers and the factious; shots were exchanged; and finally, Zayas marched against the band of Bessieres, routed it, and expelled it from Madrid, after having killed three hundred men. Shortly after the vanguard of the French arrived, and Zayas fell back upon the main Spanish army.

I embarked for Seville on the 28th of May, but did not arrive before the 31st, in consequence of the current of the Guadalquivir which always impedes the navigation. Large boats are obliged to cast anchor at low water on account of the shallows which abound in that river. I found the whole ministry changed; Florez Estrada, Calvo de Rosas, and Torrijos had been removed. After various alterations the ministers definitively appointed towards the end of May were as follows:—Minister of state, Pando; minister of the interior and of justice, Calatrava; minister of war, Zorraquin; finance, Yandiola; colonies, Vadillo; marine, Capaz. Zorraquin



being with the army of Catalonia, where he acts as chief of Mina's staff. The war department continues to be under the superintendence of general La Barcena, to whom it was entrusted in the early part of May. Shortly after the arrival of Calatrava, the ex-political chief of Valencia, Manzaneres was appointed minister of the interior.

We have received here intelligence respecting the army formerly commanded by Abisbal: it retreated through Estramadura, and is now at Trujillo. On leaving Madrid, this army had taken the positions of Talavera and Aranjuez, in order to retreat along the Tagus. A French column having marched upon Talavera, the Spanish troops who did not expect them, evacuated the place after a slight contest. General Casteldosrius collected his army at the bridge of Arzobispo, where another trifling skirmish took place, and the Spaniards retreated as far as Trujillo. On the side next La Mancha, Seville is protected by little more than one thousand men, under the orders of brigadier Plasencia, whom I have mentioned to you several times before. The remainder of the army of reserve, consisting of eleven battalions and a few squadrons, is scattered in different directions over Andalusia.

The day of my arrival at Seville, the government, with the approval of the cortes, concluded an agreement with general Sir Robert Wilson to the following effect:—Sir Robert Wilson is to raise a body of ten thousand men, a third to be cavalry; he is to

have the rank of lieutenant-general in the Spanish service; he is to appoint his own officers; the discipline of his troops is to be such as he may think proper to establish. The battalions are to be of one thousand men each, and the cavalry regiments of four hundred and fifty, divided into five squadrons. The individuals attached to this corps are to be entitled to retired allowances and pensions for wounds and infirmities, on the same scale as Spanish soldiers.

This agreement necessarily supersedes the formation of other foreign legions. On the other hand, things appear to me too far gone for the completion of Wilson's plan; and Spain, through the stupidity and tergiversation of her ministers, will derive no benefit from either scheme.

I forgot to tell you, that as soon as the defection of Abisbal was heard of at Seville, the ex-minister of war, Lopez Bagnos, had been appointed to succeed him. This is one of these subversions of order which are to be met with no where but in Spain. A major-general of fresh date is going to take the command over the two lieutenant-generals Casteldosrius and Zayas. General L. accompanies him to organize the foreign legion, which is to be attached to the third army. He is not acquainted with the character of Lopez Bagnos; his errand will be fruitless. It is to be lamented, as general L. is capable of rendering the greatest services if he is allowed to act. But on the 7th, news were received from Trujillo;

party spirit and the despicable character of Lopez Bagnos have produced the effects which might have been foreseen. The majority of the army is composed of comuneros; and Lopez Bagnos, who is a fanatical free-mason, cannot bear them. This dislike, and the pride which generally accompanies weakness of mind, caused him to behave with an insufferable degree of haughtiness. He neither assembled the army, nor condescended to shew himself to the troops; he scarcely admitted his officers to his presence. The result was, that the army which the other generals had brought back from Madrid without loss, to the number of fifteen thousand men, is nearly disbanded, and reduced to five thousand.\*

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\* A person attached to the ministry has shewn me a document of a rather curious nature. It is a representation or memorial of colonel F. to the commandant-general of Galicia. In this document colonel F. talks of the abortive attempts of refugees without reputation, and proposes to remedy the evil; he speaks of the solicitation of the Spanish government; of a general and officers sent by him to the army of observation, and boasts of all that he has done for Spain: he concludes by declaring, that if his propositions are not accepted he will disclaim before Europe all public responsibility. Although quixotism is rather out of fashion, it has about it an air of grandeur and of generosity when it is sincere; that is, when it has real merit and modesty for its foundation. Here, however, it naturally provokes a few questions. I know not whom colonel F. attempts to designate as persons without reputation; but he who makes

The day after my arrival at Seville, the militia of the town invited to a banquet the Madrid militia ; and a disturbance ensued. Soldiers of the militia, and individuals of the lower orders, paraded the streets, singing patriotic airs, and forcing every body to join them in shouting "*viva Riego! viva el pueblo Sobrano!*"

The vociferations of the militia soldiers seemed to indicate that the appointment of a regency, a change of ministry, and a reform of the cortes, was the purport of their threats. An unfortunate veteran, who did not shout immediately "*viva Riego!*" was killed, and some citizens were wounded. The house of a deputy to the cortes, a member of the ecclesiastical committee, was broken into, the *papers of the committee destroyed*, and his money and effects stolen. While this was going on, the garrison ran to arms, and by nine o'clock quiet was restored. Both free-masons and comuneros disclaimed any participation in this riot ; the national guard did the

use of such an expression, must be a man whose reputation is undeniably founded on real and important services, not upon exploits of which the celebrity is confined to the spot that witnessed them. Is this really the case with colonel F. ? Why should the eyes of Europe be fixed upon him ? Where is the public responsibility of which he speaks ? It would puzzle most people to answer these questions. The document in question might give rise to enquiries of a more serious and painful nature, from which I willingly refrain.

same, and dismissed from its ranks those who had been guilty of any excess.

I give credit to all these protestations; and really believe that the serviles, and particularly the priesthood, are chargeable with the disturbance.

A fresh tumult was apprehended on the 15th, when an event, which in my opinion has given the last blow to the liberties of Spain, has completely changed the face of affairs.

La Barcena had transferred the charge of the war department to Sanchez Salvador, the same who had caused the dismissal of Riego in 1821; Zarco del Valle still remained at the head of the staff; Villa Campa, who delayed as much as he could the organization of his troops, hardly took the trouble to conceal his opinion.

In a conversation which I had with him, he went so far as to say that there was no patriotism in Spain; and that all that had taken place, and was taking place, was nothing more than a contest for sinecures and riches, in the midst of which an honest man ought to remain neuter. This bias of the chief authorities was not unknown to the public, and every one was awaiting with anxiety their result; when on the 11th in the morning the unwelcome and unexpected intelligence was brought that the French army had passed the defile of Despeguaperros, and was marching upon Cordova. The consternation was universal; and crowds assembled before the hall of the cortes.

In the early part of the sitting, on the motion of the deputy Galliano, the cortes called upon the ministers to give an account of the actual state of the nation, and of the measures which had been taken to insure the safety of the king and of government. On another motion of Arguelles, the sitting was declared permanent, till such time as the measures adopted, or to be adopted, had been carried into execution. The ministers having presented themselves, the minister of war was called upon; the result was as follows.

Brigadier Plasencia being questioned upon the situation and movements of the enemy, stated, that the French concealed their movements by sending to the distance of three or four leagues before them bodies of factious which allowed no one to pass; that the government, however, had ascertained that the French, in order to take possession of Madrid, had divided themselves into three corps: the first had taken the direction of Valladolid; while the second, composed of the guard amounting to six thousand infantry, and three hundred cavalry, was marching upon Madrid; and the third advancing upon Tudella and Soria. It is therefore the opinion of government, that upwards of thirty thousand infantry and seven thousand cavalry have by this time entered Madrid. The central division of the invaders consists only of the forces of Molitor; the troops which have entered Catalonia, under the orders of marshal Moncey, and which have concentrated themselves

at Manresa, amount to about twenty-five thousand men. The government has, therefore, reason to believe that the French troops upon the Spanish territory consist of seventy thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry. The division which entered Madrid was subdivided into three columns; the column on the right amounting at first to three thousand men, marched upon Talavera, where on the 4th of June it received an accession of five thousand men; it then advanced upon the bridge of the Arzobispo, which it crossed, and Lopez Bagnos retreated towards the Guadiana. The central column, consisting of the royal guard, marched at first towards Aranjuez, and from thence to Manzanares, and Valdepegnas; it is not known whether they have turned the position of Despegnaperros.

It is presumed that Plasencia is in La Mancha with seven hundred men; but all that the government knows for a certainty is contained in a report of the commanding officer of the cavalry regiment of Santiago. In this report, dated Baylen, 8th instant, he announces the affair of Vasillo; states that there is only a body of five hundred French cavalry at St. Elena, and that he had retreated first to Carolina, and thence to Andujar, where he is waiting for orders.

The government not having at its disposal any battalion of regular troops, was obliged to send a second battalion of the regiment of America, composed of conscripts. Brigadier Plasencia judging his pre-

sence necessary at Almagro, to keep in awe the factious chief, called Locho, had led the two battalions from the heights of Vasillo. The government reminds the cortes, that the army of reserve consists only of eleven battalions; the only veterans amongst which, are the skeletons lately filled up by recruits, and which as yet are neither clothed nor equipped: it is, therefore, necessary to send a corps of reserve to Cordova; but the want of means has prevented the possibility of sending there a single battalion.

The cortes have assisted the government as much as it was in their power; but the provincial deputations, notwithstanding their good intentions, have not been able to furnish their quota. Thus government has found it impossible to carry into effect the measures which had been determined upon.

Is it possible not to be struck with dismay in perusing this mutilated and perplexed account, of which the obscurity is so evidently intentional! The apparent ignorance of the government, respecting what is actually taking place on its own territory, almost exceeds the ordinary limits of indolence and stupidity. On reflecting upon such a document, one is naturally led to conclude that there must be treachery somewhere; and the name of Sanchez Salvador, which is coupled with it, strengthens the presumption.

The ministers having been next called upon to state what measures had been provided for the safety of the king and of the national representatives, the



minister of the interior replied, that as soon as the government had foreseen that the French might penetrate into Andalusia, a council of generals had been called together, in order to deliberate whether it were possible to stem the progress of the invasion, and in order to decide on the most eligible place of retreat. The result of the deliberation had been, that the invasion of Andalusia could not be prevented; and that the most eligible place of retreat for the government was the Isla Gaditana. A report had been made on the subject to the king, who had referred the matter to the council of state. The latter approved of the proposed retreat, but considered Algesiras as the most advantageous spot. The king had not as yet made his choice.

After having heard these two reports, the deputy Galiano observed, that under similar circumstances the cortes ought to address immediately the king; and proposed that a deputation should forthwith proceed to the palace in order to prevail upon his majesty to quit Seville with his family. Arguellez further proposed, that the king should fix his departure for the next day, and name the Isla Gaditana for his retreat. The deputies were chosen, and proceeded to the palace. When they had returned, general Valdes who had presided the deputation, made the following report: having presented himself to the king, stated to him the object of his mission, and the motives which rendered necessary the removal of the government to the Isla Gaditana, his

majesty replied, that his conscience and the welfare of his subjects did not allow of such a removal, though as an individual he had no objection to it. General Valdes having urged that his majesty's conscience ought not to be alarmed, since if he erred as an individual, as a constitutional king he was perfectly free from any responsibility, his majesty replied, "*I have said.*"

It must be evident, that by this answer the cortes were thrown into an equivocal and feverish situation, to which it was essential to put a speedy end, as Seville might be invested within three or four days. Politically speaking there were two methods of obtaining the solution of the problem—I mean the removal of the king and of the government to Cadiz. The first of these methods was to get up an insurrection, in order to frighten the king, and make him comply with the wish of the cortes. The well known character of Ferdinand ensured its success; and it would have been far more justifiable to have recourse to such an engine, for the purpose of rescuing the government from the hands of the enemy, and procuring a chance of advantageous terms of negotiation, than for the paltry object to which it was applied on the 19th of February, that of keeping a few individuals in their ministerial seats. The second method was a violent one, and would at once have severed the gordian knot, by deciding whether Spain was or was not to be free—it was to declare the throne vacant, from the moral incapacity of the king, and to

appoint a regency, till Spain, freed from her invaders, could decide upon the succession of the present dynasty, or the choice of another.

The members of the cortes were divided in their opinions ; and during the interval which elapsed between the departure and the return of the deputation, small parties of them were discussing in the hall, or at its entrance, on the measures to be adopted, in case of the king's refusal, which every one surmised.

The most distinguished of the patriots not belonging to the legislative body, went to make representations to the cortes ; I went with them. But several of the deputies refused to listen to the proposal of energetic measures, and pretended that nothing should be ventured upon beyond remonstrances to the king. This was a sure method of preventing a removal ; and these deputies, at the head of whom was Falco, by remaining at Seville, proved that such was their object. Other members were for taking decisive steps, and in my opinion it was the safest plan ; for, if the Spaniards are once more to bow the neck to despotism, the deposition of the king can add nothing to the fate which awaits them ; *moderados* or *exaltados*, Ferdinand VII. will have them all hanged if he can. The herd of wretches, called the *belly*,\* were anxious to run away,

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\* French metaphor; those who always vote with ministers of any party.

but trembled at the idea of a generous determination. Those who wished the deposition of the king, might have succeeded, if they had hazarded the proposition. The opposition of the deputies, who may strictly be called royalists, would have been but weak, and the opinion of the armed patriots who had flocked to Seville from Madrid, and other towns of Spain, was so decided, that passive members of the cortes would have sided with the stronger party. This was represented to the chief patriotic members. Many of them rated too high the obstacles likely to be opposed by their colleagues, and were inclined to steer a middle course. They pretended that too violent a transition ought not to be hazarded at this moment, and that a temporary regency would be the best expedient to prepare the public opinion. This is the worst plan that could be hit upon; a regency of three days, or one of three years, is still a regency: the very thing which would best please the holy alliance.

As to preparing the public opinion, it was a strange time to think of such a thing, when most of the provinces were a prey to the invaders. In the desperate situation of Spain, violent remedies alone can do any good; protracting the crisis is leading her to irretrievable ruin; a violent shock must be given to public opinion to produce a decided result of some kind. All this was urged in vain: the cortes were moved, but not convinced.

When the deputation sent to the king had returned, the deputy Galiano ascended the tribune,

and submitted that in consequence of the obstinate refusal of the king, it was fit that he should be declared to be in a state of moral incapacity, and that in conformity to the one hundred and eighty-seventh article of the constitution, a temporary regency should be appointed, to exercise the functions of the executive power *during the removal only*. A few voices were for an absolute regency, and the debate became animated. Arguellez took possession of the tribune, and his fatal eloquence has sealed the doom of Spain.

On the proposal of the deputy Infante, the motion of Galiano was approved, and a committee was appointed to designate the members of the regency. The committee proposed the deputy Don Cayetano Valdes, and the counsellors of state, Don Gabriel Ciscar and Don Gaspard Vigodet. The cortes gave their approval, and the same evening the regency entered upon its functions.

During the interval which had occurred, the cortes rendered several decrees, the most important of which was that the militia of Seville if willing to follow the government, should receive the same indemnities as the Madrid militia.

The evening of the 11th there was something like a conspiracy in the palace, an attempt to carry off the king, but which from want of external support fell to the ground. It ended, however, in the arrest of a dozen individuals, among whom was

general Downie, who belongs to the king's household. The particulars have not transpired; but in my opinion the attempt was only talked of; it is hardly to be supposed that men in their senses would think of putting it into execution.

Suspecting what would take place at Seville, after the departure of the king, which was to be on the 12th in the afternoon, I determined to leave the town in the morning. I was aware of the difficult navigation of the river, and while some were looking out for large boats to contain their luggage and furniture, I selected a small one, in order not to be detained by the shallows, and fall into the hands of the factious, who could not fail to make their appearance on the 13th at the latest. I therefore embarked at twelve o'clock, with two deputies and their families; we arrived the next day about the same hour at San Lucar, and the same evening we made the port of St. Mary: the morning of the 14th we were in the walls of Cadiz.

The king, the regency, and the ministers, left Seville by land, under the escort of the troops. The deputies of the cortes who had not closed till before six in the evening the sitting of the 11th, came to San Lucar in the steam boat. My surmise was justified by the event: on the 13th the villages bordering the river, and especially Coria, were in a state of insurrection. Several boats detained in the shallows (and amongst others those carrying the effects of the

deputies and of the minister of foreign affairs) were plundered; some individuals were killed in the fray, and others wounded.

The 15th at four o'clock in the afternoon, the king made his entry into Cadiz, where he met with a cool reception; and the ephemeral regency ceased its functions.

The British ambassador remained in the first instance at Seville, from thence he went to San Lucar. After a few days, and when the blockade was already completed, the ministers wrote to invite him to come and take his residence near the king, who was in full possession of his constitutional authority. Sir W. A'Court replied, that he had not received official information of the dissolution of the regency. It had, however, been forwarded to him on the 15th, and I witnessed myself the departure of the courier who was the bearer of it. It was afterwards ascertained that the despatches did not reach their destination; the courier was thrown into prison, but he has since been released. Sir W. A'Court remained at San Lucar till the 15th, when he left it for Gibraltar, by order of his government.

Immediately after the departure of the government from Seville, the inhabitants of the suburb of Triana, who to say the truth are no better than a swarm of ruffians, rushed tumultuously towards the town. They joined the serviles, who had also taken arms; and these worthy confederates ran through

the streets plundering the houses of the patriots, and committing all sorts of horrors.

The most sanguinary among these wretches were the monks, who were inciting the others to murder with all their might ; fortunately their associates found it more their interest to rob than to kill. The hall of the cortes, the theatre, and the coffee-house of the patriots were demolished. The banditti then went to the building, formerly belonging to the inquisition, expecting to find in it a considerable amount of money belonging to the government. There was a magazine of powder in the vaults ; the plunderers while running in every direction with torches, set fire to it, and above two hundred of the wretches were killed by the explosion. What is more to be lamented, several houses in the neighbourhood were thrown down ; and amongst other victims of the disaster, are the wife and two daughters of a member of the cortes.

General Lopez Bagnos who had been apprised on the 14th of the removal of the government, and of what had taken place at Seville, hastened his retreat, for fear of being intercepted by the French column, which was advancing by way of Cordova. After forced marches on the 14th and 15th, he arrived early in the morning of the 16th before Seville. He found the factious in possession of the suburbs of Triana, and protected by two pieces of cannon placed at the end of the bridge ; the left bank of the Guadalquivir was also covered with their troops. The



two companies composing the vanguard of Lopez, supported by the cavalry, crossed the suburb, and carried the bridge in gallant style. The factious retreated into the town, and endeavored to defend themselves; but the remainder of the infantry of Lopez Bagnos came up; the place was carried, the cannon taken, and the rebels dislodged; the cavalry pursued them on the road of Cordova. General Lopez Bagnos imposed upon the chapter and clergy of Seville a contribution of one million of reals, and twenty thousand pairs of shoes. But the movement of the French columns on Jerez, and through Estremadura, not allowing him to remain long at Seville, he left that town on the 18th. Having sent a strong detachment into the county of Niebla, and supposing that he would be able to make directly for Cadiz, he took the direction of Huelva, in order to embark there with three thousand men and twenty-two pieces of cannon.

On the night of the 17th, the temporary minister of war, Sanchez Salvador, cut his throat with a razor. On his table were found the next morning a sealed letter addressed to the king, and an open note.

The letter, which ought to have been read before a commission of the cortes, contained no doubt important revelations; but it was taken out of the way, probably by Zarco del Valle. The deputies who knew of its existence, and were bound to enquire into the subject, had the weakness or the

carelessness to omit it. The substance of the note was, that finding existence intolerable, he had resolved to put an end to it by his own hands; and that for the consolation of his family and friends he declared that he descended into the tomb without having to reproach himself with a crime.

The political career of Sanchez Salvador; his utter aversion to the constitution; the unforeseen invasion of Andalusia; the events of Seville; are so many stains upon his memory, which, however, his particular opinions did not show him under the same light. It is more than probable that dreading investigations, and other necessary consequences of the trial of the individuals at Cadiz, he put an end to his existence, in order not to undo those by whom he had been himself undone.

The French troops appeared before Cadiz on the 17th; they were the column of Cordova, made up chiefly from the royal guard. This column occupied the Puerta St. Maria, Puerto Real, and the positions facing the bridge of Zuazo. The naval division has also made a nearer approach, and the blockade is completed by sea and by land. General Lopez Bagnos arrived on the 19th at Huelva.

On a false report of the approach of the French, terror seized the general and his staff, and soon spread among the troops. All ran to the coast in search of boats to embark; but the least frightened, and among others the chief commissary, requested of the quarter-master-general to give his orders for

the embarkation, and establish some degree of regularity; "do as you can," was the only answer that could be obtained from him. Three hundred men who could find no room in the larger boats went over to a small island; the twenty-two pieces of cannon were left behind, as well as their caissons, and the division sailed for Cadiz. Fortunately the wind was westerly, and the French squadron was cruising to windward. The French troops did not enter Huelva before the 23rd, when the military commandant made his retreat with as many regular troops and armed men as he could collect in the interior of the province where he carries on the war.

Cadiz is in an excellent state of defence. All the works of the Isla de Leon and of Caracca have been repaired, or are repairing with the utmost activity. The head of the bridge of Zuazo has been strengthened. New batteries have been erected at the mouth of the river Santi Petri, and on other spots. All these works are protected by artillery of the best description; the ramparts of Cadiz, in fact, are supplied with more artillery than they require; and there are a hundred guns besides in the arsenal. An order has been issued for the arming of fifty gun-boats to protect the mouth of the river Santi Petri, the canals which join it and the bay; but the want of funds will, I fear, delay the execution of this decree.

There is plenty of ammunition at Cadiz; there is no scarcity of provisions; and even since the occupation of Chiclana by the French, vegetables and fruits

have been brought by land. It will be impossible for the French cruisers to prevent the arrival of provisions from Gibraltar and the coast of Africa, when high winds necessarily disturb the regularity of the line of observation. At all events boats of two hundred tons can always come unmolested up Santi Petri; as the shallows and rocks by which its mouth is protected preclude its navigation by larger vessels.

The French, it is true, are preparing small craft at San Lucar, and have got possession of Conil; but although they may occasionally intercept the supplies destined for Cadiz, they can never reduce the place by famine.

The garrison of the Isla de Leon and of Cadiz, consists of seven or eight thousand soldiers of the line, and six thousand men of the militia of Cadiz, Seville, and other commercial towns. The regular troops are animated by a proper spirit; but the militia, composed of persons who have taken an active part in the revolution, are rather too violent.

The army at the Isla de Leon was at first under the orders of the ex-regent, lieutenant-general Vigodet. The 10th of July, he was succeeded by major-general Burriel. The marines were put under the orders of general Valdes, who was also appointed commandant of the province and political chief. The artillery was confided to general Alava.

In order to give effect to these arrangements, the cortes had authorised the government to employ

deputies; and, in fact, most of those who were military joined the army. The political affairs do not, in my opinion, present so cheering an aspect, notwithstanding the excellent spirit of the city of Cadiz. The cortes are losing their time in passing decrees of little or no importance, which may have their use in times of tranquillity, but are now worse than idle, at a moment when the object of the Spanish legislators should be to repel the danger which presses upon them, and not to waste their hours on forms of administration, which can be of no service if the administration is overthrown.

The cortes do not seem to think it necessary to watch the government; and the advice of the patriots respecting it is entirely thrown away upon them. I have myself had some serious conversation with several deputies on this subject, but all I could get from them was: "It cannot be"—"They will never dare." In my opinion the composition of the ministry could not be worse; it is precisely what the anti-constitutional party could wish. *Calatrava* is too well known by his conduct in the former administration, and by his defence of the *anilleros*, to make it necessary to enter into particulars respecting him. *Yandiola* is clever, cunning, and treacherous in his political conduct; and having most talent is the most dangerous of all. *La Puente*, a colonel of artillery, who was appointed minister of war on the 20th of June, and who is son-in-law to the notorious general Campana, whose two daughters he married

in succession, is to me exceedingly suspicious. All the patriots are of the same opinion; and La Puente is detested at Cadiz. *Manzanares* arrived towards the end of June; and I have also been compelled to alter the opinion I entertained of him. Since he is minister, his language is quite different to what it previously had been, and he now inveighs against the exaltados, his former companions.

Such are the four leading ministers; and, properly speaking, those upon whom every thing depends. Their expenditure is as lavish as that of the former administration. The funds disappear as soon as they have been deposited into the public chest; and no one is paid; the troops even are stinted. To my certain knowledge, when the treasury was empty, and the troops without pay, the minister of finance had funds at a banker's, where any orders he chose to send were duly paid.

The public voice charges the chief masonic lodge with having deposited at Gibraltar twenty millions of reals, in reserve for the dignitaries of the order.

On the 23rd of June, the ministers laid before the cortes a series of laws of exception to the number of fifteen; the tendency of which was to give them a dictatorial power over the nation. In a word, their adoption would have caused in the constitution a modification of much greater importance than any that had been proposed. A committee appointed by the cortes reduced them to four laws, which were passed in the sitting of the 30th. The first which

virtually abrogates the protection hitherto afforded to refugees, invests the ministers, and all the civil and military chiefs, with the power of exiling any foreigner, whom they may be pleased to consider as a suspicious character. The second authorises the ministers and the generals to supersede and replace all subaltern authorities; to suppress civil and religious congregations; to arrest and throw into prison, without any preliminary forms, any citizen whatever; and to make such requisitions, and levy such contributions, as they may think fit. The third law deprives of their civil right all Spaniards who join the ranks of the enemy, in addition to the penalties already provided by the law. The fourth orders the suspension of all patriotic assemblies.

The second and fourth of these laws contain all that the ministers really wish. The writers in their pay have renewed for some time their attacks upon the comuneros by accusing them of republicanism. In order to pursue their plans without interruption, the ministers want to get rid of the comuneros, who have sought an asylum in Cadiz; they want to prevent meetings where their conduct would be censured; and to wrest from their rivals the authority which they may still retain in the provinces. Their first proceeding, therefore, after the passing of these laws, was to cause the arrest of the comuneros, who had not time to make their escape from Cadiz; the ministers know that they have nothing to fear

from the free-masons, some of whom are bought over, while the others are blinded by party spirit.

Even Riego is hateful to the ministers, who wished to get rid of him by appointing him second in command under Ballesteros; they know well that the schism which the relative situation of the two generals must necessarily create, will cause the ruin of Riego; if, however, he is not taken prisoner before he can reach head-quarters. Riego had requested that a small body of troops should be confided to him, and that he should be authorised to levy troops in Andalusia, where his name was so popular. Several of the Cadiz patriots, many of the foreign refugees, and myself, amongst others, would have spontaneously joined him. This was not the intention of the ministers; they refused the request of Riego, who on his side declined the command intended for him. This caused a sharp correspondence, in which La Puente had the impudence to write to Riego, that he belied the expectations of his country. The wretch! were these expectations fulfilled by his father-in-law, Campana, when he shed the blood of the inhabitants of Cadiz the 11th of March, 1820?

Riego counts among his enemies all those who are instigated by ambition and thirst of power; and the very qualities which ought to conciliate the general esteem and affection, inflame the spite and jealousy of every mean and venal spirit. His mildness, his modesty, his generosity, his inflexible integrity,



and above all, his affability, which make him the idol of the nation, annoy and irritate those who wish to emulate him, without being able to stand the comparison. To his face they flatter him; in public they accuse him; and behind his back they slander him. Pretending not to know that he is absolutely inaccessible to ambition, they try to insinuate that his object is to put himself at the head of the nation. He might reply without presumption—"I should be there, if I wished it; and my not being there, is the best proof that I never wished it." But the wretches will accomplish his ruin; his unsuspecting nature will lead him into the snares laid for him by perfidy and treason; I told him so at Cadiz;—I repeated it in a letter written from Algesiras before I left Spain; but fate pursues him. He says himself that he had determined upon the sacrifice of his life ever since the 1st of January, 1820, and that henceforth it belongs no more to him but to his country.\*

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\* Riego fell some time after into the hands of the royalists, through the treachery of Ballesteros. He was at first conducted to the French head-quarters, and it was anticipated that he would be treated like the other Spanish prisoners of war. All those who had the least spark of honorable feeling, fondly hoped that the honor and generosity which till then had characterised the leaders of the French army, would save Riego from the hands of his executioners. But those who had not blushed to fight by the side of ruffians such as Misas, Mosen Anton, Caragol, &c. gave up their prisoner to the faction, whose blood-thirsty vengeance they came to second. Riego, condemned upon grounds

As early as the 20th of June Zayas had been appointed commander-in-chief of the army, formerly under the orders of Villa Campa. The same day he went to join it with a body of cavalry by the road of Chiclana, of which the French were not then in possession. General Zayas went first to San Roque, near Gibraltar; and general Villa Campa having transferred to him some cavalry, which was under his orders at Gaucin, he went on to Malaga, to organise the troops which are stationed there. There has been no military operation near Cadiz, with the exception of a general reconnoitring on the 26th of June, by order of general Vigodet.

On the 6th of July, we received news from Ballesteros. I shall first speak according to the account

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which ought rather to have saved his life, perished on the scaffold, after having experienced the barbarous treatment, of which ferocious and ignorant fanaticism alone is capable; nor was the vengeance of his fiends satisfied till they had insulted his lifeless remains. Let us draw the veil over this scene of horror, which has completed the misfortunes and degradation of Spain, and damned to everlasting infamy the hand which sealed at once the doom of Riego and the Spanish nation. It has even affixed a stain on the name of those soldiers who were enjoined to witness the deed; as if its authors had been desirous of pressing them into the service of ignominy. The sacrifice of Riego is one of the most atrocious political crimes of which history preserves the memory; his murderers can only be compared to tigers, since they shed his blood for no assignable cause, but the pleasure of shedding it.

contained in his official report. On the 10th of May, as I previously mentioned, he appeared before Valencia, but did not think of besieging Murviedro before the 3d of June. The 4th, he took possession of the suburb; the 9th, a battery was established to open a breach on the 10th. But on that day, intelligence was brought that the division of Molitor, and the factious of Samper were beyond Segorbe. Neither I nor any one else can explain how the Spanish troops could be ignorant of the march of the French army till it was within five leagues of them. However that may be, Ballesteros fell back between Murviedro and Foyas. On the 4th, he crossed the Guadalaviar, and retreated as far as Valencia; Molitor arrived at Murviedro. On the 12th, Ballesteros crossed the Xucar, preceded by the baggage and the families emigrating from Valencia. The 13th, he took up a fresh position on the heights of Jativa, having left a small rear guard at Alcira. The latter troops were driven back by the French who engaged a skirmish with the cavalry sent against them by Ballesteros, and afterwards retreated beyond the Xucar.

The 16th Ballesteros came to Alcoy, from whence he sent his artillery to Alicante. He was to continue his movement upon Grenada, and it was expected that he would join general Zayas, and by marching in concert with him upon Medina Sidonia, Arcos, and Jerez, compel the French to raise the seige of Cadiz. Ballesteros has twelve thousand men, and

Zayas will have three or four thousand. The anticipated junction was effected; on the 27th, Ballesteros was at Grenada, and on the 3rd of July, Zayas also arrived there from Malaga.

After having given you Ballesteros' own account of these movements, it is but fair that I should acquaint you with what I learnt, partly through the medium of private correspondence, and partly from the verbal narrative of an inhabitant of Alicante, on whose veracity I can depend.

The militia volunteers of Valencia had alone gallantly defended the town for a whole month; they had sustained a brisk bombardment, and suffered without a murmur a severe want of provisions. The first mark of satisfaction, which Ballesteros on his arrival bestowed on these brave men for their noble conduct, was to disband them. He next exacted from the town a contribution of twenty millions of reals, an exorbitant quantity of clothing, and sixty thousand sacks of earth, for the siege of Murviedro, which he was to undertake on a gigantic scale, like that of all idle schemes. He also levied a contribution of seven millions of reals upon the province of Castellon. He then proceeded to take up his positions before Murviedro; he established a wide circumvallation, posted strong batteries, and dug trenches, which he covered with the artillery of Valencia, but without firing a single gun. The five hundred wretches, a collection of peasants and bandits, whom Samper had left at Murviedro, fled from

the suburb on the arrival of Ballesteros, and repeatedly begged to capitulate, stipulating only for their lives. Ballesteros persisted in refusing to grant it; at length the postmaster of Valencia brought the official gazette of Madrid, announcing the march of Molitor upon Valencia. Ballesteros ordered the man to be shot, and he would have seen his order carried into execution, had it not been for the serious remonstrances of general Balanzat, and the political chief Abascal. He then sent out a reconnoitring party of thirty men, with orders to push on as far as Segorbe. This detachment fell in about mid-way with Molitor's vanguard, was fired upon by a whole regiment, and nineteen men were killed.

The army of Ballesteros, amounting to fifteen thousand men, loudly called upon him to lead them to battle. He refused to do it; and left behind him at Murviedro his heavy artillery, his stores and ammunition. He traversed the province of Valencia, dismantling every fortification on his way; he sent on his light artillery towards Alicante, but having soon left it unprotected, it fell into the hands of the enemy. What dependence after that can be placed on such a man?

On the 15th of July, the newly-appointed general Burriel wishing to signalise the opening of his career, resolved to attempt an expedition, which has since been called a reconnoitring excursion; the object in view was to surround the French troops stationed at Chiclana. This operation required secrecy,

which was so remarkably well observed, that in the afternoon the officers were talking of the expedition in the coffee-houses and on the public place; nevertheless it took place on the 16th, when the troops were divided into four columns. The first headed by colonel Gutierrez Acugna, amounted to six hundred men, most of them belonging to the Madrid militia; they were directed upon Chiclana, and supported by four gun boats. The second column, amounting to two thousand five hundred infantry and two hundred cavalry, left Cadiz by the bridge of Zuazo, under the orders of general Espinosa. This column broke into two divisions; colonel Casano at the head of five hundred foot and twenty horse marched upon Chiclana over the Arecife;\* while general Espinosa bearing to the left, protected this movement with the other division. The third column, composed of four companies, under the orders of colonel Golfin, took the road to which leads la Carracca in order to harass the enemy. The fourth, consisting of one thousand men, commanded by general O'Daly, left the Trocadero under the protection of four gun boats, to make a false attack on Puerto Real.

The division of colonel Casano crossed the Arecife; but, as might naturally be expected, the defile beyond was protected by two pieces of cannon. These being loaded with grape shot did murderous execu-

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\* A strong embankment.

tion on the Spanish troops. Casano was mortally wounded; the column was thrown into confusion, and fled in disorder beyond the Arecife. At this moment the column of Guttierrez Acugna attacked the wood which covers Chiclana on the same side. This was the moment for calling into action the two battalions of reserve, and renewing the attack by the Arecife. General Burriel neglected it, and contented himself with keeping up a useless fire. The French sent reinforcements to Chiclana, and the column of Acugna was obliged to retreat. The retreat was made in good order, and the Madrid militia gave great proofs of courage. This column would, however, have been intercepted by the French cavalry, when fortunately two volleys of grape shot from two gun boats effectually stopped the pursuers, and the retreat was completed. The column of O'Daly pushed nearly as far as Puerto Real, and the Madrid volunteers gave proofs of equal intrepidity. By twelve o'clock at noon all the troops had returned. The Spaniards had lost about two hundred men, and the French *it is said* five hundred.

All was tolerably quiet till the 25th of July, save the firing of the batteries. Several boats loaded with provisions came up the river Santi Petri; indeed I am assured that Cadiz is supplied in that way for six months at least; there is, therefore, little apprehension of the town being reduced by force or famine. But I fear that the only safeguard against treachery is the number of persons more or less

obnoxious to the royalists, who are shut up in Cadiz. When, however, I consider of what men the ministry and part of the cortes are composed—when I consider the political puritanism of some of the patriots, and the credulity of others, I am indeed disheartened.

The fate of Spain seems to be hastening to a consummation. On the 30th of June, three deputies of the junta of Galicia came with the English steamboat of Mr. Doyle. They were sent in order to lay before the government their motives for suspecting the treachery of Morillo, and to request that he might be superseded. The ministers gave an evasive answer. Manzanares, who spoke to me on the subject, seemed but little anxious to take it up. We have heard since that the treachery of Morillo has been consummated. But which is most guilty, Morillo, or those who knowing the man, entrusted him with the command?

In this state of things it was no longer safe for a foreigner to remain in Cadiz; we were placed in an invidious situation, appearing to be an obstacle to the intended negotiations.

On the 26th of July, the ministers went even so far as to forbid the Spanish consul at Gibraltar to give passports to foreigners desirous of coming to Cadiz, or of joining the Spanish armies. I therefore determined on making my exit; my intention was to sail for England. English vessels were not wanting in the port of Cadiz; but I found upon enquiry



that on the 15th of July the French admiral had given notice that neutral ships should not be allowed to leave the town with passengers. I therefore went to the river Santi Petri, where I threw myself into a smuggling boat which had brought provisions into Cadiz; I fortunately escaped the French cruisers, and landed safely at Algeiras. I remained there for some days on quarantine, and then passed on to Gibraltar.

Here I have been informed of the proceedings of Ballesteros. Instead of performing with his fifteen or sixteen thousand men a manœuvre which would have compelled the French to raise the siege of Cadiz, and which the long residence of Molitor gave him full leisure to put into execution, he remained inactive at Grenada. Neither the remonstrances of general L. who had left Cadiz with general Zayas, nor those of the latter, could prevail upon him to begin active operations.

The government appointed him generalissimo, and requested him to make a movement, but all to no purpose; it is plain that he is negotiating the price of his defection. General Zayas, although far from being an enthusiast in the constitutional cause, has conducted himself very well. It is said, however, that ministers have superseded him, and appointed as his successor Riego, whom they have determined to implicate with Ballesteros. Mina is, therefore, henceforth the only prop of the constitutional cause in Spain; and the defence that he can make depends on

the political spirit of Catalonia, to the resources of which he is limited.

In spite of the advantages obtained by Milans and Llobera over marshal Moncey, in spite of the firmness and decisive character of the gallant Rotten, and the just reliance which all the patriots place on Mina, I fear that he will not be able to protract his defence. His army, enfeebled by the usual chances of war, and the necessity of supplying with garri-sons the places susceptible of defence, will not be able to keep the field much longer. The defection of Ballesteros will leave the division of Molitor unchecked; so that the forces of the enemy will increase in the same proportion as those of Mina diminish. He will, therefore, be shortly deprived of every resource, save that of falling with honor, the last and only consolation of a great mind in the general disaster.

What I have just written gives birth to melancholy reflections on the situation and fate of Spain. You may conclude from what I have said, that I take for granted the defection of Ballesteros. A letter which I received a few days ago from one of my old friends at Alicante, puts the matter beyond a doubt. This once established, which will fall first, Mina or the government? Barcelona or Cadiz? If stores and ammunition, and means of defence of every kind were the criterion, Cadiz ought undoubtedly to hold out the longest. This town, as I have already said,

has provisions for six months, and the time approaches when the winds will prevent a strick blockade on the part of the French, and favor the introduction of fresh cargoes. With a little courage, activity, and vigilance, the Isla de Leon may easily be defended; but I repeat it, other circumstances are to be taken into consideration; and Cadiz, I fear, will be given up before the surrender of Barcelona; and then it would be folly to suppose that Mina could protract much longer his defence.

After all, it is but a question as to the priority of two events, which in my opinion must inevitably take place, unless England interfere. Will England interfere?—time alone will show. Ought she to interfere?—an enquiry into the probable result of the subjugation of Spain, and of a renewal of a family pact, will, perhaps, enable us to form an opinion.

This result must be considered as having a double effect;—first, as affecting the general political system of Europe and the *continental balance*;—secondly, as affecting the private commercial interests and relations of France and England.

I proceed to examine the political consequences. This requires that we should go back to the year 1815; and knowing as well as myself the real springs of the political engine, you must be aware of the necessity of placing, side by side, the new political æra, which began in 1815, and that which signalised the dawn of the 18th century. After the last treaty of Paris, Europe presented a new aspect, the scale of

the gradual forces of its chief possessors ; that distribution of power which the minor competitors to it have more or less willingly agreed to acknowledge, and which they have graced with the imposing name of *political balance* ; that scale was remodelled : I shall not stop to enquire whether this was the effect, or the cause of the pressure of the east upon the west, still less about the justice or injustice of the operation. The law of nations cannot be governed on the same principles by which the rights of individuals are protected ; because municipal laws, which prevent the infractions of individuals, do not exist for nations. The relative rights of nations are purely and simply those of man and man in a state of nature, before the framing of any social contract. This is not a bright picture but a true one ; it cannot be otherwise, because nations are governed by men whose few virtues are lost sight of amidst the glaring assemblage of their vices. To deny it is proof of weakness, or an attempt at imposition. But I refrain from saying more ; we both of us know what we are to believe on that subject.

The new division of Europe in 1815, was the effect of a violent political commotion, of a re-action of principles long compressed, which have compressed other principles in return, and consequently produced every where a corresponding resistance. In politics, as well as in mechanics, compression keeps up the elements of re-action, and concentrates them by the

very power which it exerts against them. The effect soon followed the cause, in the instance of which I am speaking, and re-actions took place in Spain and Italy. There can be no doubt but in Spain, where it first took place, it would soon have been compressed again, if the critical situation of the government, recently established in France, and the agitated state of Italy, had not prevented such a measure. But when Italy caught the infection, the holy alliance began to be alarmed, and ran to arms. Austria, as the most interested, and by *right of vicinity*, was commissioned to interfere. But what has been the result of this interference, and what is likely to be the result of every other interference of this kind? Austria has made a domain of Italy; for sound logic does not allow us to consider in any other light the protection which she has extended to her southern neighbour. France is playing the same game, and the reduction of Cadiz, and consequently of Spain, will also add a fine domain to her empire, for the family pact will follow, as a matter of course, and subject Spain entirely to her view. The separation of Brazil leaves Portugal to the mercy of the arbitrator of Spain, so that France will add the Iberian peninsula to her territory, just as Austria has added Italy and its dependencies to her's.

But let us cast our eyes on the treaties of 1814 and 1815, which are to regulate the increase of the respective proportions of the triumvirate of conti-

mental potentates. We shall perceive that Russia is without her contingent; is she to remain so? Direct your looks to the mouth of the Danube, and that of the Wolga, and you will soon be convinced that Russia is only watching for the opportunity of a third intervention, and her eagle will on the first signal take her flight to repose on the domes of the city of Constantine. The invasions of Italy and Spain will be an ample justification of this third interposition. Why should Russia be deprived of her share of the booty? It may therefore be expected whenever a favorable opportunity occurs. This no doubt will not suit England; but this is the age of political delusions; and it is not impossible that news may some day reach London that Constantinople is in the possession of Russia, before the movement of the Russian armies is known.

Such in my opinion is the influence which the subjugation of Spain must have over the political state of Europe; and the tolerable degree of accuracy with which I have foretold the events which have taken place since 1815, allows me to think that I am not very wide of the mark in my present calculation.

Let us now consider the results of the same event in a commercial point of view; they may, I think, easily be foreseen. Before the present war the prohibitory system adopted by the Spanish government could be nowise injurious to the commercial interests of Great Britain, as the possession of

Gibraltar made it altogether nugatory. The erroneous principles upon which it was established, and the severity with which the restrictions were enforced, encouraged and increased, as I have already mentioned, a system of smuggling of which Gibraltar was the depot. From that spot articles of British manufacture found their way into every part of the peninsula, without any risk to the manufacturer, as the Spanish smugglers, or those at Gibraltar, bought the goods on their own account.

The few articles of French manufacture which were thus introduced into Spain, were another source of profit to the inhabitants of Gibraltar, in whose magazines they were first deposited. It was therefore not without reason that the Spanish government was requested to make a free port of Cadiz. It is easy to guess that the request was denied at the instigation of the British merchants; but it is difficult to appreciate the ignorance of those who could overlook the incalculable benefit which Spain would derive from such a measure.

If France gets possession of Cadiz (which must happen if England remains neuter) this relative state of commercial interests will be completely altered. Cadiz will become the entrepot of French trade, for which purpose its situation is infinitely superior to that of Gibraltar. The harbour and roads of Cadiz will afford space and shelter to the largest fleets: while Gibraltar has but an indifferent anchorage, at

the bottom of a stormy bay, where the shipping is at all times badly sheltered from the easterly winds, and often endangered by gales from the west.

Cadiz and Ceuta are the real keys of the Straights by the shelter they at all times afford (the former especially) to the largest cruising fleets. The situation of Spain, the causes which occasioned its revolution and its counter-revolution, and the wretchedness which must be the inevitable consequence of the present war, will oblige the French army to occupy its territory for a considerable length of time. The French government is too much alive to its own interests to neglect the opportunity of making use of the Spanish ports, and the effects of Napoleon's continental system will be produced without any public declaration, or any political struggle. It remains to be seen whether Cadiz will remain entirely in the hands of the Spanish government, when France has withdrawn her troops.

France is so much interested in finding a mart for her trade, and the opportunity of spreading her navy over the Mediterranean, that she will hardly be guilty of such an oversight. There is therefore every reason to believe that England will henceforth be confined to Malta as an entrepot for her Levant trade.

But it is not in Europe alone that the effects of the catastrophe of Spain will be sensible; South America will inevitably feel the shock; and the very



same principles which have been advanced to justify the invasion of Spain, will be extended farther, and furnish plausible grounds for every measure necessary to benefit the commercial interests of France on the other side of the Atlantic, at the expense of Great Britain. Do not suppose, however, that I allude to the occupation of Cuba, which is talked of here ; the acquisition of that island is an affair of secondary importance ; neither do I imagine that the interference of France will manifest itself by a noisy expedition. The losses experienced by France when she attempted the conquest of San Domingo, are a lesson not to be forgotten. The French government will interfere in a safer way. South America will be once more placed under the sway of Ferdinand, or of a government established on the principles of the holy alliance, but gold and intrigue will once more do the work they have so effectually consummated in Spain. Perhaps, however, when the flame of civil war is once alive, when the cause of despotism begins to flourish, a rapid expedition may be attempted ; for be assured that at such a period of the crisis, a very few troops, and a very short time, will be sufficient to complete the business. Such an expedition may give the last blow to the South American trade of England, whether it be successful, or whether the United States are left to prevent it, for in that case their influence must necessarily preponderate.

Such are the reflections suggested to me by past and present events. I shall soon be a more tranquil

spectator of the scenes which will ensue, but I can hardly believe that my views will be altered. 'Ere long I think the event will shew whether I am right or wrong ; whether Great Britain ought or ought not to have interfered in the affairs of Spain before the fall of Cadiz.

## APPENDIX.

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No. I.—Page 23.

(TRANSLATION.)

THE interest which you take in the sacred cause of liberty, and the sacrifices by which you have proved it are such, that I lose no time in informing you that we are busily employed on the subject of the memorial which you had the kindness to transmit to my friends, Moreno de Guerra and Romero Alpuente, and which now lies before me. You will receive, by next post, an answer, which I trust you will deem satisfactory. In the mean time accept the assurance of the sincere esteem and cordial friendship with which we offer you our services. For my own part,

I remain

Your devoted humble servant,

F. DIAZ DE MORALES.

*Madrid, June 15, 1821.*

## No. II.—Page 38.

(TRANSLATION.)

I duly appreciate all that your excellency has been pleased to communicate in your letter of the 8th instant, relative to the situation of Europe, and especially of your own country; and I can but applaud your excellency's efforts to rescue your native land from its present distressing situation; but I am sorry to add, that it is not in my power to offer you the least assistance.

I should betray my duty, as a Spanish citizen, were I to meddle in affairs which might inflict on my beloved country the direst calamities.

I beg to assure your excellency, that I wish to see your country enjoying the highest state of prosperity, a country whose inhabitants deserve to hold the first rank amongst civilised nations.

I am, &c.

RAPHAEL DEL RIEGO.

*Saragossa, August 12, 1821.*

## No. III.—Page 43.

(TRANSLATION.)

Allow me to take the liberty of calling myself your friend, since the identity of your principles and of

our wishes unites us, before we have seen each other. The plans in favor of liberty, which occupy your attention, are already prepared, and probably more matured than you seem to suspect. But allow me to say, before I proceed, that it is absolutely necessary that you should observe the greatest secrecy. The society with which you have entered into relation, and which I know thoroughly, being one of its oldest members, will not feel interested in forwarding your designs; and though it may not be necessary that you should break off the connections you have established there, be assured that it is not through that channel that you can obtain your end. In order to obtain that end, you must, I repeat it, observe the profoundest secrecy, and endeavor to represent as unimportant the plans which you may have incautiously divulged. The watchfulness of the French government renders it important that we should not run any risk in trusting to those who arrive from France, as the loss of the co-operation of one individual is of infinitely less consequence than the danger we should incur by misplaced confidence. If in the town where you are residing you can see my colleague, Moreno de Guerra, or the patriot, Don Jose Maria del Regato, they will no doubt give you some news; if not, write to my colleague, Romero Alpuente, at Madrid. For the present confine your confidential communications to those persons who will be able to give

you positive information with which you will be pleased.

F. DIAZ DE MORALES.

Cordova, August 12, 1821.

No. IV.—Page 46.

(TRANSLATION.)

The confederation of the comuneros is the association of the comuneros in every part of Spain, proposing themselves for object to emulate the virtues of those heroes, who, like Padilla and Lanego, devoted their lives to the liberty of their country. They engage to maintain at any price the rights and liberties of the Spanish nation, established by the political constitution of the Spanish monarchy; and they adopt, as the basis of their principles, the third article of the constitution. The confederation is divided into *comunautés*. A *comunauté* is the assembly of the *comuneros* of a *merindad*. A *merindad* embraces the territory of a province of Spain according to its political division; and each *merindad* is subdivided into an indefinite number of *torres*. A *torre* is the meeting-place of the members of a section of the *comunauté*; a *torre* cannot be composed of more than fifty, nor of less than seven members. A military body constitutes a *torre*, whatever its number may be.

The rights and duties of every *comunero* are the same. His rights consist in being eligible to all the offices of the confederation, and under its special protection. His duties, in addition to those prescribed by his oath of initiation, oblige him to contribute to the expenses of the *torre* to which he belongs, unless he obtain legal exemption from the same. Each member is bound to investigate the causes of the misfortunes which may befall his country, either from the mismanagement of the administration, or the ignorance of the people; and he is to propose the means which he thinks best calculated to restore the national prosperity. No *comunero* is to make use of the influence of the confederation to obtain an appointment, but the confederation are to exert that influence in the promotion of its most deserving members. The misconduct of a *comunero* is subject to the code of the confederation.

The supreme government of the confederation is representative, and is confided to a supreme assembly, which is made up of deputies, one from each *merindad*. The functions of the supreme assembly are as follows:—first, to superintend the operations of the confederation;—second, to enforce the observance of the statutes and regulations of the code of the confederation;—third, to frame the *merindads*, and give to each its diploma;—fourth, to issue diplomas to the different *torres* and their members;—fifth, to transmit the resolutions of the assembly to the various *juntas* of administration, for the further

circulation and execution of the said resolutions;—sixth, to receive the funds, keep an account of them, report upon them, and regulate their application;—seventh, to change, if necessary, the rallying words, signs and countersigns;—eighth, to issue exemptions of payment.

The supreme assembly resides in the metropolis, unless compelled by danger to change its residence. No deliberation can take place unless two-thirds of its members are present. Its place of residence is called the *alcazar* of the confederation — The supreme assembly elects from its own members, a president, a vice-president, an *alcaïde*, a treasurer, and four secretaries. It is likewise to appoint a committee of justice, a committee of general superintendence, and a committee for the administration of its affairs. The president assigns to each secretary his peculiar task, appoints extraordinary committees, maintains order in the debates, regulates the march of the proceedings, opens and closes the ordinary sittings, and appoints extraordinary meetings as occasion may require. The *alcaïde* is the keeper of the *alcazar*; and the records of the assembly are under his care.

In the month of April every year, the supreme assembly draws up a statement of the different objects of public interest which have been discussed, and takes into consideration the progressive consolidation of the constitutional system and of the general prosperity.

Each *merindad* is governed by a junta, composed of a president, an *alcaïde*, a treasurer, and a secre-



tary. This junta resides in the chief town of the *merindad*; its meeting-place is called the castle of liberty.

The president of *merindad* has the same functions as the president of the supreme assembly; when he assists at a *torre* he takes the chair. The castle and its effects are under the special care of the *alcaïde*; he is also keeper of the seals, examines the accounts, and takes care that none but comuneros shall be present at the meetings. There is a committee of superintendence, and a committee of justice. In the month of February the junta transmits an account of its operations to the supreme assembly.

The *torres* are governed by an *alcaïde*, a keeper of the keys, a treasurer, and a secretary. Each has a committee of superintendence. The *alcaïde* is the president; the keeper of the keys prevents the intrusion of improper persons, or their admission into the society.

An assembly of comuneros, not less than three, nor less than seven in number, constitutes a *fort*. The *fort* is in correspondence with the nearest *torre*; it is governed by a keeper of the keys and a secretary.

A candidate wishing to become a member of the confederation, must be in full possession of all the rights of a citizen; he must be above nineteen; he must be a man of good moral principles, and of unblemished reputation; he must exercise a trade, or profession, or be possessed of an income sufficient

for his maintenance; he must have given proofs of his attachment to the constitutional monarchy, and of his abhorrence to tyranny in every shape; he must take the oath, and submit to the trials and formalities prescribed by the confederation.

Every *comunero* is entitled to present a candidate, but he must make strict inquiries to ascertain the opinions of the individual whom he presents, and obtain proofs of his attachment to the cause of liberty. When a candidate is proposed it must be by writing. If the candidate is unobjectionable, the proposition is transmitted to the committee of superintendence, who report upon it in the course of five days. The candidate being admitted by a majority of six-sevenths of the comuneros present, when he is balloted for, appears before the junta, where he must have a majority of two-thirds in his favor. He then returns to the *torre*.

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*The Oath of the Comuneros is as follows:—*

“ I swear before God, and on my honor, before  
 “ this assembly of Spanish comuneros, to uphold,  
 “ maintain, and defend at any price, and by all and  
 “ whatever means are in my power, either alone or  
 “ with other confederates, the rights and liberties of  
 “ the Spanish nation, and of each individual Spaniard,  
 “ such as they are established by the political con-  
 “ stitution of the realm; recognising as a funda-

“ mental and immutable principle, that the sove-  
 “ reignty resides essentially in the nation, and that  
 “ consequently the nation alone has a right to alter  
 “ the laws on which the present constitution is  
 “ founded, as it is literally expressed in the third  
 “ article. I also swear obedience to the statutes  
 “ and regulations of the confederation, and to the  
 “ orders emanating from the authorities of the said  
 “ confederation. I swear likewise to observe as  
 “ long as I live the most inviolable secrecy con-  
 “ cerning the affairs of the confederation. I swear,  
 “ moreover, to maintain an unalterable union and a  
 “ fraternal friendship with each and every one of  
 “ the confederates ; assisting them with my person  
 “ and my property in all their dangers and difficul-  
 “ ties, and submitting to a friendly arbitration the  
 “ complaints I might have to make against one  
 “ or several of them. Finally, I swear to maintain  
 “ and defend at any risk, what is herein above  
 “ expressed ; and like the illustrious Padilla and  
 “ Lanuzo, to die sword in hand, rather than submit  
 “ to tyranny. And if I fail in the accomplishment  
 “ of these solemn obligations, I declare myself to be  
 “ a perjured and treacherous member of the con-  
 “ federation, deserving to be ignominiously expelled  
 “ from it ; and I submit to all the other penalties to  
 “ which I may be sentenced.”

Every candidate on being admitted brings a  
 donation, which is not to be less than forty reals.  
 Each merindad pays five hundred reals for its

diploma, and each torre sixty. Each comunero pays four reals a month.

(Such are the statutes relating to the organization of the comuneros. As to the internal regulations, those concerning the administration, and the code of the society, it is not thought necessary to give them.)

No. V.—Page 71.

(TRANSLATION.)

MY VALUED FRIEND,

You have formed an erroneous opinion of the Spanish patriots—I am not led to say so from a ridiculous spirit of national vanity; the Spanish liberals are above such a prejudice; they belong to the great family of mankind, and are armed to defend its general rights. But allow me to say with the unreserve of friendship, and the liberty with which one honorable man should speak to another, that your good intentions have misguided you, by inducing you to place confidence in an individual who is not thoroughly known to you.\* You have forgotten my warning, and trusted to a splendid name. The good intentions of the patriots can be

\* Almodovar.

but imperfectly known to you at such a distance; the restoration of European liberty is, perhaps, nearer at hand than you suppose. I shall content myself for the present with asking you whether my letters are regularly delivered to you, and with assuring you that you may put my friendship to any trial: whatever interest or property I possess is at your disposal. Be assured, that I have your welfare at heart; and allow me to repeat that an excess of prudence can never do any harm.

Banish all care and anxiety; and if you think me worthy of your confidence, share it only with those who are undeniably friends of liberty, like those whom I had the honor of pointing out to you. Have you spoken to Torreno?

*Madrid, September 7, 1821.*

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No. VI.—Page 87.

## CIRCULAR OF THE MINISTER OF WAR.

War Office, First Division—Secretary's Department,  
Central Section.

Although the king reposes full confidence in the subordination and discipline of the regiment under your orders, as well as in its attachment to the happy system by which Spain is ruled; anxious,

however, to prevent the incalculable evils which under present circumstances would be entailed upon the nation by a spirit of discord and of disobedience to the government, whether caused by an intemperate zeal or erroneous opinions, his majesty has ordered me to require that you will increase your vigilance and your activity; in order that the troops under your command may keep within the bounds of subordination, and may pay *due respect to the authorities* whom his majesty has thought fit to appoint to your province; and you are made responsible for any act of disobedience in your regiment, and the disorders which may ensue. The above I transmit by order of the king for your information and guidance.

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No. VII.—Page 90.

## MESSAGE OF THE KING TO THE CORTES.

I have learnt, with the deepest sorrow, the events which have lately taken place at Cadiz, where under the pretence of attachment to the constitution, the rights with which it invests me have been trampled upon. I have ordered my ministers to lay before the cortes a report upon this unfortunate event, in the full confidence that they will cordially assist my government in preserving the integrity of the public liberties, and of the prerogatives of the crown, upon

which those liberties in a great measure repose. My wishes are identified with those of the cortes; like them I have at heart the observation and preservation of the constitutional system. But the cortes are aware, that the infractions of which the ministers might be guilty against the rights of the nation, are not more dangerous to the constitution than the excesses of those who infringe the rights which it confers on the throne. I hope that on this important occasion the cortes will give to Spain and to Europe a fresh proof of the wisdom by which they have hitherto been distinguished, and will profit of so favourable an opportunity to consolidate anew the constitution of the monarchy, of which the advantages cannot be felt, and must, 'ere long, be totally lost, if the evils with which we are threatened are not stifled in their birth.

(Signed)

FERDINAND.

*San Lorenzo, November 23, 1821.*

## REPLY OF THE CORTES.

SIRE,

The extraordinary cortes beg to assure your majesty, that they duly appreciate the new proof of confidence with which you have condescended to honor them by your message of the 23d instant, and in the mean time to express their grief at the events which have made it necessary. Your majesty has

formed a true estimate of the sentiments which animate the representatives of the nation. The cortes will always feel themselves bound to express their disapprobation of any act of insubordination, of any violation of public order, or of any outrage against the laws; they will at all times be ready to co-operate with all the powers conferred upon them by the constitution, in resisting the least encroachment upon the liberty of the nation, or the legitimate authority of your majesty; being convinced that the integrity of the prerogatives of each is essential to the constitution, and that the rights of the Spaniards can have no security if the privileges conferred upon the throne by the fundamental law, are once invalidated. The cortes therefore beg to renew to your majesty the expression of their unshaken loyalty to the throne, and of their devotedness to your august person; and they will immediately take into their serious consideration the message communicated to them by your majesty. They will endeavor to give to your majesty, and to the whole nation, a fresh proof that they are determined to omit nothing that may tend to consolidate the constitutional system, which is only compatible with the preservation of order and strict obedience to the laws.

(Signed) F. MARTINEZ DE LA ROSA,  
*President, &c.*

*Madrid, Nov. 26, 1821.*



No. VIII.—Page 126.

## TO GENERAL RIEGO.

I enclose copy of a letter, which I have just received from a friend in France. The subject of it deserves consideration. With the facts therein related you are perhaps already acquainted; I take it for granted that you are; but I beg of you to reflect on the consequences. Remember that you and your colleagues will have to answer for the fate of your country and of Europe. Like Fabius of old before the senate of Carthage, you carry in the fold of your robe liberty or slavery; but the choice is not in the hands of your enemies—it is in your own.

You have accepted a responsibility of which you know the extent. I shall never forget the last conversation we had together; but I return to the subject of my letter.

Can you still entertain any doubt respecting the intentions of your government, and of that of France? Are you not aware of the stipulations entered into by the allies at Paris in 1815, and since that at Aix-la-Chapelle, Carlsbad, and Laybach? You must be acquainted with them; and under this impression I entertain the greatest hopes. Do not suppose that I am merely guided by my private interests, or those of my native country: believe me your fate is so closely interwoven with that of the

patriots all over Europe, that their failure or their success must inevitably follow your own.

You have great difficulties to contend with, I am aware of it—but will general Riego hesitate to face them? Neither I nor Europe will believe it. I am not unmindful of the obstacles which may be opposed to you in a legal shape; but the cortes must be to Spain what the convention was to France; they must be the liberators of Europe, or they must act the pitiful part of the French chamber of deputies in 1815, and stifle with their hands European liberty. Do not suffer yourselves to be duped by the *legality* which is made use of to destroy you. You have in your hands a formidable weapon, and I have no doubt you will make a good use of it. Call for an account of the insurrections of Cadiz, Seville, Corunna, Catalonia, &c. and enquire into their *causes*. Make the abettors of them responsible for their misdeeds; insist upon the execution of the law which *limits* the nominations of the government, by fixing the qualifications of the nominees. Declare null and void every nomination which is not in exact conformity to the conditions prescribed by the law. Thus you will reach the council of state which you must reform, in order to cleanse the Augean stable. You have an unquestionable right to do all this; and if you had not, you should recollect that in a revolution might is right. Did the army of the Isla de Leon wait for a decree of the Castilian council to authorise its proceedings?

But do not forget that there is a new *convention of Pillnitz* set up against you. We opposed it with our bayonets; you may therefore put France, that is, thirty millions of individuals, between you and your enemies. Are you to be stopped by sophistry founded upon the law of nations, which is always interpreted as best suits the views of its expounders? Surely not; for the real law of nations is in your favor. You are aggrieved, and you are perfectly justified in a reprisal. Bear in mind that the Neapolitans might have triumphed if they had encouraged a revolution in Upper Italy. They were fearful of affording a pretext for the invasion of Austria, who did not wait for it. Their fall and their degradation are the just reward of their pusillanimity. What a field for reflection!

*February 12, 1822.*

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No. IX.—Page 115.

(TRANSLATION.)

MY DEAR SIR,

I have been for some days so much occupied, that I have not had time to answer fully your valued letter. I entirely subscribe to the ideas it contains, and my colleagues are of the same opinion.

Be not sparing of your good advice.

Adieu; and believe me, &c.

*Madrid, March 6, 1822.*

P. S. I am a member of the committees of responsibility and of national militia; and shall feel obliged by any suggestions of your's relative to those subjects.

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No. X.—Page 159.

(TRANSLATION.)

MY VALUED FRIEND,

I regret extremely that it is not in my power to write to you by every post, in order to request that you will not be sparing of your kind and valuable advice. My ideas perfectly coincide with those contained in your last letter, which I have mentioned to the president. He has confessed to me that he has not had time to pay to the scheme you propose all the attention which it deserves, but he says that his brother has highly recommended it to him. As yet we have not settled any plan for our conduct towards the government; all that I can tell you is, that out of a meeting of sixty-five deputies, sixty-four agreed that the ministers must be attacked. We are waiting the result of the labors of the committee, who are to report on the state of the nation; which even Riego allows is on the verge of a precipice. A confederation has suggested itself to me as a remedy, but till we can come to open acts of hostility, it should, I think, be kept as secret as possible; for

the present we are without a ministry; and although the majority of deputies are in favor of liberty, they do not all view things through the same medium, and there is generally a want of unanimity in their opinions. The object of this association would be to form one body of the comuneros and the freemasons, by lopping off from each society its useless or objectionable excrescences. Revolve this scheme in your own mind; be candid—and, if possible, write to me by every post. I wish you to enter into full particulars respecting the employment you hint at of the active militia; bearing in mind, however, that an article of the constitution invests the king with the privilege of appointing the civil and military functionaries. As to your hint respecting the propriety of confining the power of calling into action the armed force to the *municipal* authorities, I wish you to furnish me with the grounds upon which it could be proposed, so as to silence the objections of the *military* authorities. I duly appreciate your observations, and I give you my word that I shall act up to them, which will account for my troubling you.

I hope that as an old and experienced friend of liberty, you will give me every hint which you may think useful: I have nothing more at heart than to see my native country, and Europe, liberated from the yoke of despotism.

## No. XI.—Page 165.

(TRANSLATION.)

MY VALUED FRIEND,

I am very much pleased with your kind letter, and am anxious to find the opportunity of carrying into effect the suggestions contained in it, although I am well aware as well as you that we are treading on a volcano. The majority of the deputies are perverse, since they suppose that we wish to rehearse the tragedy of which Louis XVI. was the victim in France. We are, however, endeavoring as well as we can to get over this crisis. If we were to present the plan of the 2nd of May, we should literally be at daggers drawn ; such is the malignant feeling of the mock moderate party towards us.

The ex-minister Salvador, and with him an auditor, and a fiscal, have been made responsible for the issue of the trial of the colonel of the regiment of Sagonta.

*April 2, 1822.*

We (the deputies of the province of Valencia) and the special committee appointed to propose measures, have had a conference with the secretary at war ; but nothing has resulted from it.

*April 5, 1822.*

## No. XII.—Page 176.

(TRANSLATION.)

I am convinced that we are treading upon a dreadful volcano, but where it will burst, and how

its destructive effects are to be obviated, I am at a loss to surmise. The men who ought to be the chief actors in the revolutions appear to me to know least about it. The free-masons are leaning towards moderation, and the comuneros seem at first sight to be too exalted. I am determined, notwithstanding, to join the latter, and try whether something cannot be done for my unfortunate country. When I have put my plan into execution, I shall contrive to write to you with the same unreserve, and make use of your experience. What is going on in France hastens the march of our revolution, which though somewhat impeded in its course, by causes which are not unknown to you, will uniformly pursue its career.

I expect to see renewed some of the scenes which took place in the revolution of your own country ; it is naturally to be expected, since the same causes must produce the same effects.

Notwithstanding the moderation of those of whom we complain, they warmly support the really important reformatations, particularly the reformation of the clergy, which in itself is sufficient to produce a revolution, as any one at all acquainted with the Spanish character must be convinced. This revolution cannot be unfavorable to liberty, since the lower orders are averse to paying contributions, which as they know very well were not instituted by God ; and they are perfectly aware that the clergy was the chief support of despotism. As I have already

mentioned there are many grounds for apprehension, but the dawn of reason which begins to glimmer, gives hopes that the empire of liberty will be fixed upon a firm and lasting basis.

*May 16, 1822.*

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No. XIII.—Page 191.

(TRANSLATION.)

No measures could be better calculated to save Spain than those that you propose ; but we must recollect that the national congress has in its composition elements diametrically opposed to the principles upon which your plans are founded, and, according to my views the march of the government is far from promising. I am, therefore, every day more strongly convinced that we want a fresh revolution to give a new aspect to the revolution of 1820 ; indeed I know that several patriots hold meetings to decide on the best method of putting an end to the present crisis. It must be allowed, however, that we want a little of the French vivacity, and though our revolution partakes much of the character of that which took place in your own country, it also presents several anomalies.

Though no reliance can be placed upon the government, and little upon the present cortes, if an opportunity should occur favorable to the enlistment of the deserters, depend upon it I shall propose the



measure. In the mean time, I beg that you will not act upon this very remote hint.

I have shewn your letter to some of my colleagues, but as their relative situation with the ministry, and the cortes, is the same as my own, they will be able to render little or no service.

*June 18, 1822.*

No. XIV.—Page 233.

(TRANSLATION.)

MY DEAR FRIEND,

The late public events and domestic misfortunes have prevented my writing to you as early as I proposed. You must, I am sure, join me in lamenting that the liberals should have failed to secure the advantages which they might have reaped from their important victory of the 7th.

I shall give my earnest consideration to the memorial which you have had the kindness to transmit, and will do all that can safely be attempted. I have been for some days in confidential communication with some of the members of the supreme assembly of the confederation of the comuneros, respecting the propriety of extending it in its present shape to the other nations of Europe; not with the view of rendering the foreign comuneros subservient to those of Spain, but in order to establish a European confederation of comuneros, or of liberals,

who may assist each other in securing the liberty of this quarter of the globe. Several of those to whom I have spoken of this plan are disposed to enter into it, and I have gone so far as to propose a friend of mine as the mediator—that friend is yourself. But the public events have wholly occupied the attention of the cortes during the late sittings, at which, moreover, the nature of my private affairs has not allowed me to be present. I have, therefore, not been able to go further than I have stated, but I shall endeavor to make up for lost time. The statutes of the comuneros have been printed at full length; peruse them attentively, and see whether they contain any thing to prevent our scheme being carried into execution.

*July 18, 1823.*

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No. XV.—Page 302.

(TRANSLATION.)

MY DEAR FRIEND,

You must 'ere now be acquainted with the events which under present circumstances necessarily prevent my proposing any plan to the ministers. The session of the ordinary cortes is about to open, when the old proposal ought I think to be renewed, and I will do all in my power to promote its success.

In the course of one day, since the closing of the session, we have seen the ministry dissolved, and reinstated a few hours after. The former measure was so unpopular, that the crowd went about shouting, "*Death to the tyrant!* and a *Regency*" even the next day.

*Madrid, Feb. 21, 1823.*

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No. XVI.—Page 302.

(TRANSLATION.)

MY VALUED FRIEND,

The circumstances which have lately taken place, have prevented my answering your letter of the 11th, as speedily as I could have wished. But though our condition is rather becoming more desperate than improving, I will not defer any longer, for fear of retarding a measure which is called for by so many urgent motives.

You will learn by the public papers the events which Madrid has just witnessed, and which hold out but little encouragement to lay before the ministers plans which they are not destined to carry into effect. For in my opinion by holding longer the reins of the administration they would neither consult their own dignity, nor that of the king, nor indeed the interests of the nation. In order, however, to serve you and the cause of liberty, I am ready to take any steps you may think proper,

to make your proposals palatable to the ministers or the legislative body. You may, therefore, if you like, send me such proposals or representations as you think most suitable to the present circumstances, and I will forward them, and do my best to ensure their success.

*Madrid, Feb. 21, 1823.*

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No. XVII.—Page 330.

(TRANSLATION.)

TO DON MARTIN SERRANO.

MY VALUED FRIEND,

I enclose a letter or memorial for general Zarco del Valle, which I beg you will transmit to him. In our present desperate situation I have thought myself bound, as a man of honor and a patriot, to make this last effort. The same erroneous course is pursued; and if an unexpected turn of fortune does not come to our assistance, the consequences must be fatal. I explain myself.

The standard of Napoleon II. with the French national colors has been hoisted. The circumstance of a column of French troops having been allowed to leave Bilbao with the tri-colored banner unfurled, is a manifestation to all Europe that Spain sides with the French liberals, and is anxious to secure

her own liberty by assisting the triumph of liberty in France. This inference is precisely what I wished ; such a combination is calculated to insure the happiness of both nations, and is the first step to that alliance, which alone can secure the south of Europe from the encroachment of the north. You are perfectly aware of what I have done, and of the ground of my proceedings ; I refrain therefore from entering into farther particulars. What has taken place at Bilbao would give me the greatest pleasure, if it were the effect of a *positive* determination of the government, sanctioned by the cortes ; without the support of such a sanction, I can only consider this enterprise as a half measure exposed to all the turns of chance : I hope, (perhaps, because my wishes make me sanguine) that the attempt of the column at Tolosa will produce the commotion necessary to turn the arms of our enemies against themselves. But have reasonable precautions been taken to support, in case of need, this adventurous enterprise ?

There may be about two hundred men at Tolosa, and as many in Catalonia ; surely this is sufficient to shew the risk which must necessarily attend detached operations, which may be contradictory, and at all events cannot present that happy combination, that unity of plan, which is so essential to ensure success ; I repeat it, all is left to chance.

The government slighted the systematical plans proposed by me at different times, with probability

of success; and now the gauntlet of defiance has been thrown down, and the measures necessary to support the challenge have not been adopted. The propriety by which my plans were characterised has been lost sight of, while their limits have been exceeded. It would be a gross delusion to imagine that Europe will not consider that the French banner has been raised with the sanction of Spain. You will not, I am sure, think of denying it. The Spanish government is therefore in the toils, and there is but one way of shaking them off. What Spain has done is in conformity to the wishes of both nations; both of them consider a change of system in the French government, as the only means of putting an end to a crisis more to be dreaded on account of its length than of its violence. To disown such an act, would be an unpardonable and fatal weakness. Its immediate consequence would be to turn against the Spanish government the tide of public opinion, to dishearten its well wishers, and to curtail the means of defence:—to leave the enterprise entirely to chance, would, in case of a failure, have the same result. There is, therefore, I repeat it, but one resource left, namely, that of offering immediate support to this bold undertaking, of concentrating its forces, and giving it all the means of action which a daring and trust-worthy chief may desire. Indecision is the most fatal error of any government; a real statesman either acts decisively, or not at all; there is no medium.

You will, I am sure, my honored friend, excuse this rather severe expression of my sentiments; amidst the dangers by which we are surrounded, the soothing voice of flattery would be pitiful; and you are worthy by your patriotism of hearing the plain truth.

Communicate this letter to Beltran de Lis, and your other friends.

*April 1, 1823.*

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No. XVIII.—Page 336.

*Decree for the formation of Foreign Legions.*

**DON FERDINAND VII. &c.**

The cortes, in virtue of the prerogative conferred upon them by the constitution, have decreed as follows:—

I. The government is authorised to raise foreign corps.

II. These corps are to be composed of the foreigners now in Spain, or who may hereafter present themselves to defend the cause of liberty.

III. In each active army a committee, consisting of three foreigners, will be appointed by the commander in chief. Their sentiments must be unequivocally known, and such as to qualify them to decide as far as possible on the sincerity of such other foreigners as may wish to enlist.

IV. The foreign field officers, officers, and sergeants, must prove the rank which they held in the army of their nation, in order that when the foreign corps are formed, they may be incorporated according to the said rank and other circumstances. Before they are incorporated, they are to receive one-third of the pay assigned to the rank which they can prove that they held.

V. The companies, squadrons, and battalions, are to be on the same footing, and of the same strength as in the Spanish army.

VI. Two-thirds of the first company must be completed before the formation of a second is proceeded to ; two-thirds of the second before the formation of the third ; and so on, till the number is sufficient to form a battalion.

VII. The promotions are to take place as in the Spanish army.

VIII. In each army these corps are to be called the *Liberal Foreign Legion*.

*Seville, 30th April, 1823.*

MANUEL FLORES CALDERON,  
*President.*

*Sanctioned 3d May, 1823.*

(Countersigned)  
DON PEDRO DE LA BARCENA.



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
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